Toplines
Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are increasing diplomatic and economic engagement with North Korea and jointly pushing for an end to North Korea’s international isolation. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin jointly stated their countries’ opposition to “threatening the security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure” and urged “relevant parties” to stop escalating regional tensions.[1] Xi and Putin expressed this position in a lengthy joint statement on Russia-PRC cooperation signed on May 20 during Putin’s visit to Beijing.[2] Both countries have advocated for North Korea’s integration into the international community, most prominently when Xi hosted Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un alongside Putin during the PRC’s September 2025 military parade commemorating the defeat of Japan in the Second World War.[3] The PRC and Russia recently held ministerial-level exchanges with North Korea, including a visit by PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Pyongyang on April 9-10 and visits by several Russian ministers in late April.[4] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko said on May 19 that he expects a visit from North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui sometime in 2026.[5] Anonymous sources also told TIME magazine that Xi may visit North Korea soon, though neither side has yet confirmed the visit.[6]
Russia’s and the PRC’s growing support for North Korea will likely embolden Pyongyang by making it more confident in its ability to deter or weather retaliation by other countries. The PRC remains North Korea’s primary trading partner and economic lifeline. The PRC General Administration of Customs reported that PRC-North Korea trade reached 326 million US Dollars (USD) in April, the highest monthly total since November 2017.[7] The increased trade was largely driven by North Korean imports from the PRC and likely reflects North Korea’s increased revenue (from selling munitions to Russia, cryptocurrency theft, and other sources) and lax PRC sanctions enforcement.[8] The PRC has advocated against sanctions and muted its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program, indicating that it is reducing its attempts to constrain North Korea’s behavior. The PRC and Russia vetoed new United Nations sanctions on North Korea in 2022, and PRC officials have not mentioned North Korea’s nuclear program since May 2024, possibly indicating tacit PRC acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status.[9] A White House fact sheet about US President Trump’s meeting with Xi on May 14-15 said that the two shared a commitment to denuclearizing North Korea, but a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson did not directly confirm the statement when asked on May 18.[10] The MFA also declined to comment on a North Korean ballistic missile test on May 26.[11]
Russia’s relationship with North Korea has dramatically expanded since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, giving Pyongyang a major partner less interested in constraining Pyongyang’s behavior than the PRC. North Korea signed a mutual defense agreement with Russia in June 2024, sold Russia billions of dollars in munitions, and deployed thousands of troops and defense industrial workers to Russia to support Russia’s war effort.[12] Russia also publicly dropped its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program in 2024.[13] North Korea has reaped substantial economic rewards from the relationship and availed itself of Russian aid in improving its missiles, submarines, drones, and other military technologies.[14]
Key Takeaways
- North Korean Diplomatic Relations: The PRC and Russia are increasing their economic and diplomatic relations with North Korea and reducing the effectiveness of international sanctions. The PRC and Russia are likely working to end North Korea’s international isolation.
North Korean Domestic Politics
Nothing significant to report.
North Korean Military Developments
North Korea may be preparing for a high-profile test of its military satellite launch capabilities in the near future. North Korea likely seeks to develop a domestic military satellite constellation to improve its precision targeting capabilities, although it is not close to securing this capability at scale. NK Pro reported that North Korea likely conducted static tests of a rocket engine on May 12 and 14 at the Sohae space launch complex.[15] NK Pro also reported that it obtained satellite imagery that showed that North Korean workers at the Sohae complex were close to completing a new structure that could be a VIP observation stand, which would allow Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Secretary General Kim Jong Un to observe a satellite launch.[16] Kim stated his intention to produce “further evolved” reconnaissance satellites at the WPK’s 9th Party Congress in February.[17] North Korea has attempted to develop a military reconnaissance satellite constellation since 2022, but several launch failures have left it with only a single military satellite in orbit. North Korea has not attempted a launch since 2024.[18]
North Korea likely seeks to develop a military reconnaissance satellite network to enhance its ability to target critical infrastructure and equipment in South Korea and possibly the United States. North Korean media claimed after North Korea’s sole successful military satellite launch in 2023, that the satellite photographed targets across South Korea and the United States, including US Forces Korea’s (USFK) Humphreys.[19] US-based think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has assessed that the resolution of North Korean satellite is unlikely to enhance its targeting capabilities at present.[20] North Korea has leveraged its close relationship with Russia to improve its satellite launch capabilities, including during its sole successful launch of a military satellite in 2023.[21] Further Russian technical support could help North Korea develop a more mature satellite program that improves its ability to strike key targets in South Korea.
