Toplines
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, from September 22 through 24. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States agreed to an extended trade truce, with both sides praising positive US-PRC relations. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent met with PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng on September 23.[1] The United States and the PRC agreed to extend the trade truce two months beyond the original November 10 end date.[2] Bessent also reported that the United States may be open to considering a more comprehensive US-PRC trade deal.[3] Bessent stated that the PRC was meeting its commitments on purchasing US soybeans, but had yet to commit fully to the originally agreed-upon purchases of other agricultural goods.[4]
Bessent and He previously met to discuss other bilateral concerns, including artificial intelligence (AI) safeguards and establishing a bilateral dialogue on AI security, on September 20.[5] Xi similarly emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation on AI security during his summit with Trump. Xi said that the United States and PRC should ensure that the development of AI technology remains “under human control” and serves the interests of the people.[6] Xi stated that the United States and PRC have “intertwined interests” and benefit from cooperation, rhetoric consistent with that of the last Xi-Trump meeting in May 2026.[7]
The PRC appears to have taken a more conciliatory approach toward certain areas of significant US concern prior to the summit, announcing a new set of regulations surrounding illegal drug components — a significant component of US-PRC relations amid the US fentanyl crisis.[8] The PRC announced on September 22 that it would require permits to ship two precursor chemicals to the United States, Mexico, and Canada, supplementing similar legislation from 2025.[9] Xi also called for 100,000 American students to visit the PRC over the next five years.[10] Xi similarly announced the delivery of two new pandas to the United States, consistent with past instances of “panda diplomacy” meant to showcase positive PRC bilateral relations with the recipient nation.[11] Xi’s statements also referenced the “Thucydides trap” — the notion that a rising power inevitably clashes with an existing one — when calling for increased bilateral cooperation to reduce the risk of future conflict.[12]
Xi’s rhetoric emphasized bilateral cooperation and highlighted the common goals of the United States and PRC, likely in an attempt to highlight similarities between the two states and suggest that the two share common strategic interests. Xi’s September 24 speech highlighted the US and PRC’s dual role as great powers and emphasized that both must maintain a “constructive and stable relationship.”[13] Xi stated that the resolution of global issues hinges on US-PRC cooperation and that the international community supported a positive US-PRC relationship.[14] Xi confirmed Trump’s invitation to an APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in the PRC in November.[15] Xi’s September 24 dinner address echoed these themes, emphasizing the shared history between the United States and PRC, including their alliance against Japan in World War II.[16] Xi drew a connection between Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement and the PRC’s push for national rejuvenation, stating that both movements could “complement” one another.[17]
The PRC may take advantage of seemingly warming US-PRC ties to attempt to influence US policy on Taiwan. Xi warned Trump on September 24 to “oppose” “Taiwan independence,” the first time he has used such direct phrasing.[18] The PRC typically warns the United States not to “support” “Taiwan independence.” This wording change, while minor, could represent a renewed PRC effort to change US policy on Taiwan.
The Xi-Trump talks did not produce any changes in the US’ Taiwan policy. The PRC could perceive US openness to continued dialogue as an opportunity to extract concessions on Taiwan in the future, however. The United States has already delayed an arms sale to Taiwan worth $14 billion.[19] Trump has previously called arms sales to Taiwan a “negotiating chip” in reference to dialogue with the PRC.[20] US officials have blamed Taiwanese arms sale delays on supply chain constraints imposed by other conflicts.[21] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio referenced supply chain challenges when asked about arms deliveries to Taiwan on September 23.[22] Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense deputy spokesperson Chiao Fu-chun said on September 23 that Taiwan would maintain “close contact” with the United States to receive updates on the status of these arms sales.[23]
US arms sales to Taiwan are authorized under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which stipulates that the United States will provide Taiwan with defense articles that enable Taiwan to “maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”[24] US arms sales to Taiwan receive bipartisan support from the US Congress. Four Republican senators called on Trump on September 23 to release Taiwan’s security funding.[25] Delays in arms shipments to Taiwan pose an ongoing threat to Taiwan’s defense and risk fueling PRC information operations aimed at undermining US-Taiwan ties.
