The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Note: ISW-CTP will publish abbreviated updates on Saturdays and Sundays covering the Iran conflict and Axis of Resistance developments directly related to the conflict starting on July 18, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- The United States has struck several bridges and railroads in southern Iran since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff in order to disrupt supply routes to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to a senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal. Bandar Abbas is a port city that hosts the IRGC Navy First Naval District and numerous other naval facilities.
- Iran struck critical infrastructure in Kuwait on July 17, possibly in response to recent US strikes on bridges in Iran and to deter the United States from conducting strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. The Kuwaiti Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy Ministry announced that an attack, which it attributed to “Iranian aggression,” damaged several power generation units at an unspecified power and water desalination plant on July 17.
- Iran attacked US targets in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 16 and 17 as part of Iran’s ongoing effort to impose costs on US allies and partners in the region and discourage them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait. Iran targeted US assets in Oman that support US operations in the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to degrade the United States’ capability to operate around the strait.
- Iran also attacked a former US base in Syria on July 17, likely to deter the Syrian government from undertaking any serious operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The IRGC said that it targeted a US special operations command center at al Tanf Garrison in the Syrian Badia in retaliation for the killing of Iranian soldiers in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
- Iran is continuing to use force and the threat of further attacks to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran targeted a Thai-flagged vessel in the strait on July 17.
Toplines
The United States has struck several bridges and railroads in southern Iran since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff in order to disrupt supply routes to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to a senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[1] Bandar Abbas is a port city that hosts the IRGC Navy First Naval District and numerous other naval facilities.[2] Iranian state media reported strikes on bridges in and around the city and the closure of highways connecting Bandar Abbas to nearby provinces.[3] The United States also struck the Radio and Communications Regulatory Authority’s office in Bandar Abbas on July 16.[4] The office is responsible for regulating telecommunications networks, licensing operators, and managing Iran’s radio-frequency spectrum.[5] Iranian media also reported on July 17 that US forces struck Bandar Abbas’s railway junction station, which is located approximately 10 kilometers west of Bandar Abbas.[6] Bandar Abbas is Iran’s principal military and commercial hub on the strait, as the city hosts key facilities belonging to both the IRGC Navy and the Artesh Navy. The Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas handles roughly 85 percent of Iran’s container traffic and connects directly to Iran’s national rail and highway networks, making Bandar Abbas a critical hub for moving military supplies, fuel, personnel, and commercial cargo between Iran’s interior and its southern coast.[7] US Central Command (CENTCOM) acknowledged on July 17 that US forces struck “military logistics infrastructure.”[8]
Iran struck critical infrastructure in Kuwait on July 17, possibly in response to recent US strikes on bridges in Iran and to deter the United States from conducting strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. The Kuwaiti Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy Ministry announced that an attack, which it attributed to “Iranian aggression,” damaged several power generation units at an unspecified power and water desalination plant on July 17.[9] Kuwait intercepted 32 Iranian drones on July 16.[10] Interceptor shrapnel from an Iranian drone previously struck and damaged a Kuwaiti desalination plant in April 2026.[11] About 90 percent of Kuwait’s drinking water comes from desalination.[12]
Iran may have struck the Kuwaiti plant in response to recent US strikes on bridges in Iran and to deter the United States from attacking Iranian energy infrastructure. US forces struck several bridges in Iran on July 17 (see above).[13] Regime officials have repeatedly warned that Iran would attack “regional infrastructure” in response to any US attacks on Iranian critical infrastructure.[14] The Iranian regime has also attributed recent power outages in southern Iran to US strikes, although there is no available evidence at this time that the United States has targeted Iranian energy infrastructure.[15] US President Donald Trump recently threatened on July 14 to expand US strikes to include power plants, and the Iranian strike on the Kuwaiti plant may have been intended to deter the United States from intentionally targeting Iranian energy infrastructure by signaling that Iran could retaliate by attacking critical infrastructure in the region.[16]