North Korean Foreign Relations
See Topline.
North Korean Cognitive Warfare
Nothing significant to report.
Inter-Korean Relations
The South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) further accelerated efforts to adopt a two-state framework recognizing North Korea as a separate state. The MOU denied that this reflected the consensus of the Lee Jae Myung administration. The MOU published its first “Unification White Paper” of 2026 on May 18.[22] The MOU seeks to promote the administration’s core North Korea policy, the “Peaceful Coexistence” policy, which establishes that South and North Korea exist as two separate states.[23] South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young argued on May 20 that while South and North Korea are already individual sovereign states, they do not constitute foreign nations to one another.[24] Chung clarified that the MOU’s is not seeking acceptance of North Korea’s de facto statehood.[25] Chung stated that the MOU’s two-state framework puts forth a fundamentally distinct “peaceful” two-state relationship, in contrast to North Korean’s acknowledgement of a “hostile” two-state relationship.[26] WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un proclaimed the hostile two-state framework in 2023, declaring a complete dissolution of inter-Korean ties and halting exchanges with the South.[27] Pyongyang formally codified the hostile framework into its constitution by removing its unification objectives in May 2026.[28]
The MOU seeks to reopen dialogue channels through a preemptive conciliatory policy that recognizes the North Korean regime. The MOU appears to be prioritizing establishing a two-state framework over pursuing long-term unification goals. The 2026 White Paper reduced references to unification, compared to the 2025 version, prioritizing peaceful coexistence and inter-Korean exchanges.[29] The 2025 White Paper also discussed North Korean human rights abuses, which were largely absent from the 2026 White Paper.[30] The MOU is likely to continue refraining from using rhetoric Pyongyang might find provocative and showing respect for North Korea’s internal “sovereign” affairs under the two-state framework.
The Lee administration does not appear to have a unified North Korea policy, however. An unnamed MOU official clarified that the “peaceful two-state” framework reflects an internal MOU proposal rather than the official consensus of the entire Lee administration. South Korean National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac and Foreign Minister Cho Hyun stated that they do not recognize the two-state framework.[31] The MOU appears intent on establishing the two-state framework despite disagreements within the administration. The MOU proposed a constitutional amendment to Lee to accommodate the two-state framework in December 2025, which Lee rejected.[32]
The MOU also reiterated its desire to restore inter-Korean military agreements on May 26.[33] Pyongyang and Seoul previously endorsed measures for peace on the Korean Peninsula in 2018, which included reductions in US-South Korea combined military exercises and the establishment of a no-fly zone around the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).[34]
South Korean Domestic Politics
Nothing significant to report.
Counter-North Korean Coalition Building Efforts
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s official statement following his summit with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi included comparatively mild rhetoric on North Korea. Lee may be seeking to avoid provoking North Korea and promote inter-Korean engagement. Lee and Takaichi held a summit in Andong, South Korea, on May 19, marking the third meeting between the two leaders.[35] The two leaders’ statements on North Korea differed slightly. Lee said that South Korea would build a “peaceful Korean Peninsula where the two Koreas can coexist,” while Takaichi said the meeting “discussed responses to North Korea, including its nuclear and missile programs” during a press conference following their summit.[36] Neither leader explicitly mentioned North Korean denuclearization, spokesperson for the South Korean presidential office Kang Yoo-jung later confirmed that Lee emphasized his commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula during the summit.[37]
Lee’s reference to the “peaceful coexistence” policy during the bilateral summit with Japan reflects an incremental decrease in rhetorical pressure on North Korea. Lee stated his desire for the “complete denuclearization of North Korea” during his first summit with former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in August 2025.[38] The official readouts following the October 2025 summit with Takaichi omitted mentions of North Korea completely.[39] Lee stated the need for denuclearization of “the Korean Peninsula” during the January 2026 summit, unlike Takaichi, who specified “denuclearization of North Korea” in her statement.[40] Lee may have adopted more explicit language at the beginning of his term to address perceived US or Japanese concerns that he may be uncooperative with demands from bilateral or trilateral alliance demands.[41] The Lee administration has made repeated diplomatic overtures toward North Korea, which have not come to fruition. North Korea instead strengthened its “hostile two states” policy that has largely undermined Lee’s engagement initiatives. The May 29 statements by Lee and Takaichi demonstrate the disparity in bilateral expectations for engagement conditions, as Lee seeks to avoid language he likely believes would provoke North Korea and further disrupt normalization efforts.
