Toplines
Taiwan’s Executive Yuan proposed a supplementary budget aimed at accelerating the development and procurement project timelines within Taiwan’s domestic defense industry. The supplementary budget would allocate an additional $145.7 billion New Taiwan Dollars (NTD), or roughly $4.6 billion USD, beyond the existing allocations within the 2026 Central Government General Budget.[1] Specific allocations include $55.9 billion NTD ($1.77 billion USD) for uncrewed systems, $13 billion NTD ($411 million USD) for seven national defense programs including the Chiang Kung missile, $7.3 billion NTD ($231 million USD) to replenish critically low ammunition stocks, and $64.5 billion NTD ($2.0 billion USD) for two classified projects.[2] Director of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) Strategic Planning Department Huang Wen-chi stated that many of the items excluded from the original special defense budget passed on May 8 are included in this supplementary budget proposal.[3] These items include 600+ surveillance and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 40,000+ attack UAVs, and 100+ small suicide drone boats.[4]
This supplementary budget bill would provide immediate funding for Taiwan’s domestic defense industry. The special defense budget, which was passed in May 2026, included $780 billion NTD ($24.67 billion USD) in defense spending after significant debate within the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan (LY). The final version of the special defense budget omitted funding for domestic or Taiwan-US joint arms development entirely due to cuts by the opposition coalition in the LY.[5] The KMT-proposed drone budget, which was signed into law on September 10, is a six-year budget plan aimed at procuring and developing unmanned systems.[6]
The supplementary budget bill would allow Taiwanese domestic drone manufacturers to begin scaling production sooner than the LY’s unmanned systems budget and would fund Taiwanese domestic defense production programs that were left out in the final version of the special defense budget. The supplementary defense budget is part of a larger bill totaling $607.6 billion NTD, or $19.1 billion USD, of which the largest share will help fund the government-run oil supplier CPC Corporation amidst rising energy costs.[7] The bill will now be sent to the LY for review.
Taiwan is likely improving its ability to retaliate against the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) precision strikes. Taiwan could use this capability to deter PRC aggression or strike critical centers of gravity in a cross-Strait invasion. Taiwanese media reported on September 3 that Taiwan’s 2027 defense budget revealed the existence of a long-range cruise missile that could target significant portions of the PRC.[8] The cruise missile, called the Ching Tien I, has a maximum reported range of 1,500 km and can reach speeds of Mach 3.[9] Taiwan’s 2027 defense budget revealed that the Ching Tien I entered service within the Taiwanese military and is in serial production.[10] Taipei Times reported that the Ching Tien I can only be fired from fixed installations, making them vulnerable to a first strike.[11] The 2027 budget also revealed the existence of the Ching Tien II program to improve upon the first variant’s capabilities. The upgraded cruise missile will have a range of 2,000 km, reach speeds of Mach 5, and can be fired from road-mobile launchers.[12] The Taiwanese military has not yet reported when the Ching Tien II will enter service, however.
The Ching Tien series of missiles will likely enhance Taiwan’s ability to credibly retaliate against PRC precision strikes on critical infrastructure or decision-making centers. The Ching Tien II’s range allows it to strike Beijing, which could help deter future PRC decapitation strikes against Taiwan.
