Toplines
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears committed to optimizing Russian forces for continued positional warfare in Ukraine — not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held a Russian MoD board meeting on July 17 with deputy defense ministers Alexey Krivoruchko, Dmitry Shcherbinin, Vasily Osmarov, Anna Tsivileva, and Army General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov; Deputy Defense Minister for Logistics Colonel General Alexander Sanchik; First Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Gornin; and Russian State Council Secretary Alexei Dyumin to discuss the progress toward achieving objectives that the board set at the end of 2025.[1] Sanchik and Krivoruchko emphasized that the Russian MoD improved the mobility of Russian assault units by prioritizing the procurement of small, motorized vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[2] Sanchik added that Russia increased supply deliveries on the battlefield by integrating unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Krivoruchko claimed that Russian forces trained 8,000 UAV specialists in the first half of 2026 and that the MoD more than doubled its drone deliveries to Russian troops from 2025 deliveries.[3] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces are experiencing administrative and training bottlenecks for recruitment of drone operators and continue facing specialists’ shortages in unmanned systems units amid declining recruitment rates, contrary to Krivoruchko’s claims.[4] Sanchik and Krivoruchko’s statements indicate that Russian forces continued to prioritize and optimize for attacks on small, motorized vehicles over armored mechanized vehicles such as tanks and continued supplying kit such as UGVs to sustain forces in “kill zone” and positional warfare conditions. The Russian MoD therefore remained committed to enabling Russian forces to facilitate slow, grinding advances rather than resuming fast-paced maneuver warfare, as senior Russian defense officials previously outlined these optimizations during the last Russian MoD board meeting on December 17, 2025.[5]
Russian forces are actively continuing to prioritize a mode of warfare that is failing to enable them to advance. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces are losing 1.6 square kilometers per day thus far in July 2026 and will likely continue to struggle to achieve meaningful territorial advances as they have in recent months.
Russia’s prioritization of its war efforts in Ukraine and suboptimal economic policies are reportedly triggering a broader economic decline in Russia. The Moscow Exchange Composite Stock Index (IMOEX) fell by 4.24 percent to about 2,022 points at the end of the day on July 16 — marking the steepest single-day decline since September 26, 2022 — and declined again to 1,958 points on July 17 by the end of the main trading session.[6] Russian majority state-owned VTB Bank’s shares on the IMOEX Index fell by six percent to an all-time low of 57.8 rubles (about $0.74) per share on July 16.[7] The Russian Central Bank reported July 15 that its Business Climate Indicator (BCI) decreased by 4.5 points to negative 3.6 points in July 2026 — the lowest level since April 2022 and lower than after the Fall 2022 partial mobilization.[8] The BCI is a monthly survey-based measure of economic activity in Russia designed to show how businesses assess their current economic conditions. The Russian economy is likely experiencing a financial decline that extends beyond the recent fuel shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine amid Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and fuel infrastructure. Russia’s emphasis on sustaining the war effort and building up its defense industrial base (DIB) throughout the war has, in part, led to many of Russia’s current economic issues, including increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages within the construction and services industries, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[9] Devaluations of Russian state-owned banks, along with Russia’s ongoing and escalating nationalization campaign, likely deter stakeholders from investing in the Russian economy.[10] These factors, including Russia’s censorship campaign to control internet access that impacts Russians’ ability to conduct business, likely also have a compounding negative effect on Russia’s economic performance that the Kremlin will likely fail to adequately address in the mid- to long term.[11]
A Russian state-affiliated polling center recorded one of the sharpest drops in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings since the start of the war in Ukraine following several months of steady decline. The Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) published on July 17 the results of a poll taken from July 10 to 12, measuring a five percent drop in Putin’s approval rating to about 66 percent, one of the largest drops in Putin’s approval rating since February 2022.[12] The FOM also recorded that trust levels in Putin dropped from 69 to 67 percent in the same time period. The FOM’s drop in Putin’s approval ratings now coheres more closely with the polling from the Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), which recorded Putin’s approval rating at about 66 percent in a poll published on July 10.[13] Both the FOM and VTsIOM have recorded relatively steady declines in Putin’s approval and trust ratings since March 2026, but the percentage points that each has published have not closely cohered until now despite both having connections to the Russian government.[14] Data from the FOM and VTsIOM remains unreliable in terms of gauging what percentage of Russians are actually discontent with the Russian government, but it remains notable that Russian state-owned and state-affiliated polling centers believe it necessary to acknowledge growing societal discontent that is likely related to the broader costs of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, which are increasingly burdening ordinary Russians.[15]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government on July 17. Zelensky appointed on July 17 the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) First Deputy Head Oleksandr Poklad as the acting SBU head following Zelensky’s appointment of outgoing SBU Head Yevheny Khmara as the interim defense minister on July 16.[16] Zelensky proposed that Internal Affairs Minister General Ihor Klymenko become the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council and noted that he is preparing a formal decree to send to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) for approval.[17] Zelensky announced on July 16 that he dismissed Timur Tkachenko as the head of the Kyiv City Military Administration and has yet to appoint his replacement.[18] Former acting Digital Transformation Minister Oleksandr Bornyakov announced on July 16 that he is leaving the ministry following the appointment of Oksana Ferchuk as the minister of digital transformation earlier on July 16.[19]
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears committed to optimizing Russian forces for continued positional warfare in Ukraine — not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains.