Iran attacked US targets in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 16 and 17 as part of Iran’s ongoing effort to impose costs on US allies and partners in the region and discourage them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait.[17] Iran targeted US assets in Oman that support US operations in the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to degrade the United States’ capability to operate in the strait. The IRGC Navy claimed on July 17 that it destroyed a naval surveillance radar on the Salamah Archipelago and a US air surveillance radar near Ghanem Island in the Persian Gulf.[18] Iran also likely aims to deter Oman from supporting international efforts to undermine Iranian control over the strait. Iran has recently adopted a more hostile tone toward Oman and accused Oman of giving in to “US pressure” to oppose Iranian management of the strait.[19] Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait in recent weeks.[20] Iran also likely seeks to punish US regional allies and make their continued cooperation with the United States increasingly costly. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi warned on July 17 that the IRGC will continue to launch “effective and targeted” strikes until the United States ceases its attacks in southern Iran.[21]
Iran also attacked a former US base in Syria on July 17, likely to deter the Syrian government from undertaking any serious operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The IRGC said that it targeted a US special operations command center at al Tanf Garrison in the Syrian Badia in retaliation for the killing of Iranian soldiers in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[22] US forces struck the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Brigade in Iranshahr on July 15, reportedly killing seven Artesh soldiers. US forces withdrew from al Tanf in February 2026, and Syrian government forces assumed control of the position.[23] An unspecified Syrian military source told Reuters that Iran conducted an attack near al Tanf but did not hit the base itself.[24] CENTCOM denied Iranian claims that the attack killed US troops at al Tanf.[25] The Iranian attack on al Tanf comes amid repeated Iranian threats to Syria and was likely intended to deter the Syrian government from taking action against Hezbollah by demonstrating Iran’s ability and willingness to attack Syrian territory. An expert close to the Iranian regime warned on July 16 that the Iranian regime would respond to any Syrian action against Hezbollah with Iranian missile and drone attacks on Syria.[26] US President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested in recent weeks that the Syrian transitional government could play a role in operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[27] The location of the al Tanf Garrison attack on July 17 is also notable given that Syrian forces announced that they interdicted an IRGC shipment of drones, missiles, and weapons components intended for Hezbollah near al Tanf on July 16.[28]
Iran is continuing to use force and the threat of further attacks to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran targeted a Thai-flagged vessel in the strait on July 17.[29] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, citing an informed source, claimed that the IRGC Navy struck the vessel after it ignored warnings from the IRGC Navy and attempted to transit through the strait without Iranian authorization.[30] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on July 17 that an unidentified projectile struck a vessel 19 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman.[31] The location of the vessel suggests that it was attempting to pass through the southern transit route along Oman’s coast. Iran has repeatedly attacked vessels using this route because the route is an alternative to Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme and therefore undermines Iranian efforts to assert authority over the strait. Kpler data on July 17 shows that only eight vessels transited through the strait on July 16.[32] The low traffic volume on July 16 demonstrates how Iranian attacks on shipping are deterring shipping companies and ship captains from transiting the strait. Seven maritime security and shipping industry sources recently told Reuters on July 15 that shipping companies are avoiding using the southern route despite US military escorts.[33] Iran does not need to routinely attack vessels to disrupt shipping in the strait; a single successful attack, or even the persistent threat of one, can deter vessels from using routes outside Iran’s control.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
US naval forces are redirecting and disabling vessels around the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to enforce the naval blockade. The US Navy has redirected three vessels and disabled one vessel since the United States reimposed the US blockade on Iranian ports on July 14.[34] The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded the Curacao-flagged M/T Wen Yao about 100 nautical miles east of Duqm, Oman, on July 16 to ensure the vessel’s compliance with the blockade.[35] Maritime intelligence company Tanker Trackers reported that M/T Wen Yaowas carrying Iranian oil.[36]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