Long-range cruise missiles could also allow Taiwan to pursue a base denial campaign during a wartime contingency and significantly limit People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operations around Taiwan. Both the Ching Tien I and II can target air, naval, and long-range missile bases throughout the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC), which has primary responsibility for Taiwan operations.[13] Degrading or outright destroying major basing infrastructure around Taiwan could severely limit the PLA’s operational tempo during a Taiwan contingency, limiting the effects of the PLA’s numerical advantage. Iran has conducted an effective base denial campaign with long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones during its war with the United States and Israel to offset US and allied advantages in air and naval technology, which may serve as an example for Taiwan in a future Taiwan contingency.[14]
PRC China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels continued their pattern of conducting month-long “law enforcement” patrols in the waters east of Taiwan in August and early September. The PRC is likely normalizing a permanent maritime presence east of Taiwan to bolster its jurisdictional claims over Taiwan and the surrounding waters. Teams of two CCG ships have conducted roughly month-long “law enforcement patrols” in the waters east of Taiwan since June 1.[15] Data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence showed that a new pair of CCG ships has arrived to relieve the previous patrolling pair on July 4, August 4, and September 4.[16]
Starboard Maritime Intelligence data also showed that at least one of the CCG ships escorted PRC research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 on its survey mission in the waters east of Taiwan from August 10 through August 31. The PRC Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) stated the Xiang Yang Hong 03 gathered seabed geological and topographical information about the waters east of Taiwan to support “natural resource management and the development of a ‘one map’ system for territorial spatial planning” and “provide a scientific basis for China’s comprehensive management of the waters under its jurisdiction in the region.”[17] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times reported that Zhao Bi, a senior engineer at the Hubei Institute of Geosciences, stated that the Xiang Yang Hong 03’s survey also had “certain diplomatic and military significance.”[18] Jason Wang, COO of Taiwanese geospatial firm ingeniSPACE, stated that the PRC survey aimed to collect “hydrographic data of the Ryukyu Trench and East Taiwan Trench to conduct anti-submarine warfare and deny US and other allied vessels from doing the same.”[19] Taiwanese news outlets cited Wang and an unnamed senior Coast Guard Administration (CGA) official stating that a Chinese maritime militia (CMM) ship joined at least one CCG ship to escort the Xiang Yang Hong 03.[20] Wang stated that this is the first time a PRC maritime militia vessel has escorted a PRC research vessel in Taiwanese waters.[21] ISW-CDOT was unable to independently verify the PRC maritime militia ship’s presence through Starboard.
The continued CCG deployments east of Taiwan support ISW-CDOT’s assessment that the PRC is likely normalizing a permanent PRC maritime presence there to bolster the PRC’s claims to hold jurisdiction over Taiwan and its surrounding waters.[22] The PRC will be able to more easily launch a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan on short notice by maintaining a CCG presence east of Taiwan supported by CMM ships, particularly if passing ships recognize and comply with PRC “law enforcement” in the area.[23] PRC research vessels collecting detailed oceanographic data in the area may also support the development of the PLA’s undersea warfare capabilities, such as the ability to effectively conduct submarine and anti-submarine warfare in the area while denying the United States and its allies and partners the ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in a conflict.[24]
Key Takeaways
- Taiwanese Defense Budgets: Taiwan’s Executive Yuan proposed a supplementary budget that would allocate an additional $145.7 billion NTD (roughly $4.6 billion USD) for the development and procurement of unmanned systems. This supplementary budget would provide immediate funding for Taiwan’s domestic defense industry and include funding for multiple line items excluded from the original special defense budget passed on May 8.
- Taiwanese Military Modernization: Taiwan’s 2027 defense budget revealed the existence of a long-range cruise missile, the Ching Tien I, that could target significant portions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan is likely seeking to improve its ability to retaliate against PRC precision strikes and strike PRC centers of gravity in a cross-Strait invasion.
