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Iran Update

Iran Update Special Report, June 25, 2026

June 25, 2026

Iran Update Special Report, June 25, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways

Toplines

Iran is attacking and threatening vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to advance its objective of establishing control over the waterway. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked a vessel approximately eight nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, on June 25.[1] The attack came after the IRGC Navy issued a warning demanding that vessels coordinate with Iranian authorities and use the Iranian-approved traffic separation scheme.[2] The IRGC Navy warned that traffic outside these routes is “very dangerous” and implicitly threatened vessels that do not comply.[3] Iran likely seeks to use force and coercion to compel vessels to use its illegitimate traffic separation scheme and implicitly acknowledge Iranian control over the strait, which is a key objective for the regime.

The recent attack and ongoing threats also likely seek to undermine international efforts to guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Oman announced a joint initiative on June 23 to help hundreds of stranded vessels transit the strait through a designated safe route.[4] The IRGC Navy criticized the initiative as “unacceptable and completely dangerous,” likely because Iran assesses that a viable transit route outside Iranian territorial waters would weaken its ability to control maritime traffic and use the strait as leverage.[5] Commercially available maritime data indicates that at least 67 vessels transited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[6] Forty-seven vessels used the IMO-Omani route along the Omani coast, while only ten used the Iranian-approved route, which illustrates how alternative transit routes may threaten Iran’s efforts to manage traffic through the strait unless Iran continues to fire on shipping or otherwise compel shipping to use its transit scheme.[7] The IMO paused its evacuation plan following the IRGC attack on the vessel.[8] One of the IMO’s key responsibilities is to designate safe maritime routes.[9] Iran may calculate that attacks on vessels could discourage countries and international organizations from facilitating such alternative transit routes.

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Iran is using military threats and economic incentives to try to convince Gulf states to support its efforts to control the strait, but the Gulf states appear to be resisting Iranian pressure at present. The recent Iranian threats and attacks likely serve as an implicit warning to Gulf countries—particularly Oman, given the Omani-IMO efforts described above—that Iran will continue to attack international shipping if they do not cooperate with Iran. Iran used a similar strategy during the recent US-Iran War. Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Gulf states during the war in order to try to influence their decision-making to achieve Iranian objectives, which included halting US operations against Iran and driving a wedge between the United States and its Gulf allies. Iran is currently trying to diplomatically induce and militarily compel these states into cooperation. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi on June 25, likely as part of this broader diplomatic effort.[10] The US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to coordinate with Oman and the other Gulf countries on the future management of the strait, which likely explains Iran’s efforts to do so in recent days.[11] Iran has also offered economic incentives to attract regional support for its plans for the strait. Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Iran wants Gulf states to participate in a future system that would charge vessels for services in the strait and share the revenue.[12] Officials familiar with the proposal estimated that such fees could generate roughly 40 billion USD annually “for [the] states involved.”[13] It is not immediately clear whether this means 40 billion USD annually split between the states involved, or 40 billion USD annually per state.

The Gulf states appear to be resisting Iran’s efforts to control the strait and impose fees on maritime traffic, however. Delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, met with a US delegation led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Manama, Bahrain, on June 25 to discuss the US-Iran MoU and maritime security in the strait, among other issues.[14] The United States and GCC foreign ministers issued a joint statement following the meeting that emphasized the importance of “free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation” and rejected “any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait.”[15] Iran has attempted to reframe tolls as “service fees” and has signaled its intention to impose such charges over the long term.[16] The joint statement addresses this distinction and opposes any payment requirement for transit through the strait. The statement also rejects efforts to control the strait more broadly, not merely the imposition of tolls.[17] This language implicitly opposes Iranian attempts to manage maritime traffic through measures such as its traffic separation scheme or requirements that vessels coordinate with the IRGC Navy. A senior UAE adviser similarly criticized Iranian efforts to impose a new reality in the strait and region.[18]

US Vice President JD Vance told a UK-based outlet on June 25 that the United States and Iran established a direct deconfliction channel in Doha, Qatar, to reduce the threat of conflict resuming.[19] Vance added that Iran agreed to establish a direct deconfliction channel between an IRGC representative and a US Central Command official in Doha to resolve disputes.[20] Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf previously stated on June 22 that Iran and the United States agreed to establish a mechanism to quickly resolve potential problems or incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, which may be referring to the channel that Vance announced.[21]

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf

See topline section.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Iran’s Axis of Resistance

Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon

US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials continue to discuss proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon as trilateral talks continue in Washington, DC, on June 25. Lebanese media reported on June 25 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations have exchanged and rejected over ten proposals to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon due to disagreements over the location and timeframe for the proposed “pilot zones.”[22] A Lebanese official told Reuters on June 25 that the Lebanese government wants the “pilot zones” to be established in Israel’s “security zone” and facilitate a complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.[23] Israeli and Lebanese officials stated that the Israeli delegation, however, has insisted that the ”pilot zones“ should be established in areas north of the Israeli “security zone” on an incremental, case-by-case basis without any timeline.[24] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer said on June 25 that any “redeployment” would only come once southern Lebanon was demilitarized and Hezbollah disarmed.[25] The IDF remains deployed both within the IDF “security zone” in southern Lebanon and at points beyond the Yellow Line.[26] Israeli officials and the IDF on June 25 rejected reports that the IDF had begun to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon.[27]  The IDF announced that Israeli forces have not changed positions in southern Lebanon.[28] The IDF has also continued to respond to threats it perceived in southern Lebanon on June 25.[29] The IDF reported that its forces killed five Hezbollah fighters in a vehicle between Zawtar al Charqiyeh and Maifadoun in Nabatieh District.[30] The IDF reported that it also conducted an airstrike targeting Hezbollah fighters in the vicinity of Kfar Tebnit, Nabatieh District, on June 25.[31]  Israeli officials continue to reiterate that the IDF will remain in Lebanon until Hezbollah no longer poses a threat to the IDF and Israel.[32]

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Other Axis of Resistance Activity

Nothing significant to report.

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[1] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2070160682264269241
[2] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/425336
[3] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/425336
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/evacuation-plan-through-hormuz-stranded-ships-gulf-underway-un-agency-say-2026-06-23/
[5] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/425336

[6] Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at https://www.starboardintelligence.com/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyekkwm1mmo
[7] Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at https://www.starboardintelligence.com/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyekkwm1mmo

[8] https://x.com/IMOHQ/status/2070201674619101263?s=20
[9] https://www.imo.org/en/about/pages/default.aspx
[10] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/367008
[11] https://www.axios.com/2026/06/17/read-full-us-iran-deal-memorandum-understanding
[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plans-to-make-billions-in-fees-from-reopening-the-strait-of-hormuz-92bdfa76?mod=hp_lead_pos4
[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plans-to-make-billions-in-fees-from-reopening-the-strait-of-hormuz-92bdfa76?mod=hp_lead_pos4
[14] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/ar/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news-2026-6-25-7.aspx
[15] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news-2026-6-25-10.aspx ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-following-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-and-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc/
[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-june-23-2026
[17] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news-2026-6-25-10.aspx ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-following-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-and-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc/

[18] https://x.com/AnwarGargash/status/2070022688865972340?s=20
[19] https://unherd.com/2026/06/jd-vance-our-new-relationship-with-iran/?edition=us
[20] https://unherd.com/2026/06/jd-vance-our-new-relationship-with-iran/?edition=us
[21] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/927191
[22] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75930
[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-withdraws-part-southern-lebanon-buffer-zone-us-state-department-official-2026-06-25/
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-withdraws-part-southern-lebanon-buffer-zone-us-state-department-official-2026-06-25/
[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-withdraws-part-southern-lebanon-buffer-zone-us-state-department-official-2026-06-25/
[26] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2070073117813133528?s=20 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/32009
[27] https://t.me/moriahdoron/32009 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-withdraws-part-southern-lebanon-buffer-zone-us-state-department-official-2026-06-25/
[28] https://t.me/moriahdoron/32009
[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2070211744144748826 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2070063252248068574 ; https://x.com/NidaaWatan/status/2070063780868829599?s=20 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2070063252248068574 ; https://x.com/NidaaWatan/status/2070063780868829599?s=20
[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-withdraws-part-southern-lebanon-buffer-zone-us-state-department-official-2026-06-25/ ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/32014 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/32015 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2070211744144748826
[31] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2070063252248068574 ; https://x.com/NidaaWatan/status/2070063780868829599?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2070211744144748826
[32] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/2069840011655020655?s=20 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-withdraws-part-southern-lebanon-buffer-zone-us-state-department-official-2026-06-25/ ; https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/lebanonnews/2026-06-24/ty-article/.premium/israeli-defense-minister-idf-to-remain-in-lebanon-even-if-u-s-demands-pullback/0000019e-f976-d58e-afbf-fd7f24b20000 https://x.com/idfonline/status/2068695551499997530 ;
https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2068718345948475746 ;
https://x.com/N12News/status/2068650641166119125 ;
https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2068580283629072787

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