- Russia’s prioritization of its war efforts in Ukraine and suboptimal economic policies are reportedly triggering a broader economic decline in Russia.
- A Russian state-affiliated polling center recorded one of the sharpest drops in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings since the start of the war in Ukraine, following several months of steady decline.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government on July 17.
- Russia launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles, and 130 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 17.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian sources provided battlefield damage assessments (BDAs) for recent Ukrainian long-range strikes into Russia. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 17 that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast severely damaged a Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber and tore off the aircraft’s tail, likely referring to the Ukrainian strike against Engels-2 Airbase on the night of July 15 to 16.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck and caused a fire at the Slavneft-YANOS Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City on July 16 and noted that Ukraine is still conducting BDA of the strike.[21] Satellite imagery from Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) projects collected on July 16 shows damage to the AVT-4 and AVT-6 processing units of the Salavat Oil Refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan following Ukrainian strikes on July 14.[22]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 16 and 17, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[23] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 17 that Russian forces have seized 11 settlements in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in the past six months, refuting a Russian Northern Grouping of Forces’ July 16 claim that Russian forces have seized 50 settlements since the beginning of 2026 and are operating nine kilometers from Sumy City.[24] The source claimed that the Northern Grouping of Forces falsely claimed control over several settlements that are located dozens of kilometers from the active frontline. ISW observed Russian forces conduct infiltration missions at least 15 kilometers from Sumy City.
Ukrainian forces continued their drone strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 17 that Ukrainian forces struck an automobile bridge near Kozino, Kursk Oblast (roughly 1.5 kilometers from the international border) that Russian forces use for military logistics.[25]
Russian forces are escalating strikes in northern Ukraine in an effort to isolate more frontline and intermediate rear areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 17 that Russian forces are continuing plans to expand their so-called buffer zone in northern Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s heavy multi-layered defenses.[26] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 17 that the Russian command ordered elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and frontline drone operators to intensify drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and transportation in frontline areas and near the international border in northern Ukraine.[27] The GUR reported that Russian drone operators plan to use Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 fixed-wing attack drones; Lancet loitering munitions; Geran-Seeker and Gerbera-Seeker jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and V2U artificial intelligence (AI) powered attack drones to target gas stations, trucks, buses, and light vehicles.
Order of battle: An Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) platoon of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th Airborne Division) is reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[28] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of the 56th Guards VDV Regiment having a USF platoon operating in the Sumy direction.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 16 and 17 but did not advance.[29] Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows elements of the Ukrainian Skelya 425th Separate Assault Regiment clearing a Russian-occupied building in northern Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[30] The Skelya Regiment reported that its elements repelled a Russian infiltration attempt via the international border near Kozacha Lopan.[31] Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian fuel storage site in Hrafske (southwest of Vovchansk), indicating that Russian forces do not maintain positions in the area.[32]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 16 and 17 but did not advance.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 16 and 17 but did not advance.[34]
Russian forces continue to rely on infiltration tactics and a massive number of drones in the Kupyansk direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on July 17 that Russian forces are relying on infiltration tactics and launching KAB glide bomb and drone strikes against Ukrainian forces and civilian targets in an attempt to undermine Ukrainian rear positions.[35] The spokesperson added that Russian forces actively use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) for logistics in the Kupyansk direction but are not using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) at scale.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[36] A Russian milblogger published a map on July 16 that claims that Russian forces marginally advanced northeast of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control most of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[39]
Russian forces are reportedly losing the initiative in the Lyman direction but are continuing efforts to interdict Ukrainian logistics over the Siverskyi Donets and Oskil rivers. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on July 17 that Russian infantrymen are losing the initiative in the Lyman direction but that Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) over the Siverskyi Donets and Oskil rivers with drones and KAB glide bombs.[40] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are deploying additional recruits in the Lyman direction and are using radio-controlled and fiber-optic first person view (FPV) drones in this direction.
