Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese prosecutors indicted a former Taiwanese marine in December 2025 on charges of spying for the PRC. PRC espionage operations target members of Taiwan’s military as a form of psychological warfare to weaken the Taiwanese public’s trust in the military and to steal sensitive defense information. The former Taiwanese marine petty officer second class, surnamed Chen, allegedly first met his PRC handler online in January 2025.[23] Chen’s PRC handler then paid him around 6300 US dollars to film himself holding the PRC national flag, declaring that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, and pledging allegiance to the PRC while on active duty, according to Taiwanese prosecutors.[24] Taiwanese prosecutors allege Chen then sent sensitive military documents and information on Taiwanese weapons systems, amphibious assault vehicles, drones, and the annual Han Kuang military exercise to his PRC handler.[25] Taiwanese prosecutors said Chen also alerted his PRC handler to an unannounced visit by President William Lai Ching-te to the Zuoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung in July, receiving around 300 US dollars.[26] Taiwanese authorities arrested Chen in August.[27] He was discharged from the Taiwanese military in November and formally indicted for espionage under Taiwan’s National Security Act and the Anti-Corruption Act in December.[28]

PRC intelligence agencies have previously recruited members of Taiwan’s military to sign documents or film themselves pledging allegiance to the PRC or promising to support the PLA in the event of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.[29] These videos are intended to weaken the Taiwanese public’s confidence in its military’s ability and willingness to protect them from a PRC invasion, and the videos and written pledges can also be used by PRC handlers to blackmail the Taiwanese military members into committing further espionage for the PRC.

PRC intelligence agencies have also previously enticed or blackmailed Taiwanese military officers to share information about Taiwanese political leaders’ movements and security details. Taiwanese authorities sentenced three servicemen from the 211th Military Police battalion, which guards Taiwan’s Presidential Office, for sending sensitive documents to a PRC handler in March.[30] Taiwanese officials also sentenced four former DPP staffers for spying on Taiwanese government officials for the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in September.[31] The staffers sent sensitive information on then-Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and then-Vice President Lai Ching-te to a PRC handler.[32]

The PRC espionage operations, even when exposed by Taiwanese authorities, undermine the Taiwanese government’s authority and the Taiwanese public’s sense of security. Poll data from Taiwanese government-funded defense think tank the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) showed that the percentage of Taiwanese people surveyed who expressed “strong confidence” in Taiwan’s military fell from 20 percent in September 2024 to 14 percent in March 2025.[33] The percentage of respondents expressing “no confidence” rose from 25 percent to 30 percent.[34] The INDSR report cited recent espionage cases within Taiwan’s military as one reason for the Taiwanese public’s concern over Taiwan’s military readiness.[35] 

Taiwan enacted new policies to increase vessel transparency and protect undersea cables in its waters. These policies aim to deter coercive maritime behavior by the PRC near Taiwan. The seven amendments, passed in 2025, took effect on January 7. The amendments stipulate a fine of 10 million New Taiwan dollars (NTD) for turning off automatic identification systems (AIS) or concealing vessel identities, as well as fines ranging from 2 million to 100 million NTD for damaging undersea cables and other infrastructure.[36] Other amendments increase Taiwan’s control over its ports, allowing Coast Guard Administration (CGA) escort and the confiscation of vessels that improperly disclose hull markings, AIS, and navigation logs. The Taiwanese Maritime and Port Bureau may confiscate vessels that fail to follow orders to depart Taiwan’s ports within three months if their presence is disrupting the port’s function.[37]These new measures will likely improve Taiwan’s defenses against coercive or concealed behavior by PRC vessels. Taiwan’s reliance on subsea internet cables leaves it vulnerable to sabotage by PRC vessels, which can sever the cables and disrupt Taiwan’s internet. PRC-affiliated ships cut cables between Matsu and Taiwan in 2023, and between Penghu and Taiwan in 2025, illustrating the particular vulnerability of cables connecting Taiwan to its outlying islands.[38] PRC ships operating around Taiwan often turn off or “spoof” their AIS to obscure their true location or project a false identity. This allows these vessels to operate undetected or obfuscate Taiwan’s information environment while the PRC retains deniability. Such behavior frequently occurs near the outlying islands of Kinmen or Pratas. The PRC may be using these efforts to lay the groundwork for further incursions and erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty, including by the China Coast Guard or seemingly civilian vessels. The newly enacted amendments follow additional policies Taiwan has implemented to shore up its maritime security, including more frequent patrols near a critical submarine cable.[39]

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released its annual report on PRC cognitive warfare efforts against Taiwan on January 11. The 2025 report revealed a significant increase in the scale and capabilities of PRC cognitive warfare efforts directed at Taiwan compared to its 2024 findings.