South Korea is expediting the domestic process to acquire an indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) ahead of the upcoming negotiation with the United States. US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker held talks with South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Vice Minister Park Yoon-joo on May 19. The two agreed to hold a “kick-off” consultation to implement security agreements reached under the United States-South Korea Joint Fact Sheet in November 2025.[42] Hooker said there is a “need to ensure fair treatment for US companies” and remove “barriers to market access” during the meeting.[43] The statement likely refers to US concerns that a South Korean bill mandating transaction transparency in platform-based businesses will target US firms operating in South Korea. Hooker may also be referring to a South Korean regulatory investigation into the US firm Coupang over a consumer data breach.[44] MOFA stated that a US delegation led by Hooker will visit Seoul in June 2026 to discuss issues related to the SSN program, including uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing measures.[45] The discussion would mark the first working-level exchange over the SSN program since the agreement.
The South Korean Navy submitted a force requirement paper outlining capability needs for the SSN program to its Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) on May 20.[46] The document discussed logistical requirements for the program, the number of systems needed, and projected deployment schedules. The Lee administration presented a timeline to launch its first SSN by the mid-2030s and deploy it to the Navy by the late 2030s during the inaugural “Future Defense Strategy Committee” meeting on May 26.[47] The outline proposed using low-enriched uranium with an enrichment level below 20 percent for the reactor fuel.[48] Lee reaffirmed his commitment to accelerate the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to achieve “autonomous national defense” within the United States-South Korea alliance framework.[49]
South Korea likely seeks to accelerate this timeline ahead of the US midterm elections in November, possibly due to concerns that election results may affect congressional approval of a future bilateral agreement. A potential US nuclear fuel supply may require a renegotiation of the current “123 Agreement,” which restricts South Korea’s use of transferred nuclear material for any military purpose.[50] SSNs use nuclear reactors fueled by enriched uranium and the United States would have to revise Article 13 of the 123 agreement to supply fuel for South Korean SSNs.
The Lee administration has argued that South Korea’s diesel-electric submarines lack the endurance to track North Korean and PRC submarines. North Korea’s current submarine fleet—which consists of aging, small coastal submarines—likely remains operationally inferior to South Korea’s naval capabilities.[51] North Korea, however, has increased efforts to develop a strategic naval force in recent years, including by test-launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) from submersible test stand barges to enhance its sea-lagged deterrent.[52] ISW-CDOT has assessed that WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un aims to develop the Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) into a green-water navy by expanding its missile launching platforms.[53] North Korean state media unveiled in December 2025 that an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was under construction. The submarine would likely be capable of carrying 10 SLBMs.[54] South Korea likely seeks to operate its SSNs to track North Korean submarines in the future, augment its existing kill chain concept, and protect sea lines of communication (SLOC) during wartime.[55] North Korea denounced the plan in November 2025, accusing South Korea of pursuing “independent nuclear armaments.”[56] The PRC opposed AUKUS’s nuclear submarine cooperation and may respond with economic retaliation to deter Seoul from pursuing the program.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6487 ; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202605/t20260521_11914932.shtml
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6487 ; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202605/t20260521_11914932.shtml
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-3-2025/
[4] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/wjbzhd/202604/t20260410_11889710.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-april-28-2026/
[5] https://tass dot com/politics/2132943/amp
[6] https://time.com/article/2026/05/20/putin-xi-china-center-stage-diplomacy-analysis/ ; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202605/t20260521_11915471.html
[7] https://www.nknews dot org/2026/05/north-koreas-trade-with-china-hits-highest-monthly-total-in-over-8-years/
[8] https://www.nknews dot org/2026/05/north-koreas-trade-with-china-hits-highest-monthly-total-in-over-8-years/
[9] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202405/t20240530_11347765.html ; https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/26/asia/us-north-korea-united-nations-intl-hnk