Russian forces continue leaning into offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, recently infiltrated southwest of Kostyantynivka, and are increasing airstrikes and counter-drone capabilities in this direction. A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on July 16 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure have reduced Russian efforts to field vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction, but that Ukrainian forces destroy about 90 percent of Russian armored vehicles before they reach the frontline.[41] A Ukrainian military source reported on July 17 that Russian forces are scaling up counter-drone capabilities in the rear areas of the Dobropillya-Druzhkivka axis (which includes the western flank of the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction), deploying a large number of drone teams to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes and increasing their drone interception rate at the tactical depth.[42] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces are also increasing their glide bomb strikes in the area. The Ukrainian source indicated that Russian forces have likely infiltrated areas east of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Malynivka; Vsiutynske (both east of Kramatorsk); north of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka); and east of, west of, and in Novopavlivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 17 and recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Hannivka (immediately east of Dobropillya), in Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), and into eastern Dobropillya.[45] A Ukrainian military source indicated on July 17 that Russian forces have likely seized Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya), but ISW assesses that Russian forces did not seize Zapovidne over the past day.[46]
Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows a Russian FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a purported Ukrainian drone control point in Dobropillya.[47]
Russian forces are reportedly attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions by conducting infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian drone battalion’s command post head operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on July 17 that Russian forces continue attempts to bypass Ukrainian positions without engaging the Ukrainian infantry at those positions, but added that Ukrainian forces are preventing these Russian groups from advancing.[48] A Ukrainian military source indicated that Russian forces maintain a presence west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), suggesting that Russian forces have likely infiltrated these areas.[49]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), south of Shevchenko (northeast of Pokrovsk), and in Shevchenko itself.[50]
Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to use drone operations to deny each other the ability to use vehicles close to the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian drone battalion’s command post head reported that Ukrainian drone operators conduct reconnaissance at depths up to 30 kilometers from the frontline to detect moving Russian soldiers and that Russian soldiers must march up to 50 kilometers to reach the frontline due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian vehicles.[51] The command post head reported that Russian forces are using Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions and are using mothership drones to drop artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled first-person view (FPV) drones behind Ukrainian lines to strike targets in Ukrainian rear areas. The command post head reported that Russian forces are hiding artillery systems like the D-30 howitzers by removing the systems’ wheels.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on July 17 as Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction, but did not advance.[52]
Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on July 13 shows elements of the Russian Salehard Unmanned Systems Forces detachment striking a Ukrainian position in western Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[53] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows the Salehard detachment striking a Ukrainian position in Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk).[54] ISW is not prepared to assess at this time that this evidence indicates that the Russian military command redeployed the Salehard detachment, as the detachment may be operating across a wide area of responsibility.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge of the Kalmius River near occupied Staromaryivka (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline), a supply and technical equipment depot near Pokrovsk, and a Russian command and observation post near occupied Novotroitske (either roughly eight or 75 kilometers from the frontline) on July 16 or the night of July 16 to 17.[55] Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows a Russian truck burning on the side of the M-30 Horlivka-Donetsk City highway near occupied Panteleimonivka (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) following a Ukrainian strike.[56]
Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on July 16 that Russian forces are increasing their use of KAB glide bombs and drones against frontline settlements in Donetsk Oblast.[57]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 16 and 17 but did not advance.[58]
Ukrainian forces continued intermediate and frontline strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian command posts and warehouses near occupied Prymorsk (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline), with NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 17 showing heat anomalies in the area.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a substation in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[60]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson Oblast on July 17.
