Toplines
The Russian Central Bank, along with its Chairwoman, Elvira Nabiullina, appears to be advocating for a more cautious monetary policy amidst rising inflationary pressure. The Russian Central Bank announced on September 11 that it decided to keep the key interest rate at 14 percent after lowering the rate 10 times over the past 18 months.[1] The Central Bank noted that price pressure has intensified in recent months and that price growth acceleration is between five and six percent due to temporarily decreased production capacity in certain sectors. The Central Bank estimated that annual inflation will range between six and seven percent in 2026 and will return to four percent in 2027. The Central Bank highlighted that core inflation indicators rose to seven percent in July 2026, compared to an average of 4.6 percent in the previous quarter. Nabiullina echoed the Central Bank and noted the increase in pro-inflationary risks (or risk factors that increase inflation).[2] Nabiullina added that the Central Bank will clarify the scope of further key interest rate decreases in October 2026. Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank raised its key rate forecast for 2027, expecting the monetary policy to become tighter with less room for reducing the key interest rate than the Central Bank had expected in the first half of 2026.[3] Nabiullina added that Russia’s fuel market shortages were the primary cause of accelerated price growth over the summer but claimed that the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian supply chains remains insignificant.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has continuously pressured the Russian Central Bank to lower the key interest rate as part of Putin’s efforts to impose a looser monetary policy in order to expand capital and liquidity availability for the Russian military and defense industry.[5] Nabiullina has consistently advocated for a more cautious monetary policy – often trying to resist the Kremlin’s demands.[6] The Russian economy has been experiencing growing wage inflation resulting from significant labor shortages and the Kremlin’s voluntary conscription campaign’s bonus system that has been necessary to sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine without resorting to involuntary reserve call-ups.[7] Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns against Russian energy infrastructure — the effects of which Nabiullina acknowledged — and the recent strikes against Russian logistics facilities are generating additional inflationary pressures on the already-strained Russian economy.[8] Putin has only recently started to prioritize combating inflation at the expense of growth and investment, and the Central Bank’s decision to maintain the key rate at 14 percent is likely a reflection of Putin’s concerns as well as his hopes that the Kremlin’s new air defense policies may reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine’s strikes and ease one of the inflationary pressures on the Russian economy.[9] Nabiullina has repeatedly succumbed to the Kremlin’s pressure to lower the key interest rate, but Putin’s recent prioritization of combatting inflation may allow her most recent effort to constrain monetary policy to hold.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney signed a 100-year partnership agreement on September 10 that includes a Drone Deal to expand joint drone production.[10] Zelensky stated that Canada pledged more than $2 billion, with more than $1 billion toward Ukrainian air defenses, including missiles, Patriot interceptors, and co-production of F-16 fighter jets and drones.[11] Canada will provide about 350 million Canadian dollars (about $252 million) toward air defense interceptors through the United States’ Joint Ukraine Multinational Program – Services, Training and Articles Rapid Timeline (JUMPSTART) and nearly 435 million Canadian dollars (about $313 million) in loan guarantees through the European Reconstruction and Development Bank, including for Ukraine to purchase gas and generators during Winter 2026.[12] Carney stated that Canada will send a third of Canadian-produced drones to Ukraine over the next two years and that Canada is ready to join the European-Ukrainian Freyja anti-ballistic missile interceptor development project.[13]
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Central Bank, along with its Chairwoman, Elvira Nabiullina, appears to be advocating for a more cautious monetary policy amidst rising inflationary pressure.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney signed a 100-year partnership agreement on September 10 that includes a Drone Deal to expand joint drone production.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and fuel and logistics infrastructure on the night of September 10 to 11. Russia launched 162 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 11.
ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to better reflect the Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. ISW will analyze the Russian campaign in Donetsk Oblast in more detail in a forthcoming special edition.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries and logistics infrastructure on the night of September 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov City (about 460 kilometers from the international border), which has a processing capacity of about seven million tons of oil per year.[14] Footage published on September 11 shows a fire at the refinery, according to Russian opposition source Astra.[15] Ozon Marketplace confirmed on September 11 that a drone strike caused a fire at an Ozon logistics center and delivery hub in Saratov City.[16] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin acknowledged that a drone strike damaged civilian infrastructure in the city.[17] Ukrainian forces most recently struck the Saratov Oil Refinery on September 8 and have struck the refinery six times since January 2026 and 18 times since the beginning of the war.[18]
Ukrainian forces struck two chemical plants in Russia overnight. Footage indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the Uralchem Azot chemical plant, which is Russia’s only producer of higher aliphatic amines, crystalline sodium nitrite, and sodium and potassium nitrate to make gunpowder and explosives, in Berezniki, Perm Krai (roughly 1,530 kilometers from the frontline), according to Astra.[19] Locals reported that authorities evacuated the plant.[20] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin claimed that drones struck two industrial facilities in the region, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces struck unspecified targets in Perm Krai overnight.[21]
Ukrainian defense company Fire Point confirmed that Ukrainian forces used Flamingo cruise missiles to strike the Volgogradpromproekt chemical plant just south of Volgograd City (roughly 325 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[22] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that missile debris fell on an industrial facility in southern Volgograd City.[23]
Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian air defense assets in Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Taganrog (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) on September 10 or the night of September 10 to 11.[24]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 10 and 11 but did not advance.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 11 that Russian forces conducted a guided FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a Ukrainian drone control post and a Kh-39 air-to-surface tactical missile strike against the temporary deployment point of a Ukrainian unit near Lisne (southeast of Sumy City).[26] The Russian MoD also claimed on September 11 that Russian forces conducted another Kh-39 strike against the deployment point of a different Ukrainian unit in an unspecified part of Sumy Oblast.[27]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar station near Berezki, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on September 10 or on the night of September 10 to 11.[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 11 that Russian forces advanced between Kozacha Lopan and Kudiivka (both north of Kharkiv City).[30]
Ukrainian military officials continue to refute baseless Russian claims of an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast refuted, on September 11, Russian seizures of Dovzhanka, Vasylivka, and Blahodatne (all northeast of Kharkiv City) and described the area as a contested “gray zone.”[31] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed on September 11 that the claimed Russian seizure of Zarubynka (southeast of Dovzhanka) allows Russian forces to firmly secure the right flank of the claimed Russian encirclement northeast of Kharkiv City.[32] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps directly refuted Russian claims of an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on September 3, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have not encircled any Ukrainian forces in the area given the lack of evidence.[33]
Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, likely to create a false image of sweeping Russian advances ahead of the State Duma elections. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on September 11 that Russian forces recently intensified offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and have already claimed the seizures of several settlements that Ukrainian forces currently control, possibly as part of a Russian cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Russian forces as advancing ahead of the September 18-20 State Duma elections.[34] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue infiltrating in pairs. The spokesperson added that Russian sleeper, fiber-optic, and radio-controlled drones continue targeting Ukrainian road junctions and logistics routes.
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unlikely to launch a large-scale offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The milblogger stated on September 10 that a large-scale Russian offensive toward Kharkiv City is unlikely as Russian forces are only fighting in extremely small groups in northern Kharkiv Oblast, which limits their ability to conduct a cohesive offensive.[35] The milblogger noted that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces prioritizes small group tactics in an attempt to stretch the reserves of Ukrainian formations while establishing a so-called “buffer zone” along the Ukrainian border to intercept Ukrainian reconnaissance groups and enable forward-positioned air defense groups to intercept Ukrainian drones flying toward Belgorod Oblast and central Russia.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on September 10 and 11 but did not advance.[36]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 10 and 11 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[37]
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions supported by drones in the Kupyansk direction. The head of the joint fire support department of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on September 10 that Russian forces use infiltration tactics as their primary means of attempting to advance, typically by moving in small groups of one to three people.[38] Russian forces send in secondary and tertiary infiltration groups once Ukrainian forces have eliminated the first group. Russian forces support infiltration missions with various types of fixed-wing and first-person view (FPV) drones. Russian drones either head towards predetermined targets or navigate freely and attempt to penetrate deep behind Ukrainian defenses, identify Ukrainian forces, and launch a strike. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 11 that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate Kupyansk.[39]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on September 11.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an FPV drone operator training center of an unspecified Russian Akhmat unit near occupied Petropavlivka (roughly 96 kilometers from the frontline) on September 10 or on the night of September 10 to 11.[40]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