The NSB’s 2025 report noted that PRC disinformation operations seek to advance PRC objectives in Taiwan and globally. PRC cognitive warfare targeting Taiwan seeks to divide the Taiwanese populace and undermine public confidence in the Taiwanese government. PRC cognitive warfare directed at global audiences seeks to win support for the one-China principle and deter outside intervention in a Taiwan contingency.[40] The NSB report noted that the PRC conducted disinformation efforts in over 20 languages targeting foreign audiences.[41]

The 2025 report also discussed enhanced PRC capabilities leveraging artificial intelligence (AI). The PRC leverages AI-generated videos to blur the line between real and fake content.[42] The report noted that as part of the PRC’s civil-military fusion efforts, the PRC has recruited PRC-based AI companies to assist in the efforts.[43] The NSB report stated that PRC companies acquired recordings from Taiwanese people to make AI videos that speak Mandarin with a Taiwanese accent or indigenous languages like Hakka or Hokkien in order to make the videos more convincing for Taiwanese audiences.[44]

The LY has discussed measures to counter disinformation campaigns, but such legislation has not yet been passed.[45] PRC cognitive warfare efforts, particularly the use of AI-generated videos, could present a significant problem for Taiwan in its upcoming elections.

The Internal Administration Committee of the LY began deliberations on January 12 for DPP-proposed amendments to the Anti-Infiltration Act, which aims to limit the influence of foreign hostile forces on Taiwan’s political and democratic process. The Anti-Infiltration Act prohibits individuals and organizations sponsored by foreign hostile forces from providing political contributions, campaigning for political candidates, engaging in lobbying activities, disrupting public order and obstructing assemblies by force, and interfering in elections. The proposed amendments include imposing a one-year minimum sentence on those charged under the Act, expanding the Act’s coverage to ban individuals intending to run for public office from taking funding or directions from foreign agents, establishing national security courts, regulating internet service providers that set up databases in Taiwan, and addressing the dissemination of disinformation.[46] The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the NSB stated that the amendments are necessary amid PRC grey zone harassment and political interference in Taiwan.[47] Taiwanese government data shows that only five out of the 127 people indicted under the Anti-Infiltration Act were convicted since the Act was passed in 2020, however.[48] Deputy Minister of the MAC Liang Wen-chieh attributed the low conviction rate to the Act’s limited scope and light punishments and difficulties for prosecutors to establish proof that violations of the law occurred.[49]

Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian criticized the Anti-Infiltration Act as an “evil law” used by the DPP to suppress political opposition and terrorize the Taiwanese public.[50] The PRC is likely concerned that the amendments will obstruct its ability to influence Taiwanese elections, including the local elections scheduled for November 28, 2026.

China

The PRC hacked the communications of US congressional committee staffers in a “Salt Typhoon” incident similar to previous attacks. Cyberattacks offer low-cost means of undermining US infrastructure and national security. Financial Times reported on January 8 that PRC intelligence “accessed email systems used by some staffers on the House China committee in addition to aides on the foreign affairs committee, intelligence committee and armed services committee” in an incident detected in December 2025.[51] Both the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and PRC embassy in the United States denied the Salt Typhoon accusations.[52]

PRC cyber threat actors known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have been observed across the United States, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia.[53] Cyberattacks such as Salt Typhoon, which is linked with the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS), serve a strategic purpose for the PRC.[54] Salt Typhoon gained public attention in 2024, when it attacked US-based internet service providers. ISW-CDOT reported that access to the digital infrastructure of internet service providers and telecom companies would position PRC-based threat actors to steal sensitive data and potentially affect the flow of internet traffic.[55]