Executive Summary

Russian forces have been improving the intensity, tempo, precision, and depth of Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign since late 2025 and are attempting to destroy operationally-significant targets farther in the rear in order to weaken Ukraine’s frontline defenses. BAI refers to the use of air power to strike targets in the operational or near rear (within 100-120 kilometers) of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[1] Russia intensified its BAI campaign in January 2026, chiefly after Russian developers began adding Starlink satellite communication terminals onto tactical and long-range drones at scale. Connectivity via Starlink extended the ranges of Russian first-person view (FPV) capabilities and enabled Russian forces to threaten Ukrainian supply lines and isolate more areas in the Ukrainian operational rear. SpaceX’s blocking of Starlink for Russian users in Ukraine on February 1 is already degrading Russia’s ability to target Ukrainian logistics at extended ranges, but is unlikely to halt the Russian BAI campaign in the near and immediate rear, nor to prevent Russian forces from fully achieving BAI effects across the theater. Russian forces have been innovating and adopting other means to intensify the BAI campaign by extending the ranges of glide bombs, leveraging mesh networks to support long-range drone communications, and upgrading mothership drones since late 2025. Russian forces are also trying to find alternatives to Starlink to recreate the BAI effects that Russian forces achieved in January 2026. Ukraine and its partners must urgently invest in kinetic air defense systems and additional electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect Ukrainian logistics across the entire theater, and also in capabilities that would enable Ukraine to achieve its own BAI effects at scale.

Russia intensified its battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian logistics and military targets across the entire theater in late 2025 and January 2026, likely in an attempt to weaken Ukraine’s frontline defenses ahead of the forecasted Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[2]Russian forces intensified drone strikes against military and civilian vehicles and railway infrastructure in central, northwestern, and northeastern Ukraine as of early 2026, chiefly with drones using Starlink connectivity and mesh networks.[3] Russian forces had also been leveraging modified glide bombs and missiles to strike key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and military targets, including in southwestern Ukraine, in Fall-Winter 2025.[4] These intensified strikes are likely part of the Russian campaign to achieve partial BAI effects in northwestern, northern, eastern, central, and southern Ukraine.

BAI refers to the use of air power to strike targets in the operational and near rear of the frontline (roughly 100-120 kilometers from the line of contact) to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[5] These operationally significant targets include roads, railways, and bridges (infrastructure that supports GLOCs); command posts; ammunition depots; assembly areas; and training grounds.[6] In simple terms, BAI aims to deny the adversary the use of crucial logistics lines and facilities necessary to sustain battlefield operations. Neither Ukraine nor Russia has been able to conduct BAI using manned aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) due to the density and sophistication of adversary air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) over the past three years, but Russian forces are now achieving partial BAI effects in support of their offensives.[7]

Russia previously achieved some localized partial BAI effects in the immediate rear, which enabled Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces accomplished partial effects of BAI in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions in Summer-Fall 2025 by denying Ukrainian vehicles the use of key highways and GLOCs, including forest supply roads; restricting Ukrainian movements in the immediate rear; and targeting Ukrainian fortifications, training grounds, drone operator positions, military-industrial and civilian infrastructure, and weapons systems in the near rear.[8] Russian forces, particularly drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, also targeted Ukrainian heavy bomber drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which became instrumental in delivering supplies to troops in isolated environments.[9] These strikes stretched out Ukrainian logistics and isolated sectors of the Donetsk frontline, thereby creating gaps in some Ukrainian tactical positions and drone defenses and enabling Russian forces to adopt infiltration tactics.[10] Russian forces incorporated a combination of modified tactical UAVs (such as fiber optic drones), KAB glide bombs, and Geran-2 strike drones (a Russian modification of the Iranian Shahed-136, most commonly referred to as Shahed-type drone) and “human safari” targeting tactics to achieve these effects.[11] ISW assessed that the months-long Russian BAI campaign likely enabled Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and later near Hulyaipole.[12]