Ukrainian strikes are causing power outages across occupied Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Occupation Governor Vladimir Saldo stated on July 16 that Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes against critical infrastructure within the 15-kilometer zone in occupied Kherson Oblast caused power outages across occupied Kherson Oblast.[61]
Ukrainian forces continued strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea, particularly near Kerch, on July 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Svetlyak Project 10410 patrol ship, the TES-Terminal-1 oil terminal, and a fuel and lubricants warehouse near occupied Kerch.[62] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 17 shows heat anomalies near an electrical substation and pumping station near occupied Koktebel (roughly 248 kilometers from the frontline); near the Kerch railway station in occupied Kerch; an electrical substation near the Arabat Spit; the Chornomorneftegaz gas treatment plant near occupied Baherove (east of Kerch); and between a former Russian military airfield and occupied Baherove.[63] A local Crimean Telegram channel reported on July 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian cash transit vehicle that Russian forces use for supply and logistics support near occupied Krasnoperekopsk (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline).[64]
The Ukrainian strike campaign to isolate occupied Crimea continues to degrade Russian air defense capacity. A commander of a Ukrainian company stated on July 16 that Ukrainian long-range strikes against occupied Crimea are limiting Russian forces’ ability to move freely in the deep rear and forcing Russia to spend more funds on air defense production.[65] The commander noted that Ukrainian forces are strategically cutting off occupied Crimea and urging residents to leave the peninsula. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces have not yet struck the Kerch Strait Bridge because Russian forces use traffic along the bridge as a “human shield”.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov on July 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 17 that Ukrainian forces struck one Russian tanker, one gas tanker, and one tugboat in the Black and Azov seas and that Russian forces use these tankers to transport oil and petroleum to circumvent international sanctions and to support Russian forces.[66] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi added on July 17 that Ukrainian forces struck nine Russian dry cargo ships in the Black Sea, likely referring to several of the same ships that the Ukrainian General Staff referenced.[67] Brovdi added that Ukrainian forces have struck 159 Russian vessels, including 117 in the Azov Sea and 42 in the Black Sea between July 6 and 17. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 17 that some Ukrainian FP-2 mid-range strike drones began using automatic target-acquisition and guidance systems to strike Russian vessels in the Black Sea.[68] The milblogger noted that Russian forces have deployed a similar artificial intelligence (AI)-based algorithm on Russian Geran-2/4 Seeker drones.
Ukrainian strikes in the Black and Azov seas continue to affect Russia’s maritime transportation routes. The Insider reported on July 16, citing an open source intelligence (OSINT) project, that Russia does not have a single vessel in the Mediterranean Sea for the first time since 2013.[69]
Ukrainian strike campaign in occupied Crimea continues to affect the quality of life on the peninsula. Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev stated on July 17 that there are worsening power outages in occupied Sevastopol and that authorities are prioritizing power supplies for hospitals, pumping stations, and other critical facilities.[70] Russian opposition source Meduza, citing NASA Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) Black Marble, reported on July 17 that the data indicates that the general illumination in occupied Crimea at the end of June decreased by five times compared to the normal level and has yet to recover.[71] Independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported on July 16 that Russian occupation authorities require residents in occupied northern Crimea to obtain military registration to receive compensation for power and water outages.[72] Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on July 16 that Russian authorities halted traffic through the Kerch Bridge for seven hours, with around 1,200 cars waiting to cross from the directions of occupied Kerch and Taman, Russia, for up to three hours.[73] Former Mariupol City Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on July 17 that Russian forces closed the Chonhar checkpoint in occupied Kherson Oblast.[74] The Economist reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces have conducted 692 strikes against occupied Crimea since 2022, with more than half taking place since July 2025.[75] The Economist added that residents of occupied Crimea have to stock up on long-life food and queue overnight for petrol while Russian military personnel are able to use food and fuel reserves on the peninsula.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile and seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles from occupied Crimea, and 130 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed five Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 115 drones, that two missiles and eight drones struck seven locations, that drone debris struck five locations, and that the Kh-31P anti-radar missile failed to reach its target. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, transport, agricultural, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[77] Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian locomotive north of Trudove, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[78] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 17 that Russian forces struck targets throughout Odesa Oblast with at least 15 KAB glide bombs, killing two and injuring five.[79] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on July 17 that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[80]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is expanding the Ukrainian private air defense ecosystem. The Ukrainian MoD reported on July 17 that 51 Ukrainian enterprises have joined a pilot project to integrate private businesses into the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[81] The Ukrainian MoD granted these enterprises authorization to carry out air defense measures and reported that four enterprises have already intercepted over 50 Russian long-range strike and reconnaissance drones.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1]