Russian sources continue to disagree about the continued existence of the Russian salient north of Lyman amid a reported Ukrainian counteroffensive. One Russian milblogger claimed on September 11 that Ukrainian counterattacks along a broad front have forced Russian forces onto the defensive north of Lyman but suggested that Ukraine has not achieved its objectives in the area, as Russian forces are effectively managing the situation.[41] The milblogger claimed that the Russian objective in the Lyman direction in the coming weeks is to maintain a logistics corridor to Lyman, halt Ukrainian flanking attempts toward Kolodyazi and Terny (northeast of Lyman and on the west and east banks of the Zherebets River, respectively), and force Ukrainian forces to expend significant reserves during their offensive efforts. Another Russian milblogger conversely claimed that Ukrainian forces have effectively eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman and pushed Russian forces back to the Zherebets River, but acknowledged that the actual extent of Ukrainian advances is not yet clear due to insufficient evidence.[42] The milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian elimination of the salient would explain why Russian sources circulated archival and doctored footage on September 5 purporting to show Russian control over Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman), as no Russian forces are likely present in the area.[43] A Russian source circulated on September 11 a screenshot of a now-deleted post by a prominent Russian milblogger in which the milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman, pushing Russian forces back to the Zherebets River near Ivanivka, Terny, and Balka Zhuravka (all northeast of Lyman), where fighting is ongoing.[44] The deleted post included claims that Ukrainian forces have surrounded two Russian company-sized units and four platoons in Ivanivka, likely cutting the settlement off from overland supply.
The current extent of the frontline in the Lyman direction and the status of the Russian salient north of Lyman remain unclear due to limited open-source evidence about Ukrainian forces’ progress. ISW’s mapping methodology is likely underestimating the extent of Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian sources are exaggerating Russian advances toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk to make premature claims about the accomplishment of Russian objectives in the Fortress Belt. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed on September 11 that Russian forces have begun consolidating positions on the outskirts of Vasylivska Putosh (southeast of Slovyansk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that there is fighting east of the settlement.[45] The Russian milblogger claimed on September 11 that Russian forces aim to advance from the Nykonorivka and Orikhuvatka areas (both southeast of Slovyansk) to facilitate further advances toward Slovyansk.[46] ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces have seized Nykonorivka or Orikhuvatka or have any presence close to Vasylivska Putosh. The closest assessed Russian advances are 11 kilometers from Vasylivska Putosh, seven kilometers from Orikhuvatka, and nine kilometers from Nykonorivka.
Russian forces continue to use glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield for future offensive operations against Fortress Belt cities. Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported that Russian forces conducted two FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk on September 11, killing one person and injuring another.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against a railway bridge connecting central Slovyansk with its eastern suburbs.[48] Russian glide bomb strikes against Fortress Belt cities aim, in part, to create ruins that enable future Russian infiltrations and infantry advances on the ground by providing cover and concealment, and glide bomb strikes against bridges aim to prevent Ukrainian forces from maintaining supply lines to forward units.[49]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northwestern Kostyantynivka. Russian forces likely conducted an infiltration mission in northwestern Kostyantynivka, based on geolocated footage published on September 10 that shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in the area.[50]
The Russian failure to fully seize Kostyantynivka is preventing Russian forces from establishing supply lines in and around the city, hindering Russian offensive efforts north of the city. Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Deputy Commander Colonel Ruslan Tkachuk stated on September 11 that Russian forces bypassed Ukrainian positions and entered Kostyantynivka from the city’s flanks only after nine months of trying to break through Ukrainian positions south of the city; pulling up logistics, reserves, and drone pilots closer to Kostyantynivka; and attempting to attack Kostyantynivka through frontal assaults.[51] Tkachuk stated that Russian forces seized parts of the city, but that Ukrainian forces have stabilized the line of contact and continue to hold positions in the southern, central, and northern parts of Kostyantynivka. Tkachuk added that Russian forces are attacking further without having first established a foothold in the city and without properly establishing supply lines and cover. Tkachuk stated that the Russian military command is trying to create the impression that Russian forces have advanced beyond Kostyantynivka, even though Russian forces have not even seized the city yet.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
The summertime redeployment of Central Military District (CMD) elements to the Dobropillya and Kazenyi Torets River areas indicates that the Russian military command is prioritizing efforts to advance northwestward from the area to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt over efforts to advance westward deeper into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka areas. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst observed on September 10 that the Russian military command redeployed most of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, CMD), including two regiments of its 90th Guards Tank Division, over several weeks in the summer to reinforce naval infantry elements and elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 8th CAA (SMD) attacking just northeast of Dobropillya and east of the Kazenyi Torets River.[52] The OSINT analyst noted, however, that the 90th Tank Division’s 80th Tank Regiment is still operating near Komar (south of Novopavlivka and east of Oleksandrivka), while elements of the 41st CAA continue to operate in the Novopavlivka direction.
