Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim made an unannounced official visit to Italy to attend a high-level conference, despite PRC efforts to limit Taiwanese international engagement. Hsiao and Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung visited Italy on September 11 and 12 for the second Ventotene European Conference for Freedom and Democracy at the invitation of the European Parliament.[23] Neither the Taiwanese government nor the conference organizers announced Hsiao’s participation until she arrived in Italy, out of concern for her safety.[24] The European Commission canceled its participation after the conference announced Hsiao as a guest.[25] The PRC lodged diplomatic complaints with Italy and the European Union for allowing Hsiao’s visit.[26] A PRC foreign ministry spokesperson accused Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of seeking foreign support for Taiwanese independence under the guise of promoting freedom and democracy.[27] Italy does not maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, like most countries, but it does have an unofficial representative office in Taiwan. The Italian government therefore avoided official contact with the Taiwanese officials during the visit.[28] Italy’s One China Policy “takes note” of the PRC’s position that Taiwan is part of the PRC but maintains ambiguity as to whether Italy shares that position, however.[29]

The secrecy around Hsiao’s visit and the European Commission’s last-minute withdrawal from the conference reflect the PRC’s escalating efforts to prevent any official Taiwanese engagement with foreign countries and organizations. The PRC has poached most of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies by convincing them to cut relations with Taiwan and recognize the PRC, leaving only 12 countries that recognize Taiwan. The PRC frequently warns countries not to host Taiwanese officials, especially officials affiliated with the DPP. PRC diplomats tailed then Vice President-elect Hsiao during her visit to Czechia in 2024 and reportedly planned to stage a car crash to intimidate or harm her.[30] The PRC also very likely intervened to block Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te’s trip to Eswatini in April by pressuring nearby African countries to deny him overflight permission through their airspace, an unprecedented leveraging of third countries to block a Taiwanese exchange with one of its diplomatic allies. Lai made the trip in secret weeks later aboard an Eswatinian government plane.[31]

China

BRICS held its annual leaders’ summit in India on September 12 and 13, during which participants issued a joint statement on issues including de-dollarization and opposition to the war in Iran. The PRC aims to frame BRICS as an opportunity to build consensus across the “Global South” and present an alternative to the US-led world order. The BRICS nations agreed to the New Delhi Declaration on September 12, which stipulates that members would take steps toward facilitating cross-border payments in local currencies — which would support de-dollarization, a longstanding objective of BRICS.[32]

CCP General-Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a speech on September 12 where he highlighted BRICS’ role in peace efforts and leadership in global governance.[33] Xi also took the opportunity to promote the PRC’s four “Global Initiatives,” the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. The four “Global Initiatives” are a set of frameworks that seek to challenge the US-led global order and pursue PRC-led global development centered around the “Global South.” Xi’s speech also referenced the war in the Middle East without naming the United States or Iran and called for a ceasefire and a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[34] Xi celebrated the role that the PRC plays at the helm of BRICS and noted that the PRC will assume the rotating presidency of BRICS next year.[35] Xi announced on September 13 that the PRC would spearhead a collaborative AI initiative with BRICS states, a BRICS AI Open-Source Zone.[36]

The PRC aims to present itself as an alternative to a US-led world order and as a leader and consensus-builder among “Global South” countries. The war in Iran has exacerbated existing rifts within BRICS member states, however, illustrating the limits of the PRC’s ability to promote consensus. India did not fall in line with other states’ condemnations of Israeli strikes on Iran during a 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting.[37] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also consistently opposed SCO’s efforts to condemn US-Israeli combined force actions against Iran.[38] Iran and the UAE did back a joint statement calling for the protection of civilians and trade during the BRICS summit, however.[39] Disagreements between BRICS member states on major global issues will likely impede the PRC’s ability to promote complete consensus on issues of global governance. The PRC will likely continue to use BRICS and other international organizations to promote the notion of a non-US-led, PRC-aligned world order, however.

CCP General-Secretary Xi Jinping met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. This meeting was likely intended to help improve PRC-India relations, given longstanding tensions. This marked Xi’s first visit to India since 2019. PRC and Indian forces clashed at the PRC-India border in the Indian territory of Ladakh in June 2020, involving approximately 900 soldiers and resulting in at least 20 Indian and four PRC deaths.[40] Xi and Modi discussed improving bilateral trade, business, and people-to-people ties.[41]

Xi’s conversation with Modi could reflect PRC interest in improving bilateral ties. The PRC and India remain at odds strategically, however. India has historically pursued a policy of nonalignment, balancing US and PRC interests. India maintains defense cooperation efforts with the United States and has shown increasing support for US coalition building in Asia, including with Japan.[42] India is a member of the security cooperation bloc the Quad along with Australia, Japan, and the United States, one example of its involvement with US-friendly coalitions. The PRC’s close relationship with Pakistan, as well as its goal of breaking up US-aligned coalitions that it believes may jeopardize its position in the Indo-Pacific, will very likely stymie the development of the Sino-Indian relationship.