- China Coast Guard Activity: China Coast Guard vessels continued to conduct month-long “law enforcement” patrols east of Taiwan in August and early September. The PRC is likely seeking to normalize the maintenance of a permanent maritime presence east of Taiwan to strengthen its territorial claims over Taiwan and the surrounding waters.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The Taiwanese MND released a report on August 31 that stated that PLA’s recent military exercises around Taiwan have increasingly concentrated on joint blockade, quarantine, and joint landing operations. The joint blockade operation preparation reportedly included severing Taiwan’s external transportation routes, organizing an encirclement exercise, and developing conditions favorable to an attack.[25] The MND report further assessed that the PLA currently lacks sufficient amphibious landing capabilities to carry out an amphibious invasion of Taiwan but is seeking to improve these capabilities. The MND also reported that the PLA is prioritizing cyberwarfare as a critical component of modern warfare, which aligns with previous ISW-CDOT analysis that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping envisions IT systems-level operations as the primary form of future warfare.[26] The MND report hypothesized that the PLA’s main modus operandi regarding cyberwarfare consists of peacetime infiltration and wartime disruption. ISW-CDOT has previously reported on PRC disruption and sabotage of Taiwanese telecommunications during peacetime, however.[27]
The MND report’s findings on the PLA’s blockade and landing operation preparation could suggest that the PLA is increasingly enhancing its military capabilities that would be used in a campaign against Taiwan.[28] The MND report suggests that these preparations appear to be undisturbed by the large-scale purges of the PLA’s chain of command.[29] Further evidence of PLA readiness efforts and modernization includes reports of replicas of Taiwanese presidential and key government buildings used by the PLA for ground invasion and decapitation exercises and the PRC’s forthcoming October 1 National Defense Mobilization Law, which would authorize the PRC to appropriate civilian assets for military purposes during national security crises — this would be critical for the PRC in a Taiwan contingency.[30]
PRC agents likely spied on and photographed Taiwanese delegates at the 2026 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) summit in Palau. PRC agents often attempt to intimidate Taiwanese delegates during overseas visits to disrupt Taiwan’s international relations. The Taiwan International Youth Ambassadors Association stated that unidentified individuals, which the Association suspects were PRC agents, repeatedly photographed and videoed attendees of the Pacific Prosperity Exhibit’s “Taiwan Night” event on September 1.[31] Taiwan and Palau jointly hosted “Taiwan Night” during the PIF leaders’ summit.[32] Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung stated on September 4 that his delegation also witnessed plainclothes PRC agents and PRC security personnel at the PIF venues that the Taiwanese delegation attended.[33]
Taiwan is not a member of the PIF but has participated as a “development partner” since 1993 and typically holds events on the sidelines of the PIF.[34] The PRC is a nonmember “dialogue partner” with the PIF and maintains that Taiwan’s participation in the PIF is illegitimate.[35] The PRC threatened that there would be “consequences” for Taiwan’s participation in the 2026 PIF summit.[36]
PRC agents likely openly photograph and follow Taiwanese delegations and pro-Taiwan figures overseas as a form of intimidation to disrupt Taiwan’s international engagement.[37] The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stated that two uninvited PRC diplomats photographed attendees at a Taiwan National Day celebration in Fiji in 2022 and physically attacked the Taiwanese diplomats present, hospitalizing one.[38] A PRC agent photographed demonstrators during then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to California in 2023 and sent the photos and real-time updates on Tsai’s location to a PRC consular official.[39] PRC agents also tailed Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim during her visit to Czechia in March 2024 and reportedly planned (but did not carry out) a staged car accident targeting Hsiao during her visit, according to Czech military intelligence officials.[40]
China
The PLA and US military held their first theater commander-level meeting since 2024. US-PRC military diplomacy has been hampered by worsening relations and the widespread purges of PLA senior commanders. PLA ETC Commander Yang Zhibin met with US Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander Samuel Paparo for the first time on August 31 on the sidelines of the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in Vancouver, Canada.[41] A US readout stated that Yang and Paparo discussed maintaining open lines of communication to reduce the risk of miscalculation and promote safe conduct between forces.[42] A PRC defense ministry spokesperson mentioned Yang’s attendance at the conference but did not specifically mention Yang’s meeting with Paparo.[43]
The PRC has, on occasion, used high-level military exchanges as a bargaining chip in US-PRC relations rather than purely as a risk-management mechanism. The frequency of US-PRC military exchanges has, therefore, typically depended on the state of US-PRC relations. The PRC suspended high-level military exchanges with the United States in August 2022 after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and resumed them in late 2023.[44] High-level PLA purges have also likely contributed to the lack of high-level US-PRC military communications. Yang replaced Lin Xiangyang as ETC Commander in late 2025, after the CCP purged Lin from its ranks in October 2025.[45] Neither Paparo nor his predecessor met with Lin during Lin’s tenure, despite repeated US requests for dialogue.[46] Paparo’s last theater command-level meeting with the PLA was with PLA Southern Theater Commander Wu Yanan at the 2024 Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference. Wu has been missing from public view since late 2025, possibly due to the ongoing purge campaign.[47]