The United States conducted a sixth consecutive night of strikes on Iran on July 16 in order to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping. CENTCOM stated on July 17 that the United States struck dozens of Iranian coastal surveillance and air defense sites, military logistics infrastructure, and maritime capabilities.[37] The United States destroyed the Chahbahar Shahid Kalantari Port surveillance tower on July 17, which CENTCOM said Iran used to track and target commercial vessels in the strait.[38] The United States previously struck the tower on July 8.[39] Iranian media reported that US aircraft also struck the IRGC Navy Imam Ali Naval Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on July 16.[40] The US-Israeli combined force repeatedly struck the Imam Ali base in February and March 2026.[41] Commercially available satellite imagery captured between July 8 and 13 also showed damage to a boathouse and pier in Jask, Hormozgan Province.[42]
An Israeli geospatial analyst reported that commercially available satellite imagery shows that the United States struck the Oghab 44 underground aviation base in northern Hormozgan Province between July 14 and 16.[43] Israeli media reported that this facility probably houses Iranian aircraft and drones in underground facilities.[44] Iranian media separately reported that the United States struck unspecified targets at Iranshahr Airport in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 16.[45] The United States previously struck Iranshahr Airport on July 8.[46]
The United States also struck facilities that Iran may be using to strike Gulf states. Commercially available satellite imagery captured between July 15 and 17 showed damage to several buildings at the IRGC Aerospace Force Shahid Assi Zadeh Base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[47] This base’s location in western Iran and distance from the Persian Gulf suggests that this base may be involved in Iranian retaliatory attacks against Gulf countries as opposed to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. An Israeli geospatial analyst assessed that the United States struck Khorgu Missile Base in Hormozgan Province between July 8 and 16.[48] The United States repeatedly struck the Khorgu Missile Base in March 2026.[49] The geospatial analyst also assessed on July 17 that the United States struck Khormoj Missile Base in Bushehr Province on an unspecified recent date.[50] The analyst said that Iran has launched ballistic missiles from the Khormoj base at Gulf states.[51]
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continued to deploy forces to one of the “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon on July 17.[52] Lebanese and Israeli media reported that the LAF deployed additional forces to Froun and Kfar Dounine in the Bint Jbeil District on July 17.[53] French media reported that the LAF also deployed additional forces to Qalaouiyeh in Bint Jbeil District on July 17.[54] The LAF began deploying forces to Froun, Kfar Dounine, Qalaouiyeh, and additional areas in and around the “pilot zones” as part of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement on July 16.[55] An Israeli military correspondent close to the Israeli government reported on July 17 that Kfar Dounine is within one of the pilot zones.[56] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not include Kfar Dounine in the two pilot zones that he announced on June 27, however.[57] Netanyahu originally stated that one pilot zone would include territory surrounding Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh District, and the other pilot zone would include territory surrounding Ghandouriyeh and Froun in Bint Jbeil District.[58] Israeli media reported on July 17 that Zawtar al Charqiyeh in Nabatieh District is expected to be the next pilot zone.[59]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Unidentified actors conducted multiple drone attacks targeting several sites in Iraqi Kurdistan, including the US Consulate in Erbil, on July 17.[60] Kurdish counter-terrorism authorities stated on July 17 that US-led international coalition forces intercepted eight booby-trapped drones but provided no further details.[61] Iraqi media separately reported on July 17 that air defenses at Erbil International Airport shot down four drones attempting to target the US Consulate in Erbil.[62] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched numerous attacks against US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war.[63] Unidentified actors also launched at least eight drones at the US Consulate in Erbil and a US base at Erbil International Airport on July 15.[64] No actor claimed the attack, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada denied responsibility for it.[65]
Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework sources revealed to regional media on July 17 additional information about how Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to circumvent the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament initiative.[66] The sources reported that some militias are surrendering “older and lower-quality” weapons, such as heavy mortars, Katyusha rockets, armored vehicles, and mines, to the Iraqi state.[67] The framework sources added that the militias have not handed over drones or missiles with a range longer than 50 kilometers.[68] Iraqi media similarly reported on July 10 that unidentified militias are surrendering “scrap” missiles or inoperable drones but keeping functional heavy weapons.[69] Militia attacks during the war demonstrated that the militias have access to a large number of missiles and drones, including first-person view (FPV) drones.[70] The militias have acquired many of these weapons from Iran and via smuggling routes in Syria. The Iraqi federal government lacks accurate information about the number and types of militia weapons due to the covert nature of the militias, including those within the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[71]
Gulf Activity
Kuwait is reportedly negotiating an expanded defense pact with Pakistan that would build upon a limited 2023 bilateral defense agreement between the two countries.[72] Unspecified Pakistani officials told Reuters on July 17 that Kuwait wants Islamabad to deploy aircraft, drones, an air defense system, and thousands of troops to Kuwait as part of the agreement.[73] Kuwait and Pakistan’s limited 2023 agreement includes joint training and capacity-building programs.[74] Kuwait would help boost Pakistan’s oil and fuel reserves under the new agreement.[75] A source familiar with Kuwaiti security planning told Reuters that Kuwait views Pakistan as a safe alternative for defense cooperation given Pakistan’s long history of defense procurement and its positive relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United States.[76] Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan in September 2025.[77] Unspecified sources with knowledge of Kuwait-Pakistan talks told Reuters that the negotiations are in an “early stage.”[78]
[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-targets-iranian-bridges-in-bid-to-choke-off-regimes-supply-routes-5ab1c512?st=pS9D82
[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-targets-iranian-bridges-in-bid-to-choke-off-regimes-supply-routes-5ab1c512?st=pS9D82
[3] https://t.me/snntv/496837 ;
https://t.me/hamshahrinews/360629 ;
[4] https://x.com/LayBay_ish/status/2077832323039363523?s=20
[5] https://www.ict.gov dot ir/fa/companies/ministry/regulater-سازمان-تنظیم-مقررات-و-ارتباطات-رادیویی
[6] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/331108
[7] https://www.irna dot ir/news/84026675
[8] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2077827826535854208?s=20 ;
[9] https://x.com/mew_kwt/status/2078040962413002952/photo/1
[10] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2077830449292812521
[11] https://apnews.com/article/iran-strikes-kuwait-gulf-bahrain-desalination-25e6d5c8d8a027897b3fb80fad57b7d2 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cgj0gn36px8t?post=asset%3A6e6e67e7-0bbe-4dd2-b417-501cffdc5484#post
[12] https://apnews.com/article/iran-strikes-kuwait-gulf-bahrain-desalination-25e6d5c8d8a027897b3fb80fad57b7d2
[13] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/15/trump-iran-hormuz-strikes-power-plants-targeted.html
[14] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86210362
[15] https://t.me/iribnews/351892
[16] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0608wy8pro
[17] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2078020969063424115/photo/1 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/63682 ;
https://t.me/iribnews/351846 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/63664 ;
[18] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/432673
[19] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607147249 ; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/07/12/772094/iran-response-fresh-us-aggression-red-lines-defending-national-security-strategic-interests; https://x.com/jeremyscahill/status/2076227981500953075; https://t.me/defapress_ir/63306 ; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/373707
[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-june-29-2026#_edn9df960fd2047b0aded323a5308518a7d28213c25124c66aa792afce5b4a7344018 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/426494
[21] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/375637
[22] https://x.com/PHREUTERS/status/2077990736738550006?s=20; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/205680; https://www dot tasnimnews/ dot ir/en/news/2026/07/17/3649063/irgc-strikes-us-military-center-in-syria
[23] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2021961984187539590
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-irgc-say-they-targeted-us-command-centre-syria-state-media-reports-2026-07-17/
[25] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2078119805958095168
[26] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2077734344546713976
[27] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/01/world/middleeast/syria-trump-hezbollah-lebanon.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-16/trump-says-syria-would-do-better-at-taming-hezbollah-than-israel
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-16-2026; https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2077695368825917619?s=20 ; https://www.instagram.com/p/Da2z06lDeTj/?img_index=2
[29] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/432816
[30] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/432816
[31] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2078041630888579547
[32] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/07/17/world/iran-war-trump-hormuz/d73f32f2-f0a0-5753-8376-23198419531b?smid=url-share