The summertime redeployment of elements of the CMD did not result in significant changes on the frontline in the Dobropillya and Kazenyi Torets River areas, however. ISW observed reports of the 90th Tank Division’s 239th Tank Regiment and 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments operating in the Pokrovsk direction in May, and the OSINT analyst reported that the 228th and 239th regiments conducted the unsuccessful reinforced company-size mechanized assault near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya on the western bank of the Kazenyi Torets River) in July.[53] The attempted mechanized assault was the first in over a year, and a Ukrainian military source reported at the time that Ukrainian forces destroyed 80 percent of the Russian vehicles before they reached the frontline.[54] Russian forces have yet to seize Dobropillya and are still roughly the same distance from the town now as they were at the start of the summer in May (about 8.5 kilometers). Ukrainian forces were therefore able to prevent the reinforced Russian force grouping from conducting larger-scale offensive operations in the area over the summer.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya area on September 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[55] The Russian MoD claimed on September 11 that Russian forces seized Novohryshyne (south of Dobropillya).[56]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 11. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer using a first-person view (FPV) drone north of Novoandriivka (east of Novopavlivka), based on geolocated footage published on September 10.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[58]
The Russian MoD made unconfirmed claims about the Russian seizure of a settlement southwest of Oleksandrivka. The Russian MoD claimed on September 11 that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces seized Zorivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[59] A Russian servicemember allegedly raised a flag in Zorivka, according to geolocated footage published on September 11.[60] ISW cannot verify with high confidence the reliability of the footage and has reason to assess that the footage splices together multiple video clips. Russian sources continue combining Russian MoD claims with manipulated or AI-altered footage to spread aggrandized claims of advance throughout the information space as part of an ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at inflating Russian claimed advances across the frontline.[61]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 10 and 11 but did not advance.[62]
Russian forces are actively using drones and glide bombs to maintain pressure on Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Zaporizhia Oblast stated on September 10 that Russian forces are conducting a high number of drone and glide bomb strikes and constantly conducting infiltration missions.[63] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces use the strikes and assaults to maintain pressure on Ukrainian forces and exhaust them.
Russian forces are attempting to encircle Orikhiv and intercept Ukrainian logistics flowing to the city. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 11 that Russian forces are attempting to encircle and assault Orikhiv.[64] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces shifted their assaults towards Preobrazhenka (just northeast of Orikhiv) and secured positions near Novopavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) as part of Russia’s encirclement efforts. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have established fire control over the H-08 Zaporizhzhia City–Orikhiv highway to sever Ukrainian supply lines into Orikhiv. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian fortifications are impeding Russian offensive operations east and southeast of Orikhiv.[65]
Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas distribution station on the southeastern outskirts of Tokmak (approximately 27 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 8.[66]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 11.