Northeast Asia
Japan
The PRC is restricting Japanese imports of a material used in semiconductor manufacturing as part of its ongoing economic coercion campaign following Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s November 2025 remarks suggesting Japanese military involvement should Taiwan be attacked. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced on September 7 that Japanese exporters of dichlorosilane (DCS), a material used in semiconductor manufacturing, must pay cash deposits at customs.[48] Denal Silane Co., Ltd. will pay an 80.2 percent anti-dumping duty rate, Shin-Etsu Chemical will pay a 99.2 percent rate, and all other Japanese companies must also pay a 99.2 percent rate.[49] This is a provisional measure that MOFCOM reported as being part of an anti-dumping investigation set to conclude before January 7, 2027, with a possible extension of six months.[50]
Japan is the leading producer of ultrapure DCS, which is used in semiconductor logic and memory chips.[51] PRC chip manufacturers must either pay significantly more for Japanese DCS or switch to inferior alternatives. South Korea became the PRC’s biggest DCS supplier in 2025, according to customs data, reflecting a shift from the PRC’s historical reliance on Japan.[52] Switching DCS suppliers is a costly and risky process for manufacturers, as yield and quality are very sensitive to any changes in production conditions.[53] MOFCOM’s ruling will financially incentivize PRC manufacturers to seek alternative DCS suppliers, reflecting the PRC’s willingness to retaliate against Japan, even at its own expense. This effort also supports the PRC’s “fortress economy” strategy. This strategy is focused on bolstering PRC national self-sufficiency. The company that filed for the anti-dumping investigation, Tangshan Sunfar Silicon Industries, Co., Ltd., was the largest DCS producer outside of Japan in 2023, according to QYResearch.[54]
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara Minoru protested the decision and stated that Tokyo will “respond appropriately” to prevent unfair harm to Japanese companies.[55] The anti-dumping probe comes amid increasingly tense PRC-Japan relations. The PRC announced the probe one day after banning the export of dual-use items to Japan in January 2026. This provisional measure follows a series of targeted PRC economic measures against Japanese firms, likely intended to coerce Takaichi to retract her statement.
[56]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PLA drove away Philippine non-military planes around Scarborough Shoal while conducting a joint exercise. The PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) announced live-fire joint air-naval drills around Scarborough Shoal on September 2.[57] Scarborough Shoal is an uninhabited atoll in the South China Sea that the PRC seized from the Philippines in 2012. The STC stated that it has strengthened air and naval patrols around Scarborough Shoal since August to enhance its control around the shoal and respond to “various acts of infringement and provocation.”[58] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times said the exercise was partly in response to an “incursion” by three Philippine turboprop airplanes that conducted a maritime domain awareness (MDA) flight on August 21.[59] The STC released footage showing JL-10 advanced trainer jets carrying live PL-5 homing missiles during the exercise, along with a Type 052C destroyer, Type 054A frigate, Type 071 amphibious transport dock, H-6K bomber, and J-16 heavy multirole fighter.[60] This is the first time the PLA has disclosed that it used a trainer aircraft to lead a joint air-sea drill. The PLA likely adjusted its response to new Philippine tactics. Commentators in PRC state media noted that the JL-10 “excels at [the] low-altitude, low-speed operations” necessary to intercept slow turboprop aircraft, which fly well below the minimum controllable speed of most modern fighter jets.[61]
The PLA used three JL-10s to intercept three Philippine turboprop planes conducting an MDA flight on the same day as the drill.[62] The STC released footage showing a JL-10 armed with live missiles locking onto a Philippine plane and warning it away.[63] A Philippine military spokesperson condemned the interceptions as “coercive and aggressive.”[64] Taiwan’s foreign ministry also issued a condemnation of the PLA’s “unsafe, irresponsible, and highly provocative actions.”[65] Taiwan’s statement notably characterized the Philippine flight as a “normal activity of another country’s aircraft,” even though Taiwan also claims Scarborough Shoal.[66] Taiwan, on occasion, criticizes the PRC for aggressive actions against the Philippines, likely because Taiwan wants to maintain good relations with the Philippines.[67]
The PRC is increasingly militarizing Scarborough Shoal to deny access to foreign planes and vessels and possibly using the shoal to support its own maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea. PRC research vessel Haiyang Dizhi 10 operated very close to Scarborough Shoal from August 10 to September 7, according to ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The ship sailed in a grid-like pattern consistent with seabed mapping and conducted other unknown undersea survey activities. The ship’s activities may relate to the PRC’s August 18 establishment of a new marine environmental observation station for the “Zhongsha Islands,” the PRC’s name for Scarborough Shoal and several underwater features.[68] The PRC has never built permanent structures on Scarborough Shoal but likely sees it as an important location for its overall control and surveillance of the South China Sea.