[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/some-ships-refusing-us-military-guided-hormuz-transits-after-attacks-sources-say-2026-07-15/
[34] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2077866609138393167; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2076732825349628250
[35] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2077866609138393167; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2078069023552524651
[36] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2077889092407431436
[37] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2077827826535854208?s=20 ;
[38] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2078125131847594149; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2077994795360796988
[39] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2074964708445085859
[40] https://t.me/VahidOnline/77175
[41] https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2032086870281036101?s=20; https://x.com/boringosint/status/2027754830677131440?s=20
[42] https://x.com/tom_bike/status/2076724427748774163
[43] https://t.me/BenTzionM/8003
[44] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hk9perc2zl
[45] https://t.me/VahidOnline/77160?single; https://t.me/defapress_ir/63663
[46] https://x.com/EpicFuryMap/status/2077847359698927841
[47] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2078152560846716993
[48] https://t.me/BenTzionM/8015
[49] https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/29/iran-ballistic-missile-sites/
[50] https://t.me/BenTzionM/8018
[51] https://t.me/BenTzionM/8018
[52]https://t.me/moriahdoron/32473 ; https://x.com/mayadeenlebanon/status/2078101924184739967 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/78740 ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/lebanese-army-redeploys-to-southern-towns-amid-framework-deal-with-israel/ ; https://x.com/AFPar/status/2078012999210549305
[53]https://t.me/moriahdoron/32473 ; https://x.com/mayadeenlebanon/status/2078101924184739967 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/78740 ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/lebanese-army-redeploys-to-southern-towns-amid-framework-deal-with-israel/
[54] https://x.com/AFPar/status/2078012999210549305
[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-16-2026/ ; https://www.facebook.com/LebaneseArmedForcesOfficial/posts/pfbid0VtRv444PauqBPuRgNVzc9CHyfRNi4B4v5ew42zAJ3ZRSFkXMTiuCYu9D2i5xQ6HGl ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5296807-الجيش-اللبناني-يستبق-الجلسة-التقنية-مع-إسرائيل-بإجراءات-أمنية
[56] https://t.me/moriahdoron/32473
[57] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2070940344967893212?s=20
[58] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2070940344967893212?s=20
[59] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/lebanese-army-redeploys-to-southern-towns-amid-framework-deal-with-israel/
[60] https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقاط-4-مسيرات-جديدة-في-سما-ربيل ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقاط-4-مسيرات-حاولت-استهداف-القنصلية-ال-ميركية-في-ربيل
[61] https://almadapaper dot net/443933/ ; DNGTS: https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/مكافحة-ال-رهاب-بكوردستان-تعلن-حباط-هجمات-بـ8-طا-رات-مسيرة-في-سما-ربيل
[62] https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقاط-4-مسيرات-جديدة-في-سما-ربيل ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقاط-4-مسيرات-حاولت-استهداف-القنصلية-ال-ميركية-في-ربيل
[63] https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقاط-مسي-رة-جديدة-حاولت-استهداف-مطار-ربيل ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1616
[64] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/2077491979881980255 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/2077462290816000177 ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Kurdistan/Three-drones-downed-near-US-Consulate-in-Erbil
[65] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الفصا-ل-العراقية-تن-ى-بنفسها-عن-قصف-ربيل-سلاحنا-باق-والتحرك-بوقت-مناسب
[66] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/العراق-لماذا-تتم-عملية-حصر-سلاح-الفصائل-سراً
[67] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/العراق-لماذا-تتم-عملية-حصر-سلاح-الفصائل-سراً)
[68] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/العراق-لماذا-تتم-عملية-حصر-سلاح-الفصائل-سراً)
[69] https://almadapaper dot net/442723/
[70] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[71] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus163-KnightsMalikTamimi-v3%281%29.pdf#pdfjs.action=download, pp 58-59
[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-kuwait-discuss-expanded-defence-pact-sources-say-2026-07-17/
[73] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-kuwait-discuss-expanded-defence-pact-sources-say-2026-07-17/
[74] alqabas dot com/article/5965085-%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B3-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7/
[75] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-kuwait-discuss-expanded-defence-pact-sources-say-2026-07-17/
[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-kuwait-discuss-expanded-defence-pact-sources-say-2026-07-17/
[77] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/
[78] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-kuwait-discuss-expanded-defence-pact-sources-say-2026-07-17/