Key Takeaways
- US-PRC Relations: US President Donald Trump and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping held a summit in Washington, DC, from September 22 to 24. The United States and People’s Republic of China (PRC) agreed to increase cooperation in a number of sectors and extend the US-PRC trade truce another two months. The PRC could view increased US-PRC cooperation as an opportunity to influence the US’ Taiwan policy.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwanese Minister of Labor Hung Sun-han attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Nanjing, PRC, on September 21 — the first official trip to the PRC by a ministry head within the William Lai Ching-te administration. Hung’s presence at APEC represents the maintenance of the status quo for Cross-Strait relations, given Taiwan’s long-standing attendance at APEC. Hung and the Taiwanese delegation participated in the meeting under the name “Chinese Taipei.” Hung stated upon his return to Taiwan that the delegation was able to fully participate in the forum and receive the same treatment as other member economies without being “bullied.”[26] The meeting centered on the development of human resources during ongoing labor market disruptions caused by AI and technological and demographic changes. Hung spoke at the summit on AI guidelines and risk management to prevent a negative impact on workers’ rights.[27] Taiwan’s previous trade representative and minister-without-portfolio Yang Jen-ni also attended a May 2026 APEC meeting of commerce ministers in Suzhou without incident.[28]
Hung’s participation in the meeting did not represent a significant change in the status quo for Taiwan’s international position or Cross-Strait relations. Taiwan’s designation as “Chinese Taipei” at APEC meetings has remained since Taiwan joined APEC in 1991.[29] The PRC has not altered its stance on Taiwan’s participation in APEC despite its rhetoric towards the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which it views as a party of “separatists.” Hung is a former DPP legislator with a record of speaking out on issues politically sensitive to the PRC.[30] Hung stated that the summit was an important element of Taiwanese international participation. Hung also clarified that the delegation’s visit to the PRC was a representation of the importance of the forum, rather than a signal of warming cross-Strait relations.[31] The PRC’s engagement with DPP delegations at APEC appears to be an exception to its typical assertion that cross-Strait engagement must align with the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus is a semi-official agreement between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) based on an agreement that there is “One China,” but disagreeing on what “China” means. The DPP does not officially accept the 1992 consensus.
China
Former US Army soldier Ruoyu Duan pled guilty to conspiring to spy for the PRC on September 16. The PRC seeks to acquire information on US and allied military units and systems that could impede a future PRC invasion of Taiwan. Duan recruited two active-duty soldiers to gather US military secrets for the PRC from 2021 to 2025, including technical manuals on high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), information on Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles, and information on US military readiness for a potential conflict with the PRC.[32] The soldiers also stole several classified hard drives and an encryption-capable computer to sell to the PRC. US authorities arrested and charged the three co-conspirators in March 2025.[33]
PRC espionage operations seek to acquire US military secrets and advanced technology, likely to improve the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s military capabilities and discover vulnerabilities in US and allied forces that the PRC could exploit to defeat potential US and allied intervention in a future Taiwan conflict.[34] US, Australian, and Taiwanese armed forces currently field HIMARS, and Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea have hosted US-operated HIMARS during combined training exercises.[35] Taiwan is planning forward deployment of HIMARS to its outlying islands, allowing Taiwan to strike PLA Navy (PLAN) bases along the PRC’s east coast and stationary PLA amphibious landing ships during an invasion, significantly degrading the invading PLA force.[36] US and allied forces can also rapidly forward-deploy HIMARS directly from transport aircraft to aid in a Taiwan scenario.[37]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The Philippines and Taiwan are likely expanding bilateral cooperation in ways that could improve their ability to combat PRC coercion. The PRC likely views enhanced Philippine-Taiwan ties as a threat to its regional ambitions. Taiwanese media reported on September 22 that an unnamed source confirmed reports that the Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) had transferred a decommissioned patrol vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG).[38] The vessel is a 500-ton patrol ship that was in service with the CGA since 2008.[39] Taiwan typically only transfers decommissioned vessels to states that officially recognize Taiwan’s statehood, which the Philippines does not.[40] Taiwan’s CGA also plans to visit the Philippines in 2027, the first such visit since the Philippines switched its recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 1975.[41] Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung also announced on September 15 that Taiwan would establish its second Philippine representative office in Cebu.[42] These developments may indicate that the Philippines and Taiwan are enhancing their bilateral relations, despite the Philippines’ recognition of the PRC.