The PLA also fired flares at a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) aircraft conducting an MDA flight on September 7 over the PRC base on Subi Reef.[69] The Philippines claims Subi Reef as part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Spratly Islands. A PCG spokesperson condemned the PRC for endangering flight safety by firing the flares.[70] PLA aircraft or ground installations previously fired flares at Philippine aircraft near disputed features on several occasions in 2024.[71]
Oceania
The PRC is framing Taiwanese financial assistance to Pacific countries as “dollar diplomacy” to discredit Taiwan’s regional role and credibility as a partner, even as Beijing continues to use large-scale aid and infrastructure pledges to secure influence across Oceania.[72] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning cited Taiwan’s increased aid to Palau prior to the PIF, an increase of $18 million in 2025 to $25 million in 2026, and alleged that Taiwan had provided grant money directly to Palauan political figures.[73] Palau invited Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung to attend the 2026 PIF opening ceremony and related side events, despite Beijing’s objections that Taiwan was “not qualified” to participate.[74] The PRC itself has repeatedly leveraged aid, investment, and likely illegal political donations to buy influence in Oceania, however.[75] PRC officials promised $500 million in aid to the Solomon Islands if it switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019.[76] The PRC has also coerced Taiwan’s former diplomatic allies Kiribati and Naoero to switch their diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Palau, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands are the only Pacific Island states that recognize Taiwan at present.[77]
The PRC’s regional influence campaign is competing with a collective $1.3 billion in Western and Taiwanese financial commitments to the region in 2026, as well as new Western security agreements with regional states.[78] Some Pacific Island states have accepted commitments from both the PRC and Western states to avoid outright alignment with one side. The Solomon Islands, under its new Western-friendly prime minister Matthew Wale, is deepening security ties with Australia and permitting US Coast Guard patrols in its territorial waters while maintaining a 2022 security pact with the PRC.[79] Papua New Guinea similarly signed a defense treaty with Australia in 2025 but also closed its Taiwanese trade office in July 2026 to align with its One-China policy.[80]
The PRC could be leveraging its influence in Solomon Islands politics to target Prime Minister Wale specifically due to his Western-friendly turn. A surprise no-confidence motion forced Wale to leave the 2026 PIF in Palau hours after arriving. Analysts and regional officials speculated that the PRC may have pressured the Solomon Islands’ government to issue the motion, though ISW-CDOT has not seen direct proof of interference.[81] Wale’s more PRC-friendly predecessors sought to exclude Taiwan from the PIF in 2024 and 2025. The PRC’s strategic objective is likely to keep Oceania inhospitable to Taiwanese engagement while leveraging financial relationships to influence politicians to favor PRC interests, including granting the PRC resource rights and port access, while avoiding defense cooperation with the PRC’s rivals.