https://t.me/mod_russia/65652; https://t.me/mod_russia/65654; https://t.me/mod_russia/65655; https://t.me/mod_russia/65656; https://t.me/mod_russia/65657; https://t.me/mod_russia/65658; https://t.me/mod_russia/65660; https://t.me/mod_russia/65661; https://t.me/mod_russia/65662; https://t.me/mod_russia/65663; https://t.me/mod_russia/65664; https://t.me/mod_russia/65665; https://t.me/mod_russia/65666; https://t.me/mod_russia/65667; https://t.me/mod_russia/65668; https://t.me/mod_russia/65669
[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/65654; https://t.me/mod_russia/65655; https://t.me/mod_russia/65656; https://t.me/mod_russia/65657
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/65656; https://t.me/mod_russia/65657
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/
[6] https://www.moex dot com/en/index/IMOEX/archive?from=2025-07-17&till=2026-07-17&sort=TRADEDATE&order=desc ; https://www.rbc dot ru/quote/16/07/2026/6a13e1829a794726c5d6dcae?from=story_6a02df619a794741a2036dfe
[7] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1103745
[8] https://cbr dot ru/analytics/dkp/monitoring/0726/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Russian20Force20Generation20and20Adaptations20Update20April20152C20202520120PDF.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Russian20Force20Generation20and20Adaptations20Update20May20212C2020252028PDF29.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/
[12] https://fom dot ru/Politika/10946; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/17/reyting-putina-padaet-rekordnymi-s-nachala-voyny-tempami;
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[16] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6222026-60441; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[17] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20002
[18] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6152026-60417
[19] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10242968399209948&id=1352883385&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=pg8u0tFFRADf5vP2#; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[20] https://t.me/SBUkr/18124; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/17/povnistyu-vidirvano-hvist-u-sbu-povidomyly-detali-znyshhennya-tu-95/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41200; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[22] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13332 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/25435 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/salavatskomu-npz-urazyly-ustanovky-nafty/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/
[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/35601; https://t.me/dva_majors/96252; https://t.me/severnnyi/8707; https://t.me/sashakots/63168; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20257
[24] https://t.me/severnnyi/8715 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20257
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41200
[26] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02NdrxGpxLgZrLcstX3j1GKWzUbVCbrMSfbjGZ8wuLqvyfubGXhm8TtbM7DpmvENk8l
[27] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8913
[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/96256
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177; https://t.me/severnnyi/8707; https://t.me/sashakots/63168; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20257; https://t.me/epoddubny/28237; https:/t.me/vysokygovorit/23342; https://t.me/wargonzo/35601
[30] https://x.com/Skelya425/status/2078031038089945483 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2078081686638567793
[31] https://x.com/Skelya425/status/2078031038089945483
[32] https://x.com/Skelya425/status/2078031038089945483; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2078081686638567793; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2077987091892310415 ; https://t.me/izvestia/246608
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177; https://t.me/severnnyi/8707
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/osirskiy/1766; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45428; https://t.me/wargonzo/35601; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/17/minus-odyn-dron-nad-nashymy-golovamy%c2%abyak-polyuyut-na-rosijskyh-operatoriv-bpla/; https://t.me/grvZapad/19161
[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/17/minus-odyn-dron-nad-nashymy-golovamy%c2%abyak-polyuyut-na-rosijskyh-operatoriv-bpla/
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/96252; https://t.me/grvZapad/19161; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45428; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45405
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177; https://t.me/grvZapad/19161
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45405
[40] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1357526-rosijska-armia-atakue-perepravi-bila-limana-abi-uskladniti-oboronu-ukrainskim-vijskovim-66-ombr/
[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/16/90-znyshhuyetsya-shhe-na-pidhodah-na-kostyantynivskomu-napryamku-vorog-ridko-ryzykuye-lizty-tehnikoyu-v-kil-zonu/
[42] https://x.com/solonko1648/status/2077835494927274036; https://x.com/solonko1648/status/2077835634467627056; https://x.com/solonko1648/status/2077835739362918797; https://x.com/solonko1648/status/2077835937703178325; https://t.me/silukr/1030