Russia has since continued its BAI campaign in the immediate and near rear, most notably in Donetsk Oblast, likely to prepare for an offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Spring-Summer 2026. The Fortress Belt refers to Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast, composed of the heavily fortified cities of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk. Ukrainian military sources reported in January and February 2026 that Russian forces have recently been prioritizing interdicting Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction over combat operations, including by patrolling Ukrainian GLOCs with UAVs; remotely mining supply lines using sleeper drones (fiber-optic drones that lie in ambush on the ground and are activated when potential targets approach); targeting Ukrainian UGVs; and hunting for Ukrainian drone operators.[13] Russian forces are continuing to target Ukrainian logistics with fiber-optic and tactical first-person view (FPV) drones in the Kostyantynivka direction in an effort to undermine Ukrainian defenses in the city.[14] Russian forces are also using KAB glide bombs in the Druzhkivka direction.[15] Russian forces similarly use fiber-optic, reconnaissance, tactical FPV strike, and Shahed drones to attack railway tracks, supply routes, personnel movement, and rotation areas in the Slovyansk direction.[16]

Newly Achieved Partial Effects of BAI

Russian forces conducted systematic drone strikes against Ukrainian logistics up to 100 kilometers west of the active frontline in January 2026, including targeting vehicles on a major highway in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Ukrainian military sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on January 29 that Russian forces began launching drone strikes against a section of the E-50 highway running between Pokrovsk, Troitske (roughly 35 kilometers behind the frontline), and Pavlohrad (roughly 78 kilometers behind the frontline) in mid-January 2026.[17] The E50 highway is a major transportation artery from eastern to central Ukraine, and some parts of the Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk segment of the E50 highway run close to the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk regional border. Footage geolocated on January 31 shows a destroyed Ukrainian truck on the E50 highway segment between Dmytrivka and Mykolaivka (about 45 kilometers from the nearest frontline and 65km northwest of Pokrovsk).[18] Ukrainian officials reported on February 1 that four Shahed strike UAVs struck a bus carrying miners near Ternivka (parallel to E50 highway and just east of Pavlohrad), killing at least 12 people and injuring at least 16.[19] Rubikon published footage on January 30 reportedly showing Rubikon drone operators striking dozens of targets along and near the E50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway segment, including vehicles such as cars, trucks, fuel tankers, and a bus; engineering equipment; a mobile reconnaissance and command post; and an armored fighting vehicle.[20] Rubikon claimed that drone operators struck these targets along the highway, connecting roads, and railways at distances ranging from 26 kilometers to over 70 kilometers from the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[21] Rubikon’s geolocated footage shows a strike on a bus traveling along the E50 highway near Bohuslav, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (around 65 kilometers from the nearest frontline and 88 kilometers northwest of Pokrovsk).[22]

Russian forces started to simultaneously precisely target Ukrainian weapons systems directly west of the Fortress Belt in southwestern Kharkiv Oblast and westernmost Donetsk Oblast in late January 2026. Geolocated footage published on January 28 shows a Russian drone reportedly striking a Ukrainian fuel tanker in Preobrazhenivka, Kharkiv Oblast (91 kilometers southwest of Slovyansk and 65 kilometers behind the nearest frontline) while reportedly receiving guidance from a ZALA reconnaissance drone.[23] Geolocated Rubikon footage published on January 20 shows Rubikon drone operators reportedly targeting a Ukrainian High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) multiple rocket launcher on a local road near Novobakhmetjeve, Donetsk Oblast (57km west of Slovyansk and 45 kilometers behind the closest frontline).[24]

Russian forces have been increasingly disrupting Ukrainian railway logistics by systematically targeting railway infrastructure since July 2025. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba stated in mid-November 2025 that Russian forces have increased their strikes against Ukraine’s rail system threefold since July 2025; have struck railway infrastructure 800 times since January 2025; and damaged 3,000 railway objects.[25] Kuleba stated that the Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure has three objectives: to destroy Ukrainian logistics in the south to prevent the movement of goods such as Ukrainian grain to seaports; to disrupt rail traffic to cut off frontline oblasts; and to “destroy everything” in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure such as junction stations, suburban rolling stock, power substations, freight cars, trains, and administrative buildings in Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts since November 2025.[26] Ukrzaliznytsia announced in November 2025 the temporary suspension of railway connections from western Donetsk Oblast and southern Kharkiv Oblast to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[27] Ukrzalinytsia also noted that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure temporarily restricted rail traffic in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[28] ISW recorded Russian forces targeting railway infrastructure and trains in Volyn, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts.[29] Ukraine’s Statistics Service reported that Ukraine’s rail infrastructure carries more than 63 percent of Ukraine’s freight and 37 percent of its passenger traffic, including transporting military aid.[30]