[1] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202609030213.aspx
[2] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/03/2003863634; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-proposes-extra-46-billion-defence-spending-this-year-2026-09-03/ ; https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202609030184.aspx
[3] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202609030184.aspx
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-proposes-extra-46-billion-defence-spending-this-year-2026-09-03/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-may-22-2026/
[6] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/11/2003864105
[7] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20260903002705-260407?chdtv; https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609030018
[8] https://def.ltn.com dot tw/article/breakingnews/5561463?fbclid=IwY2xjawUF8YdwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMUNwcnYyY0doY003ZmNLdjFzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeazCx9oXAGoEnAr0m0yUd3MH1OAjF27rDikdKE5m4ZjKfaizYyZPIL9Oje9I_aem_pF5Uu9f9PeCXLO8grX9dlg
[9] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2026/09/05/2003863713
[10] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6433320
[11] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2026/09/05/2003863713
[12] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2026/09/05/2003863713
[13] https://jamestown.org/snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/
[14] https://warontherocks.com/irans-asymmetric-counterair-campaign-attacking-the-u-s-air-forces-nests-and-eggs/; https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2026/04/01/the-strait-of-hormuz-offers-a-lesson-in-air-denial/
[15] https://www.aei.org/commentary/the-peoples-republic-of-china-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/the-prc-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/
[16] https://www.aei.org/commentary/the-peoples-republic-of-china-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/the-prc-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/
[17] https://www.news dot cn/tw/20260903/437b80b8d1e943ea9bfbfb4ff9b4adf5/c.html
[18] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202609/1369727.shtml
[19] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6428897
[20] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6428897; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/08/27/2003863240
[21] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6428897
[22] https://www.aei.org/commentary/the-peoples-republic-of-china-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/the-prc-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/
[23] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-july-10-2026/
[24] https://www.aei.org/commentary/the-peoples-republic-of-china-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/the-prc-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-august-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-25-2026/
[25] https://def.ltn dot com.tw/article/breakingnews/5557838
[26] https://def.ltn dot com.tw/article/breakingnews/5557838 ; https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6430606; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-21-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-july-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-18-2026/
[28] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609010018; https://www.scmp dpt com/news/china/military/article/3366011/mainland-china-stepping-preparations-taiwan-blockade-report-sys
[29] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609010018; https://www.scmp dpt com/news/china/military/article/3366011/mainland-china-stepping-preparations-taiwan-blockade-report-sys
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-july-31-2026/; https://understandingwar dot org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/
[31] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/04/2003863674; https://udn dot com/news/story/7238/9731619?from=udn-ch1_breaknews-1-cate6-news
[32] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/04/2003863674; https://udn dot com/news/story/7238/9731619?from=udn-ch1_breaknews-1-cate6-news
[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-condemns-chinas-wolf-warrior-behaviour-pacific-forum-2026-09-04/
[34] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/
[35] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/; https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-01/china-warns-of-consequences-over-taiwan-attendance/107100296; https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-pacific-islands-forum-beijing-taipei-98d61be45393e17135c4f88f7bd5e4ee; https://www.reuters.com/world/pacific-leaders-remove-taiwan-communique-after-china-complaint-2024-08-31/
[36] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-4-2026/; https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-01/china-warns-of-consequences-over-taiwan-attendance/107100296; https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-pacific-islands-forum-beijing-taipei-98d61be45393e17135c4f88f7bd5e4ee
[37] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-14-2026/
[38] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/19/taiwan-official-in-hospital-after-alleged-violent-attack-by-chinese-diplomats-in-fiji; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2020/10/20/2003745460
[39] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-14-2026/; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/political-operative-sentenced-48-months-federal-prison-acting-covert-agent-peoples-republic
[40] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-14-2026/
[41] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3366413/china-us-military-commanders-snap-2-year-break-talks-canada
[42] https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Articles/Article/4591082/readout-of-adm-samuel-j-paparos-meetings-on-the-sidelines-of-the-indo-pacific-c/
[43] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16483561.html
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-november-13-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-5-2026/
[45] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3337383/xi-jinping-promotes-pla-commanders-overseeing-taiwan-strait-beijing-full-general
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[55] https://apnews.com/article/china-japan-chips-chemical-dumping-ea58c95c47481c5c822a3a544e6b68cc
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