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle in Sonyachne (northeast of Kherson City) on the afternoon of September 10, injuring one civilian.[67] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck an ambulance in Kherson City with a drone on the morning of September 11, injuring three medical staff.[68] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of first-person view (FPV) drones to strike mainly civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear, especially in Kherson City, is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[69]
Ukrainian forces likely continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on September 11. A Crimea-based Telegram channel reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military truck on the H-05 Kherson City-Simferopol highway near Vorontsivka (about 115 kilometers from the front).[70]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[71]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 10 to 11 and during the day on September 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 161 Shahed-type strike drones (including jet-powered drones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea, and an S8000 Banderol loitering munition from Belgorod Oblast.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 138 drones, that an unspecified number of aerial targets hit 19 locations, and that debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, civilian, residential, and medical infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, including a “double tap” strike against Ukrainian rescue workers in Kyiv City.[73] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on September 11 that Russian drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Odesa, Zaporizhia, Chernihiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts.[74]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck telecommunications infrastructure and gas stations in Kyiv City, including with jet-powered Shahed-type drones, during the day on September 11.[75]
Ukrainian officials confirmed on September 11 that the September 10 strike against a shopping center in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killed five people and injured 67.[76]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that Belarusian authorities are inspecting Belarusian forces for readiness but emphasized that Belarus will not attack unspecified neighboring states. Lukashenko stated on September 11 during his visit to the Obuz-Lesnovsky Combined Arms Training Ground in western Belarus that Belarusian forces will continue undergoing a readiness inspection “up until mobilization.”[77] Lukashenko noted that the Belarusian army needs a “shake-up” and that Belarusian authorities have already inspected tank and motorized rifle units and are currently inspecting artillery brigades. Lukashenko emphasized that Belarus must always be prepared for a timely and adequate response and noted that Belarus has no intention of attacking unspecified neighboring states, defining such an attack as “tantamount to death.”[78] Lukashenko stated that Belarus would not win a conflict with unspecified neighboring states and that Belarus does not want to start a war, but noted that Belarus is obliged to defend its land and people. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin told Lukashenko on September 11 that Belarusian forces are ready to deploy in the event of a war.[79] Lukashenko has resisted allowing Russia to operationalize the Belarusian Armed Forces to support Russian operations in Ukraine or recruit Belarusians on a large scale into the Russian military since 2022, while avoiding adopting the Kremlin‘s rhetoric that portrays Ukraine as a threat to Belarus.[80]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.cbr dot ru/press/pr/?file=11092026_133000key.htm; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/11/tsb-vpervye-s-2025-goda-ne-stal-snizhat-klyuchevuyu-stavku-ona-ostalas-na-urovne-14
[2] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/28103221
[3] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/28103275
[4] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/28103369; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/28103473
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/
[10] https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/09/10/canada-and-ukraine-scale-drone-production-build-canadas-defence; https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/09/10/joint-statement-prime-minister-carney-and-president-zelenskyy; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-pid-chas-spilnogo-z-premyer-minis-106313; https://www.international.gc.ca/country_news-pays_nouvelles/2026-09-10-canada-ukraine.aspx?lang=eng; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-ta-kanada-pidpisali-dokumenti-pro-storichne-partner-106309
[11] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/kanada-nadaye-ukrayini-2-milyardi-dolariv-na-raketi-dlya-pat-106317
[12] https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/09/10/canada-and-ukraine-scale-drone-production-build-canadas-defence; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/kanada-ogolosila-sim-novih-paketiv-pidtrimki-dlya-ukrayini-z-106329
[13] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/zelenskyy-visits-canada-to-seek-more-military-support-for-ukraine-against-russia; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20799
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42201
[15] https://t.me/astrapress/124868
[16] https://t.me/ozonmarketplace/3269
[17] https://t.me/busargin_r/12091
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8/
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/124897
[20] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/54742
[21] https://t.me/mahonin59/13293; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20818
[22] https://t.me/firepointofficial/299
[23] https://t.me/rgn_34/12192
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42202
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193; https://t.me/wargonzo/36850
[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/67226
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/67230
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42202
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193; https://t.me/severnnyi/9286 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36850
[30] https://t.me/divgen/83871