Russian forces have struck Ukrainian trains on at least nine occasions since July 2025, in addition to targeting railway infrastructure. Russian forces notably targeted a diesel locomotive near Bokove (on the T-05-15 highway in western Donetsk Oblast) in mid-July 2025, likely in an effort to set conditions for the Dobropillya (northeast of Pokrovsk) assault in August 2025.[31] Russian forces also struck train cars of the Intercity+ high-speed train fleet and a railway junction in Kozyatyn, Vinnystia Oblast, causing a massive power outage that impacted railways throughout Ukraine in late August 2025.[32] Russian sources published footage in early October 2025 reportedly showing Russian forces striking a moving Ukrainian locomotive with a new Shahed variant in Bobrovytsya, Chernihiv Oblast.[33] Geolocated footage published in early and late October 2025 showed Russian forces targeting a passenger train in Shostka, Sumy Oblast (roughly 47 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian international border) and a moving train near Zaliznychne, Sumy Oblast (roughly 75 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and on the M-02 highway), respectively.[34] Russian forces also targeted a Ukrainian freight train near Korosten, Zhytomyr Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers south of the Belarusian border) on December 22, 2025, which derailed the freight train and a passenger train.[35] Russian forces then reportedly struck the Kovel railway station in Volyn Oblast (64 kilometers south of the Belarusian border) on December 26, 2025, which reportedly damaged an Lviv Railway locomotive and a freight wagon and shattered windows at a locomotive depot workshop.[36] Russian forces conducted three Shahed drone strikes against a civilian passenger train near Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast (roughly 49 kilometers from the frontline and 45 kilometers northwest of Slovyansk) on January 27, killing at least five people.[37] Rubikon’s January 30 footage reportedly shows Rubikon drone operators striking a Ukrainian locomotive moving on the railway along the E50 highway near Olefirivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (about 55 kilometers behind the nearest frontline).[38] Russian forces also damaged electric train and freight cars alongside other railway infrastructure with seven drone strikes against the Synelnykove train station in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (southeast of Dnipro City and 67 kilometers behind the frontline).[39]

Russian forces intensified efforts to undermine Ukraine’s southwestern GLOCs in Odesa Oblast by employing combined air strikes, remote mining, and human safari tactics to restrict traffic over bridges. Russian forces particularly intensified their strike campaign in December 2025 against bridges in Odesa Oblast, likely in an effort to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs that connect to Romania and Moldova by making it dangerous for vehicles and trains to pass through key logistical bottlenecks such as bridges. Russian forces targeted a bridge on the P-70 Odesa City- Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi highway over the Dniester River in Zatoka, Odesa Oblast (southwest of Odesa City and on the Black Sea), notably one of only two road bridges over the Dniester River connecting Ukraine’s Budjak region to the rest of Ukraine and the only bridge that directly connects Ukraine to Romania, overnight on December 14, 2025, reportedly with FAB glide bombs equipped with unified gliding and correction modules (UMPCs) and Shahed drones.[40] Geolocated footage showed Russian forces striking the Odesa Railway bridge over the Sarata River in southern Sarata, Odesa Oblast (west of Zatoka) with Geran-2 drones and Russian strikes against another railway bridge, derailing a train in Zatoka on December 15, 2025.[41]

Russian forces on December 18 and 19, 2025, launched Geran-2 drones and reportedly an Iskander ballistic missile double tap strike against a bridge near Mayaky, Odesa Oblast, on the M15 highway that links the port city of Reni with Bucharest.[42] Geolocated footage published on December 18, 2025, showed that Russian forces targeted a civilian vehicle traveling along the Mayaky bridge, possibly with a Shahed drone, killing a mother and injuring her three children.[43] The seemingly precise strike on the vehicle resembles Russian “human safari” tactics, or precise targeting of any moving vehicles along highways that intend to make transport along key routes too dangerous to use.[44] Ukrainian and Russian commentators noted that Russian forces likely used cluster munitions dropped from Geran-2 drones to remotely mine the Mayaky bridge and later used a ballistic missile with cluster warheads to strike repair crews operating at the scene.[45] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed that these strikes with cluster munitions would not have destroyed the Mayaky bridge, implying that these strikes aimed to impede transit and repairs over the bridge.[46] Ukrainian border officials temporarily closed some customs checkpoints along the Ukrainian-Moldovan international border on December 19 due to the strike on the Mayaky bridge and power outages in Odesa Oblast.[47]