[10] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry/ ; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202605/t20260518_11912625.html
[11] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202605/t20260526_11918267.html
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/ ; https://www.38north.org/2025/12/alabuga-the-latest-destination-for-north-koreas-drone-ambitions/ ; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-has-paid-north-korea-billions-for-help-fighting-ukraine-south-korean-intel-says/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-5-2026/
[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-lavrov-says-north-koreas-nuclear-status-is-closed-issue-2024-09-26/
[14] https://www.nknews dot org/2026/05/north-koreas-russian-pork-imports-surge-in-first-4-months-of-2026/ ; https://www.nknews dot org/2026/05/north-korean-officials-tour-drone-operator-training-facility-in-russian-far-east/
[15] https://www.nknews dot org/pro/north-korea-appears-to-test-rocket-engine-build-satellite-launch-viewing-area/
[16] https://www.nknews dot org/pro/north-korea-appears-to-test-rocket-engine-build-satellite-launch-viewing-area/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/north-koreas-9th-party-congress-signals-confidence-in-nuclear-deterrence-rejects-denuclearization-and-inter-korean-talks/; https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/6083545
[18] https://www.csis.org/analysis/history-and-evolution-north-koreas-space-capabilities
[19] https://www.legion.org/information-center/news/security/2025/january/north-koreas-failed-satellite-launches-may-signal-potential-technological-shift
[20] https://www.csis.org/analysis/history-and-evolution-north-koreas-space-capabilities
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-received-russian-aid-satellite-launch-south-korea-lawmakers-2023-11-23/; https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-capitalizes-on-russias-help-by-expanding-satellite-launching-facility-34135754
[22] https://www.unikorea.go dot kr/ebook/whitepaper/white_2026/index.html#p=16
[23] https://www.unikorea.go dot kr/ebook/whitepaper/white_2026/index.html#p=16
[24] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20260520144800504?input=1195m
[25] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20260520144800504?input=1195m
[26] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20260520144800504?input=1195m
[27] https://www.segye dot com/newsView/20260519514754
[28] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25426277
[29] https://www.unikorea.go dot kr/ebook/whitepaper/white_2026/index.html#p=16
[30] https://www.koreatimes.co dot kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20260518/unification-white-paper-pivots-to-peaceful-two-state-coexistence-with-n-korea
[31] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2025/10/29/YWJJBPC45VD7PPGSSXVEMHBMYQ/
[32] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25391749
[33] https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do ?ncd=8570061
[34] https://www.korea dot kr/briefing/policyBriefingView.do?newsld=148865808
[35] https://www.nknews dot org/2026/05/lee-takaichi-agree-to-join-hands-to-restore-peace-on-korean-peninsula/
[36] https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/cedpxxl12wgo
[37] https://www.donga dot com/news/Politics/article/all/20260520/133955630/2
[38] https://globalnation dot inquirer.net/289094/japan-s-korea-renew-ties-with-first-joint-statement-in-17-years
[39] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/10/lee-takaichi-agree-to-coordinate-on-north-korea-denuclearization-at-first-talks/
[40] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2026/01/14/BHLSZTV3BBFL5EZJ2RMR7DOBA4/
[41] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2026/01/14/BHLSZTV3BBFL5EZJ2RMR7DOBA4/
[42] https://www.news1 dot kr/diplomacy/defense-diplomacy/6174449
[43] https://www.news1 dot kr/diplomacy/defense-diplomacy/6174449
[44] https://www.csis.org/analysis/where-sovereignty-meets-statecraft-south-koreas-fairness-act-and-us-alliance; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-says-us-alliance-not-crisis-despite-coupang-linked-friction-media-2026-04-24/
[45] https://www.news1 dot kr/diplomacy/defense-diplomacy/6174449
[46] https://www.donga dot com/news/Politics/article/all/20260520/133957835/1
[47] https://www.mk.co dot kr/news/politics/12057947
[48] https://www.mk.co dot kr/news/politics/12058060
[49] https://www.mk.co dot kr/news/politics/12058060
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-april-7-2026/
[51] https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korea-submarine-capabilities/
[52] https://www.inss.re dot kr/upload/bbs/BBSA05/202010/F10405.pdf
[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-12-2026/
[54] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/12/north-koreas-first-nuclear-powered-missile-submarine-is-revealed/
[55] https://www.sejong dot org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=1&seq=12539
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-april-7-2026/