[43] https://t.me/divgen/82411 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33551
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177
[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33551
[46] https://t.me/silukr/1030
[47] https://t.me/Osintpen/3147; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30027;
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/17/%c2%abdes-50-km-vony-jdut-pishky%c2%bb-yak-zryvayut-rosijski-ataky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[49] https://t.me/silukr/1030`
[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33551
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/17/%c2%abdes-50-km-vony-jdut-pishky%c2%bb-yak-zryvayut-rosijski-ataky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177
[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12491; https://t.me/vbs_salehard/9
[54] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2075912082722038062; https://t.me/vbs_salehard/8
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41200
[56] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2077874986384306622?s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2077875145709064669?s=20 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/62989v
[57] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/16830;
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41199; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41179; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41177; https://t.me/wargonzo/35601; https://t.me/motopatriot78/53943 ; https://t.me/sashakots/63175; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45416; https://t.me/dva_majors/96252
[59] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2077763875248767119?s=20 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2077807008552476827?s=20 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2077809211212263556?s=20 ; https://x.com/gunn59058/status/2077817226984398918?s=20; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@36.284,46.791,11.174z
[60] https://t.me/arx_spn/30340
[61] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/16515; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/39596; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/39600
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41200
[63] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104920 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104971; https://t.me/andriyshTime/63236; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104915 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104927; https:/t.me/Crimeanwind/104951; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104937 ; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@35.7,46.1,7.7z
[64] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104982
[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Nr9g5VJMxw&t=3s; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1356712-ak-middle-strike-droni-znisuut-cili-rf-u-krimu-komandir-roti-udarnih-kril-brigadi-nemesis-u-podkasti-pro-krim-20/
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41200
[67] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2612 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2614 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2210 ;
[68] https://t.me/milinfolive/176251
[69] https://theins dot press/en/news/294958
[70] https://t.me/razvozhaev/22339
[71] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/07/17/ukraina-pogruzhaet-krym-vo-tmu-eto-horosho-vidno-dazhe-iz-kosmosa
[72] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2026/07/16/zhitelei-severa-kryma-zastavliaiut-vstavat-na-voinskii-uchet-dlia-polucheniia-kompensatsii-za-otkliucheniia-sveta-i-vody-news; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/17/novaya-gazeta-evropa-zhiteli-severa-kryma-zhaluyutsya-chto-ih-zastavlyayut-vstavat-na-voinskiy-uchet-dlya-polucheniya-kompensatsiy-za-otklyucheniya-sveta-i-vody
[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/385577;https://t.me/tass_agency/385607; https://t.me/tass_agency/385609
[74] https://t.me/andriyshTime/63285
[75] https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2026/07/16/russia-is-losing-its-grip-on-crimea?giftId=MGViYmUwNzAtNmE2YS00NTIyLTlhMzItOTNiNmFhZGFlYzM2&utm_campaign=gifted_article; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104965
[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/68838
[77] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30536; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0kKxqenQCvxPzuwEh8Ku6H44aC628B7uM421M8mxNgNRx94sL87FRw2f7vs4ffeLrl&id=61579137283645&__cft__[0]=AZZNYm-lcoAaV9hZDDeegeUMNDv26Px9TQGBSCkA9BLufRm42l093sMfQQMoMhdK3QbhG2_Vt5Ba1Uh86wehDd6OgaQtitp3tDd4DL5qwhj-pCg7Z0hrDZ4YSgO98x2MsFxNHAdzrl42J-xNaToZ0_wvWd5EI4TUcuddMz3wpaw81A&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30840; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27631; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30840; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27631; https://t.me/synegubov/23871; https://t.me/synegubov/23867; https://t.me/synegubov/23873; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4335; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4338; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4337; https://myk.gp.gov dot ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=426158; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/44001; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44249; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/69005?single
[78] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2077772465103605815?s=20; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30018; https://t.me/mod_russia/65626
[79] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19989;
[80] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7453; https://suspilne dot media/1357362-cerez-obstrili-e-znestrumlenna-u-pati-oblastah-minenergo/
[81] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/vzhe-ponad-piv-sotni-pidpryiemstv-pryiednalysia-do-pryvatnoi-ppo