Taiwan and the Philippines face a common coercive threat from the PRC that cooperation, particularly between coast guards, could help address. The China Coast Guard (CCG) and PLAN frequently operate around the Philippines and Taiwan’s sovereign territory and claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZ).[43] The CCG often uses its vessels’ numerical and size advantage over CGA and PCG vessels to attempt to support the PRC’s territorial claims and aggressive maritime exercises.[44] Enhanced CGA-PCG cooperation could allow Taiwan and the Philippines to coordinate effective responses to PRC coercive activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
The PRC likely views this kind of cooperation as a significant threat to its regional ambitions. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office criticized both the vessel transfer and Taiwan’s plan to open a representative office in Cebu, stating that the Philippines was failing to adhere to the one-China principle.[45] The PRC has expressed significant concern regarding strengthening ties within the first island chain, including improved Japan-Philippine ties.[46] These concerns reflect the PRC’s perception that it will struggle to achieve its aggressive ambitions against its neighbors if they coordinate their responses to PRC coercion. The PRC will likely aim to use the Philippines’ official recognition of the PRC and its regional economic influence to impose costs on enhanced Philippine-Taiwan relations.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-treasurys-bessent-chinas-he-meet-unfinished-business-before-trump-xi-summit-2026-09-23/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-treasurys-bessent-chinas-he-meet-unfinished-business-before-trump-xi-summit-2026-09-23/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-treasurys-bessent-chinas-he-meet-unfinished-business-before-trump-xi-summit-2026-09-23/
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-treasurys-bessent-chinas-he-meet-unfinished-business-before-trump-xi-summit-2026-09-23/
[5] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-treasurys-bessent-chinas-he-launch-talks-ai-trade-critical-minerals-2026-09-20/
[6] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202609/t20260924_12030964.shtml; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2026/sep/24/trump-xi-jinping-china-ai-trade-summit-latest-news-updates
[7] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2026/sep/24/trump-xi-jinping-china-ai-trade-summit-latest-news-updates
[8] https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/china-sets-guidelines-fentanyl-related-crimes-prior-trump-…
[9] https://apnews.com/article/china-us-drug-precursor-chemicals-6e3012905f3263b796325c03e94d1e40
[10] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202609/t20260925_12031112.shtml; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/sep/24/xi-jinping-trump-china-cooperation-thucydides-trap
[11] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/24/two-pandas-heading-atlanta-zoo-xi-jinping-announces/; https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240226-a-brief-history-of-panda-diplomacy—with-new-additions-to-global-zoos
[12] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/sep/24/xi-jinping-trump-china-cooperation-thucydides-trap
[13] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202609/t20260924_12030964.shtml
[14] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202609/t20260924_12030964.shtml
[15] https://asia.nikkei dot com/spotlight/trump-xi-summit/trump-xi-summit-live-chinese-leader-says-bilateral-ties-will-be-brighter
[16] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202609/t20260925_12031245.shtml
[17] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202609/t20260925_12031245.shtml
[18] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-24/xi-presses-trump-to-oppose-taiwan-independence-during-summit; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3368829/xi-presses-trump-take-next-step-taiwan-oppose-independence
[19] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c232z4yk437o; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/defence-firm-anduril-says-us-delay-taiwan-arms-sales-affecting-its-business-2026-09-19/
[20] https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-trump-arms-68eaac52b871e556aa6bd0509b101a90
[21] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c232z4yk437o
[22] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/09/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-press-16
[23] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/23/2003864770
[24] https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479
[25] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/four-us-republicans-call-trump-release-taiwan-security-funds-2026-09-23/
[26] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609210024; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-minister-says-he-was-not-belittled-rare-trip-china-2026-09-22/
[27] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6444882 ; https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609210024
[28] https://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202609/t20260902_12785940.htm ; https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6368146
[29] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6444882
[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-minister-makes-rare-trip-china-apec-event-2026-09-20/
[31] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6444882
[32] https://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/former-us-army-soldier-pleads-guilty-gathering-and-transmitting-national-defense; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/active-duty-and-former-us-army-soldiers-arrested-theft-government-property-and-bribery; https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ord.185010/gov.uscourts.ord.185010.69.0.pdf
[33] https://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/former-us-army-soldier-pleads-guilty-gathering-and-transmitting-national-defense; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/active-duty-and-former-us-army-soldiers-arrested-theft-government-property-and-bribery; https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ord.185010/gov.uscourts.ord.185010.69.0.pdf
[34] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-august-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-7-2026/
[35] https://www.army.mil/article/287152/army_replaces_howitzers_with_himars_to_boost_soldier_lethality; https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2025-07-18/himars-gives-force-strategy-denial; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-1-2025/; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-may-15-2026/; https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2026-09-23/orient-shield-exercise-japan-russia-22938405.html; https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Photos/igphoto/2003906720/; https://www.army.mil/article/292155/us_army_pacific_allies_execute_himars_fire_in_philippine_coastal_defense_drill
[36] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-1-2025/
[37] https://www.army.mil/article/291029/precision_strike_missile_success_at_talisman_sabre_accelerating_army_long_range_precision_fires_modernization; https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2025-07-25/himars-extends-range-christmas-island; https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2025/wings-and-rockets-c-130j-and-himars-redefine-rapid-strike-capability.html
[38] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609220026
[39] https://news.usni.org/2026/09/23/taiwan-transfers-coast-guard-patrol-vessel-to-the-philippines
[40] https://news.usni.org/2026/09/23/taiwan-transfers-coast-guard-patrol-vessel-to-the-philippines
[41] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-17/taiwan-coast-guard-plans-visit-to-philippines-as-china-pressure-grows
[42] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202609150008
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/the-prc-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-pushes-back-china-patrols-with-coast-guard-trip-foreign-lawmakers-2026-07-09/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-22-2026/
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-special-report-december-31-2025/
[45] https://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202609/t20260923_12814547.htm
[46] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3359264/china-sends-warning-japan-and-philippines-over-wrongful-maritime-talks