Russian forces are conducting similar strikes against Ukrainian bridges in the operational rear areas, although it appears that they are still largely prioritizing targeting bridges in the immediate rear to undermine Ukrainian frontline defenses. Geolocated footage published on October 10, 2025, shows that a Russian strike damaged a road bridge over the Dniprovska Hydroelectric Station dam in Zaporizhzhia City (around 40 kilometers behind the line).[48]Geolocated footage published on January 19 shows a Russian long-range Geran strike drone hitting a railway bridge over the Seym River north of Lysohubivka, Sumy Oblast (about 80 kilometers from the frontline, northwest of Sumy City near the Sumy-Chernihiv Oblast administrative border).[49] ISW observed geolocated footage of Russian forces targeting bridges, some with FAB-3000 glide bombs, in the Slovyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions.[50]

Russia’s Recent Technological Adaptations 

Russian forces were able to dramatically intensify and extend the theater-wide BAI campaign in January 2026, chiefly by integrating Starlink terminals into various UAV models. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov explained that Russian drones equipped with Starlink terminals fly at low altitudes, are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW), and are controllable in real time at long distances.[51] Russian and Ukrainian sources also claimed that Russian forces have been relying on Starlink terminals to maintain communications and for command and control (C2) on the frontlines.[52]

Russia’s integration of Starlink satellite terminals onto cheap, tactical FPV drones enabled Russian forces to conduct strikes against the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway at an extended, operational depth of up to 100 kilometers in January 2026. Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces used Molniya-type drones equipped with Starlink satellite communication terminals during the January 29 and 30 strikes against Ukrainian vehicles traveling along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway.[53] Molniya is a type of Russian low-cost and mass-produced UAV (made partially of plywood and foam) with an average range of 30 kilometers, and its several variants can perform strike, reconnaissance, mothership, and remote mining functions.[54] Russian forces notably began equipping Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones with Starlink satellite communication terminals in November and December 2025 in the Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk directions.[55] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Rubikon fielded Molniya-2 drones with Starlink terminals in these directions starting in early November 2025, reportedly concluding that these upgraded drones were most effective at night and when simultaneously used in large, “swarm-like” quantities.[56] The integration of Starlink terminals into Molniya-type drones ultimately enabled Russian forces to control and transmit data to the drones at an extended range beyond 30 to 50 kilometers, increase the drones’ resistance to conventional EW systems, and improve precision strikes.[57] Russian developers also integrated additional explosives onto Molniya drones with Starlink terminals in January 2026 that would destroy the terminal in the event that Ukrainian forces downed the drone.[58] ISW previously observed Russian forces conduct similar systematic Molniya strikes against Ukrainian vehicles at an average distance of 20 to 50 kilometers from the frontline in Summer and Fall 2025 after Russian developers integrated EW-resistant fiber-optic cable controls and target acquisition systems into these tactical drones.[59]

Russia later integrated Starlink terminals onto mid-range drones, which temporarily allowed Russian forces to launch more precise FPV strikes on moving and operationally-significant targets farther in the rear. Russian forces most notably began conducting precision strikes with Starlink-equipped, domestically-produced BM-35 Italmas drones in mid-January 2026.[60] BM-35 drones are one-way attack FPV UAVs with flying wing (delta-wing) design, which can operate at a reported distance of up to 200 kilometers and have a smaller frame than Shahed strike drones.[61] Rubikon reportedly deployed BM-35 drones at scale in September 2025 after Russian forces began fielding these drones in December 2023.[62] Beskrestnov noted that Russian forces used Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones for the first time on January 15, 2026, and observed that the drone had an extended range of up to 500 kilometers and was EW resistant.[63] Beskrestnov then recorded BM-35 drones with Starlink terminals reaching Dnipro City (nearly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and attacking Kyiv City on January 26 and warned that Russian forces were increasingly relying on Starlink to facilitate strikes at longer ranges.[64] Russian state media claimed that Rubikon’s January 30 footage also shows a Starlink-equipped BM-35 striking a Ukrainian truck and an M113 armored personnel vehicle moving along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway.[65]

Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones likely improved Russian air reconnaissance capabilities necessary to coordinate precise drone and missile strikes against operationally significant targets in January 2026. Russian forces reportedly used Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones to reconnoiter targets deeper in the operational rear. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces flew Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones over Kyiv City for over four hours on January 26 and later reconnoitered over Dnipro City.[66] Russian milbloggers highlighted that BM-35 drones were more effective in reconnaissance and fire coordination operations than traditional reconnaissance drones because of their higher speed, real-time surveillance and data transmission capabilities, and up to 500-kilometer range.[67] A Russian milblogger observed that BM-35 drones have a speed of 150 to 200 kilometers per hour, while other Russian reconnaissance drones fly at 40 to 60 kilometers per hour.[68] ISW previously reported that improved reconnaissance UAV support allowed Russian forces to carry out at least seven precise missile strikes on Ukrainian training grounds and forces concentration points between late 2024 and Summer 2025.[69]

Russian forces may have also used modified mothership drones to strike targets along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway and deeper in the rear. A Russian milblogger speculated that Russian forces may have used a mothership UAV, which carries several short-range FPV drones to areas farther from the frontlines, to facilitate strikes on a segment of the E50 highway, given that Russia has previously used motherships to conduct drone strikes at operational depths.[70] Russian forces have notably been using Molniya-2 UAVs as motherships to extend tactical drone ranges beyond 25 kilometers in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions in Summer and Fall 2026.[71] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces used motherships to strike Zaporizhzhia City on several occasions and noted that these motherships operated on Ukrainian SIM cards, which allowed Russian drones to fly at extended ranges.[72] Beskrestnov reported on February 3 that Russian forces used a Gerbera drone as a mothership drone to carry an FPV drone for the first time, presumably in Ukraine.[73] Russian forces have also reportedly recently adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones.[74]

Russia likely developed the ability to launch precise strikes against Ukrainian trains and railway infrastructure after adapting FPV Shahed strike drones for use in FPV mode. Ukrzaliznytsia head Oleksandr Pertsovskyi stated in October 2025 that Russian forces use “very precise” Shahed-type drones to target individual locomotives.[75] A Ukrainian defense official also confirmed in October 2025 that Ukrainian forces recovered and examined a Russian Geran-type long-range strike drone fitted with a civilian camera and radio modem, which allows Russian drone operators to identify Ukrainian targets.[76] Bestkrestnov first published footage of intercepted Shahed drones with cameras and modems in August 2025, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely started fielding modified Geran drones in June 2025 after adapting Iranian- and Chinese-controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA); artificial intelligence (AI) components; cameras and thermal imagers; and radio modems.[77] Cameras and modems allow Russian drone operators to send and receive data wirelessly and adjust the drone’s flight path in real time, facilitating precision strikes against moving targets.[78] Bestkrestnov reported that such modified Gerans could fly up to 200 kilometers into Ukrainian territory and stream back video that supported their operations.[79] Bestkrestnov warned that Ukrainian locomotives are particularly vulnerable to Russian drone adaptations because they travel along predictable routes and because of their slow speed. Destroying a large proportion of Ukraine’s locomotives would cripple Ukraine’s rail system.

Russian forces were also able to pursue moving and previously unreachable targets by relying on mesh networks to coordinate Shahed drone flights. Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces struck the bus carrying miners near Ternivka on February 1 using a group of modified Shaheds with mesh network modems, which allowed Russian drone operators to control the drones online.[80] A mesh network is a wireless network that enables a group of drones to maintain a signal amongst themselves, as opposed to individually relying on ground signal systems.[81] A Ukrainian technology expert noted that in a mesh network, one Shahed drone transmits a signal to another until the data reaches the control point along the chain. This data connection allows other drones in the group to know how to bypass Ukrainian EW systems or air defense systems. The expert added that mesh networks enable Russian drone operators to control a particular Shahed in the drone group even if the drone itself loses connection with the operator, as long as other Shaheds in the group continue to transmit a signal to the operator. The expert explained that mesh networks are less vulnerable to Ukrainian EW systems because there are many nodes that distribute the signal, making it harder for Ukrainian forces to jam the signal and easier for Russian drone operators to reach the target. The expert noted that Russian drone operators use algorithms, some AI elements, and manual drone control to coordinate the group of drones via a mesh network. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed in early October 2025 that Russian developers began actively integrating mesh network modems onto Shahed drones after first testing these modems on Gerbera drones.[82] The milblogger claimed that the integration of mesh network modems demonstrates that Russian forces are trying to develop “drone swarms,” or a group of autonomous UAVs that communicate and act collectively.

Russian forces may have used Starlink-equipped Shahed drones to pursue a moving train, but it is unclear if Russian forces were able to field this capability at scale. Beskrestnov also assessed that Russian forces likely used mesh networks or possibly Starlink terminals to conduct the January 27 civilian passenger train strike near Barvinkove.[83] Beskrestnov assessed on January 25 that Russian forces likely used Shaheds with Starlink terminals to strike Ukrainian helicopters near Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad Oblast, and a Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces were increasingly integrating Starlink terminals onto Shaheds in late January 2026.[84] ISW has not observed significant evidence suggesting that Russian forces had been able to use Starlink-equipped Shahed drones to achieve partial BAI effects at scale before losing access to Starlink.

Russian forces also attempted to disrupt Ukrainian logistics deeper in the rear by expanding remote mining capabilities onto Shahed drones, particularly by integrating cluster warheads and mines with magnetic detonators. Beskrestnov observed that approximately half of the Russian Shahed drones that targeted Ukrainian railway lines between Kovel and Kyiv City in January 2026 carried mines with magnetic detonators.[85] Beskrestnov reported that Russian Shahed drone operators dropped these mines in the snow and warned that these mines would self-detonate within a few days. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces began dropping mines with magnetic detonators in January 2026 to kill Ukrainian deminers and sappers who would try to neutralize the mine upon seeing it drop from the drone.[86] Russian milbloggers also claimed in October and December 2025 that Russian drone operators began fielding Shahed drones with cluster munitions to remotely mine Ukrainian GLOCs located farther in the rear.[87] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces began dropping Lepestok PFM-1 anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines from Shahed and Gerbera UAVs to remotely mine areas and roads in Kherson and Chernihiv oblasts starting August 2025.[88] A Ukrainian aviation expert then observed that Russian forces were trying to use Shahed remote mining capabilities to interdict certain roads in the near rear, particularly dirt roads.[89]

Russian forces have increased the range of their guided glide bombs to 200 kilometers, which may have enabled combined Russian strikes against Ukrainian bridges in Odesa Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported in February 2026 that Russian forces are employing UMPB-5R guided glide bombs with a range of up to 200 kilometers.[90] Reports of Russian forces using glide bombs with such ranges are not new, however. Ukrainian officials notably observed Russian Su-34 fighters launching three long-range guided glide bombs against Odesa Oblast for the first time in October 2025.[91] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces conducted strikes with modified long-range glide bombs against Poltava Oblast; Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast; and Mykolaiv City in mid to late October 2025.[92] Beskrestnov reported in October 2025 that Russian forces introduced the UMPB-5R bombs with an extended range of 100 to 180 kilometers and a payload of 100 kilograms.[93] Beskrestnov reported that Russia relies on Chinese-produced jet engines to increase the glide bomb’s range and that Russian aircraft launch the bombs from an altitude of at least 10 kilometers.[94] A senior Ukrainian intelligence official reported in November 2025 that Russia planned in 2025 to produce 500 of the longer-range glide bomb variants that can fly up to 200 kilometers and that it is working to further modify the bombs to fly up to 400 kilometers.[95]

Russian forces are developing makeshift measures to undermine Ukrainian anti-drone defenses, particularly targeting the anti-drone netting that covers Ukrainian highways in the near rear. Russian sources amplified footage in Fall 2025 showing Russian drone operators damaging anti-drone netting along an unspecified highway with likely thermite compounds, likely in an effort to burn through kilometers’ worth of anti-drone nets and enable tactical FPV drones to threaten the highway.[96] A Ukrainian military source also observed in October 2025 that Russian forces were using a new Geran-2 warhead with incendiary charges, possibly napalm.[97] The source assessed that Russian forces were likely integrating these incendiary warheads to maximize damage against targets and increase fire effects.

Conclusion 

The recent joint efforts between SpaceX and Ukrainian authorities to deny Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine are already degrading the intensity, tempo, precision, and depth of the Russian BAI campaign as in January 2026. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk restricted Starlink satellite terminals operating in Ukraine at the Ukrainian government’s request in order to counter Russia’s use of Starlink on drones on February 1.[98] Fedorov then reported on February 2 that the Ukrainian government adopted a resolution to only allow officially registered and verified Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine and to disconnect all other terminals.[99] Fedorov finally announced on February 5 that the first group of officially authorized Starlink terminals is operational within the Ukrainian military and that Russian Starlinks cannot operate within Ukraine.[100]

Ukrainian military officials have already observed that the block on Russian Starlink use in Ukraine is denying Russian ability to conduct some reconnaissance missions and strikes. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces reduced their assault operations and FPV drone operations after SpaceX blocked unregistered Starlink terminals.[101] The spokesperson added that Ukrainian forces no longer have to expend additional resources striking Russian Starlink terminals in order to disable them. Rubikon has also notably not offered detailed geographical details about any of its strikes since February 4, just days after SpaceX blocked unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine.[102] Rubikon has previously published footage on its Telegram channel highlighting strikes against specific frontline or rear settlements, such as the January 30 video showing strikes against the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway. Rubikon has continued to post about its strikes across the frontline since February 4 but has not provided specific locational details, suggesting that SpaceX’s decision to restrict Russian forces’ access to Starlink on February 1 has been negatively impacting Rubikon’s strike campaign.

Russian forces are actively looking for Starlink alternatives, but it will likely take Russia at least half a year to develop technological innovations to recreate some of the BAI effects they achieved with Starlink. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade told BBC Ukrainian Service that Russian forces will likely spend about six months trying to find an alternative to Starlink.[103] Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces are ”scrambling to establish an equivalent” to Starlink.[104] Russia is reportedly testing a stratospheric communications system, the Barrage-1, as an alternative to Starlink, which some Russian milbloggers have already dismissed as an inadequate replacement.[105] Russian Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Minister Maksut Shadayev similarly tried to reassure Russian forces on February 18 that Russia would launch its low-orbit communications satellite constellation called Rassvet in the first quarter of 2026, which he described as a “response” to the Starlink system.[106] One Russian milblogger explained, however, that Rassvet’s launch does not mean that Russian forces will receive Starlink equivalent systems by Spring 2026 but marks the “first step” toward creating a large satellite constellation with communications terminals in the long term.[107]

Russian forces will likely continue strikes farther into the operational rear with other capabilities that do not rely on Starlink, such as mesh networks and glide bombs. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are continuing to operate Shahed drones using mesh networks and that Ukraine is actively working to protect locomotives from mesh network-operated drones.[108] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that it will be harder for Russian drone operators to conduct precise strikes on moving targets such as Ukrainian HIMARS with Shahed UAVs, but that Russian forces are going to continue targeting Ukrainian energy and industrial facilities and will be relying on mesh networks.[109] Russian forces may not be able to recreate the same intensity of precise strikes as they could with Starlink terminals, given that Russian forces would need to simultaneously fly many Shahed drones, all equipped with mesh network modems, to create such a capability.[110] A Ukrainian technology expert observed that Russian developers do not install mesh network modems on every UAV type, which may impact Russia’s ability to replicate mesh networks for other drone types. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on February 17 that Russian forces reduced the number of FPV drone strikes in the Zaporizhia direction after the blocking of Starlink, but have started to launch more glide bomb strikes.[111] Voloshyn also observed that Russian forces are still using Shaheds in southern Ukraine and that some pass the Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces’ operational airspace.

Russian forces will also continue their BAI campaign in immediate and near rear frontline areas, as tactics and technology that Russia has developed in 2025 remain significant threats for Ukrainian frontline logistics. Russian forces are continuing fiber-optic, tactical FPV, and Shahed drone strikes and glide bomb strikes in the immediate rear areas, particularly around the Fortress Belt.[112] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on February 18 that Russian forces are increasingly employing mothership drones and striking bridges with guided aerial bombs.[113] Russian forces are continuing to strike rail infrastructure and trains within 50 kilometers of the Ukrainian-Russian international border. Russian forces reportedly conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against a train car on the Pivdenna-Zakhidna railway line near the Tereshchenska station in southeastern Voronizh (roughly 43 kilometers from the international border).[114]

Ukraine and its partners must continue to urgently invest in kinetic air defense systems, Ukrainian mid-range strike capabilities, and additional electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect Ukrainian logistics across the entire theater and undermine the Russian BAI campaign. Ukrainian forces are already countering the Russian BAI threat by expanding their mid-range strike capabilities and targeting Russian drone operators, specifically Rubikon elements.[115] Ukraine will need capabilities to undermine Russian mesh networks and additional air defense systems to shoot down glide bombs. Ukraine and its partners must also closely monitor Russian efforts to find alternatives to Starlink terminals to adequately prepare countermeasures for such threats.