The PLA likely views its ability to mobilize civilian resources for military use as a critical requirement for prevailing in a future conflict. PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA, published an article on September 13 on the requirements for an effective future warfighting system.[43] The article emphasized the need to use civilian resources for “functional compensation” when military equipment was damaged or destroyed and emphasized the use of non-military means to achieve battlefield effects.[44] Another PLA Daily article published on September 13 discussed the role of civilian entities in future “control warfare,” wherein information and cognitive operations were critical to PLA success, requiring significant military-civil integration and cooperation.[45] Another PLA Daily commentary on military deception in the age of the transparent battlefield suggested that surprise will be created through unorthodox fighting methods and novel warfighting formations, possibly indicating that civilian resources will have a critical role on the future battlefield.[46]

These commentaries come only two weeks after the PRC passed revisions to its national mobilization law that widen government control over civilian resources during national crises and expand the situations in which the PRC may invoke mobilization.[47] The PRC has practiced using civilian assets in several roles, including troop and supply transportation during an amphibious landing.[48] Other recent PLA commentaries have centered the role of AI in future warfare and have noted the importance of tapping developments in the civilian sector to enhance the use of AI in military operations.[49] PLA discussions of “People’s War Under Modern Conditions,” an authoritative concept in PLA literature, also highlight that PRC control of the economy and society provide a critical advantage in mobilizing civilian resources for war compared to the PRC’s adversaries.[50] The PRC thus likely understands the effective mobilization of civilian assets and emerging technologies for wartime use to be a precondition for success in future conflict.

The PLA may also believe that its ability to restore maneuver to the modern battlefield will hinge on the mobilization of civilian resources for military purposes. PRC state broadcaster CCTV published a video discussing how to solve the present “stalemate” in ground warfare seen in Ukraine.[51] The video noted that the war in Ukraine had become characterized by pervasive battlefield reconnaissance and overwhelming precision fire, preventing the concentration of armored forces required to achieve significant breakthroughs.[52] CCTV invited several unmanned systems and information warfare experts who argued that complex unmanned ground vehicles and AI-enabled information technology would be critical to restore maneuver to the modern battlefield.[53] These observations are consistent with ISW-CDOT’s assessment that the PLA envisions the center of gravity of future warfare to be information dominance, meaning that a better ability to gather, synthesize, and disseminate information will enable battlefield advances.[54] A September 13 CCTV video showed an amphibious combined arms unit assaulting a beach and demonstrating some of these principles, as each amphibious vehicle was equipped with a drone that could be piloted from within the vehicle.[55] The exercise also showed unmanned ground vehicles participating in the assault of the beach alongside manned platforms.[56]

The PLA’s observations on the role of AI-enabled information technology and advanced unmanned systems may have driven the PRC’s attempts to expand government control over critical civilian industries. The revisions to the PRC’s national mobilization law added language the singled out emerging critical technologies being developed in the civilian sphere.[57] Other recent PLA commentaries have highlighted the rapid innovation cycle demonstrated in the war in Ukraine, particularly for unmanned systems development.[58] One of these articles notes that traditional procurement processes lack the flexibility to rapidly iterate technology in accordance with battlefield realities.[59] The PRC possesses the world’s largest civilian drone sector, accounting for 70 percent of global output by some estimates.[60] The PRC may thus view wartime or pre-war mobilization of its civilian drone and AI sectors to be more efficient than creating parallel, purpose-built military industries.

These discussions fit into an existing body of PLA commentaries on the war in Ukraine that aim to incorporate select tactical lessons from the war into PLA warfighting while maintaining that the essence of future conflict will be sharply distinct from the war in Ukraine. The CCTV discussion of future battlefield maneuver reflects a perception that a superior information network, driven by superior AI algorithms and the use of them, could nullify material disadvantages.[61] The side that can orchestrate manned and unmanned operations, synthesize battlefield data, and damage an enemy’s operational awareness will be the side that is able to restore maneuver to the battlefield according to this view. The role of civilian-driven technologies in achieving these effects, and the PRC’s estimation of its ability to effectively mobilize civilian resources to enhance warfighting, may drive the PLA’s assessments of its own preparedness for future war.