[31] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1400854-ce-sira-zona-u-dpsu-zaperecili-zaavu-rf-pro-okupaciu-troh-sil-na-harkivsini/
[32] https://tass dot com/politics/2186123
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/
[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/11/vony-jdut-lizut-rosiyany-aktyvizuvalysya-na-harkivshhyni-dlya-kartynky-pered-vyboramy/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PhNEqE0jJI [35] https://t.me/rybar/83055 [36] https://t.me/severnnyi/9286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193 [37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193; https://t.me/wargonzo/36850 [38] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/10/mali-grupy-drony-ta-postijnyj-tysk-vijskovyj-pro-taktyku-rosiyan-na-kup%e2%80%99yanskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w [39] https://t.me/severnnyi/9286 [40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42202 [41] https://t.me/sashakots/64378 [42] https://t.me/milinfolive/179361 [43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/ [44] https://t.me/swodki/618676 [45] https://t.me/tass_agency/394819 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47483 [46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47483 [47] https://www.facebook.com/Vadymlyakh/posts/pfbid0MYSgXhgtrjiEz7FZ7WGHZxowh318ZMcrDrApYCrJZ6y5spszgVQRTSgzi4L6t1i7l [48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47483 ; https://t.me/arx_spn/31026 [49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ [50] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/880; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2098110768743133398 [51] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/11/nyshhymo-voroga-v-promyslovyh-masshtabah-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-zapekli-boyi-za-kostyantynivku/ [52] https://x.com/WarUnitObserver/status/2098143557789876333 [53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/04/dyviziya-povnistyu-sterlasya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zavodyat-u-bij-svoyi-rezervy/ [54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ [55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193; https://t.me/wargonzo/36850 [56] https://t.me/mod_russia/67223 [57] https://x.com/99Dominik/status/2098089260607782916; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/1126
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193
[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/67224
[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/21063; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12929?single; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2098337504541778119?s=20https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12929?single; https://t.me/Osintpen/3522; https://t.me/sashakots/64376
[61] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42191 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42193 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36850
[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/10/vony-nakopychuyut-syly-ale-ye-odna-zagadkova-detal-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-zaporizhzhi/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[64] https://t.me/sashakots/64379
[65] https://t.me/arx_spn/31030
[66] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2098089721138119051; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/1152
[67] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/67221
[68] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/67243
[69] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[70] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/109241
[71] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/77725
[73] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31712; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02dKd5Xbq1KfxoT6Hn4qkq21GyXQCu4iDZV2PHnaw17YPTyu3zQb5viXfEVtWUs9Jtl; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1400690-poskodzeno-budivlu-armia-rf-atakuvala-mikolaivsinu-fpv-dronami/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19904; https://t.me/dsns_sumy/28682; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1400608-rosijska-armia-vtrete-atakuvala-trc-manufaktura-v-sumah-zajnalas-pozeza/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74398; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/11/masovana-ataka-bezpilotnykiv-na-zaporizhzhya-ye-postrazhdali/; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid02g913e2Yx1K6tdmKefX8jQdKwhn7JYrYzTxByyfwqHRG79LUhcaXfT1poW5hAZSMkl; https://suspilne dot media/zhytomyr/1400704-ataka-vijsk-rf-po-zitomirsini-poskodzene-pidpriemstvo-v-ovruckij-gromadi/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20571; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv/4378; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/76453; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv_region/19483; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv_region/19483
[74] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5409
[75] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7475; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7476; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7478; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20812; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20579; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20581 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20591
[76] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31953
[77] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/posesenie-obsevojskovogo-poligona-obuz-lesnovskij; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-podtverdil-plany-prodolzhit-proverki-gotovnosti-v-vojskah-800546-2026/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/11/vplot-do-mobilizatsii-lukashenko-zayavil-chto-prishlo-vremya-vstryahnut-armiyu-belarusi
[78] https://t.me/modmilby/58661; https://t.me/pul_1/22653; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-podtverdil-plany-prodolzhit-proverki-gotovnosti-v-vojskah-800546-2026/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/11/vplot-do-mobilizatsii-lukashenko-zayavil-chto-prishlo-vremya-vstryahnut-armiyu-belarusi; ttps://t.me/modmilby/58672; https://t.me/pul_1/22662; https://t.me/tass_agency/394911;
[79] https://t.me/pul_1/22654; https://t.me/modmilby/58664
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf
