Toplines
The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as a moral justification for its protracted war in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on April 22 at a Russian Orthodox Easter reception that one of Russia’s war goals in Ukraine is to protect the “honor and dignity” of Russian citizens, including their right to use the Russian language and practice the Orthodox faith.[1] Lavrov claimed that Ukraine has persecuted the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) for over a decade and accused the Ukrainian government of seizing churches and “attacking” UOC MP clergy and parishioners. The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization, but rather the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[2] The Kremlin has long used claims about the alleged discrimination of Russian people, the Russian language, and the ROC in Ukraine as a justification for invading Ukraine and for its continued refusal to engage in good-faith peace negotiations.[3] The ROC is notably an element of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in the Kremlin’s efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia’s influence in former Soviet states and justify its war-making initiatives.[4] The ROC has also advocated for the codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that Ukraine should not exist.[5] Russia has additionally engaged in widespread persecution of religious minorities, including Orthodox believers, in occupied Ukraine as part of its wider campaign aimed at systematically destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities.[6] Russian occupation authorities regularly conduct arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and loot, desecrate, and deliberately destroy places of worship.[7] Lavrov’s April 22 claims demonstrate the Kremlin’s continued commitment to its original war aims and disinterest in negotiations to end the war. However, these claims are undermined by the realities of Russia’s treatment of religious minority communities in occupied areas.
Russian President Vladimir Putin gave Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Academy an honorary title celebrating the organizer of the Soviet campaign of mass arrests and executions. Putin awarded the FSB Academy the honorary title of Felix Dzerzhinsky, which was its name during Soviet times when the academy served as the Soviet Committee for State Security’s (KGB), the FSB’s predecessor, higher education institute.[8] Dzerzhinsky notably organized the Bolshevik secret police (Cheka)’s Red Terror, a campaign of mass arrests, torture, and executions in Soviet Russia after the 1917 Revolution.[9] The corresponding decree cites the “merits” of its personnel and Dzerzhinsky’s “outstanding contribution to ensuring national security” as the reason for the award. Putin’s decision to restore the academy’s historical name is a significant symbolic act, clearly demonstrating the Kremlin’s commitment to honoring Soviet-era repressive ideology. Putin’s personal endorsement of Dzerzhinsky’s methods of ensuring national security is consistent with Russian officials’ more recent practice of endorsing Stalin-era rhetoric, including Soviet repression policies, persecution of the Russian opposition, and the nationalization of Russia’s economy. The Kremlin has intensified such efforts against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine in an attempt to consolidate domestic control, mobilize Russian society for war, and compel disloyal Russian citizens and residents of occupied Ukrainian territories to support its war in Ukraine.[10]
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as a moral justification for its protracted war in Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin gave Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Academy an honorary title celebrating the organizer of the Soviet campaign of mass arrests and executions.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Russia launched 215 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
A Ukrainian open-source intelligence project reported that Ukrainian strikes against an equipment depot near Persianovsky, Rostov Oblast, on April 21 struck an armored vehicle storage park of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[11]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 21 shows that Ukrainian forces hold positions in northern Andriivka (north of Sumy City), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Andriivka.[12]
Russian forces continue to use pipelines for infiltration missions in northern Sumy Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Sumy direction reported on April 22 that Russian forces are crawling through pipelines for several days before attacking in an attempt to cover and conceal themselves from Ukrainian drones and covertly advance.[13]
Russian sources have reportedly begun replacing some Russian airborne (VDV) units in northern Sumy Oblast following reports that Russian forces plan to redeploy VDV units to the Kherson direction from Sumy Oblast. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on April 22 that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are gradually replacing elements of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division), likely in northern Sumy Oblast.[14] The source claimed on April 1 that the Russian military command had planned to redeploy elements of the 119th and 51st VDV regiments (106th VDV Division) from Sumy Oblast to Kherson Oblast by mid-April 2026 and replace them with elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 80th brigade, possibly referring to the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD).[15] Elements of the 106th VDV Division have taken heavy losses in Sumy Oblast and likely need to rest and reconstitute on a less active part of the frontline.[16]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command posts near Vyazovoye and Vysokoye, Belgorod Oblast (both near the international border northwest of Grayvoron), and drone control points near Korovyakovka (roughly two kilometers from the international border west of Glushkovo) and Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (on the international border southwest of Glushkovo) on April 21 or overnight on April 21 to 22.[17]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and continued attacks northeast of Kharkiv City on April 22.[18] Geolocated footage published on April 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern and southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southwest of Veterynarne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[20]
Russian forces appear to be increasing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts along the international border with Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, likely to support potential future offensive operations in the area. Ukrainian 14th Army Corps Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev reported that Russian forces have intensified strikes against Bohudukhiv (northwest of Kharkiv City along the Merla River at the intersection of the P-46 Sumy City-Kharkiv City highway and P-45 Kharkiv City-Okhtyrka highway), primarily using Shahed or Italmas drones and less frequently with Molniya and Lancet drones.[21] Sarantsev stated that Russian forces are striking all along the international border, attempting to pressure the Ukrainian rear and disrupt Ukrainian logistics between Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Bohodukhiv Mayor Volodymyr Belyi reported that Russian forces launched 110 drones against the settlement between April 18 and 22, inflicting the most damage since February 2022.[22] Russian forces may be intensifying strikes in this area as part of a BAI campaign by targeting Ukrainian logistics in the near and operational rear to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain its frontline forces. It is unlikely that Russian forces are preparing to open a new front in the immediate term, however.
Russian forces continue to employ pervasive human safari tactics in Kharkiv Oblast. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on April 22 that a Russian drone struck a civilian vehicle, killing one civilian and injuring another near Cherkaski Tyshky (north of Kharkiv City and roughly 17 kilometers from the international border).[23]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 22.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission and continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 22 but did not advance, and Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[24] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are gradually intensifying assault operations in the Kupyansk direction, particularly toward Kupyansk itself from both banks of the Oskil River.[25] Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows Russian forces operating in northern Kupyansk in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[26]
A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues in the Borova direction.[27]
Ukrainian forces continue mid-range strikes against Russian drone infrastructure in near-rear areas of occupied Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone control point near Dobrolyubivka (roughly 19 kilometers from the frontline).[28]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted offensive operations and Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on April 22.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[30]
Russian forces are reportedly transitioning from small group foot mobile infantry infiltrations to light motorized assaults in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area amid continued offensive operations on April 22.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Kostyantynivka) direction reported on April 22 that Russian forces are shifting from small group infiltrations to attacks on light vehicles, including motorcycles, civilian cars, and buggies.[32] The senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of another Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces’ use of motorcycles is an attempt to move rapidly through the “kill zone” (an isolated frontline area of elevated drone strike risk) in the Kostyantynivka direction.[33] Russian forces conducted two roughly platoon-sized mechanized assaults east of Chasiv Yar (east of Kostyantynivka) on April 18 and 19.[34]
A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Russian forces advanced south of Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[35]
Russian forces continued a relatively high tempo of ground assaults in the Pokrovsk direction compared to other areas of the frontline on April 22.[36] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces launched 688 assaults in the Pokrovsk direction between April 1 and 22.[37]
Geolocated footage published on April 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in northwestern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]
Russian forces conducted ground assaults in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on April 22 but did not advance.[39]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on April 21 and overnight on April 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Zatyshne (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline) and a troop concentration near occupied Hrafske (roughly 71 kilometers from the frontline).[40]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued infiltration missions northwest and southwest of Hulyaipole on April 22 and are fielding thermobaric artillery southeast of Hulyaipole.[41] Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows a Russian soldier operating west of Olenokostyantynivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) during what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Hirke (east of Hulyaipole), advanced south of Hirke and east of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole), and entered southeastern Verkhnya Tersa (north of Hirke).[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in the area northwest of Orikhiv on April 22 but did not advance.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[45]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on April 22, including toward islands in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[46]
Russian forces continue to employ human safari tactics against civilians in Kherson City. The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on April 22 that a Russian drone struck a car in Kherson City, injuring one civilian.[47]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Striletskyi naval traffic control center in occupied Sevastopol (roughly 242 kilometers from the front line).[48]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces continued long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 215 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other long-range strike drones, including about 140 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[49] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 189 drones, that 24 drones struck 13 locations, and that debris fell at six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck agricultural, port, railway, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[50] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian drones struck a train at a railway yard in Zaporizhzhia City.[51] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[52]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2097996/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-4/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-8-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025/
[8] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202604220002; https://shieldandsword.mozohin dot ru/kgb5491/school/highschool.htm
[9] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/22/putin-vernul-akademii-fsb-imya-feliksa-dzerzhinskogo; https://t.me/bbcrussian/94107
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_22-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-17/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25-16/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/;
[11] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12843 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/
[12] https://x.com/UkraineDailyUpd/status/2046810184786350274; https://t.me/z0vAida/4473
[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/lyublyat-povzty-try-doby-v-trubi-na-sumshhyni-cherez-svoye-dyvne-hobi-rosiyany-zhyvut-ne-bilshe-nizh-15-hvylyn/ ; https://youtu.be/T3CvA7krXqc?t=1265 ;
[14] https://t.me/severnnyi/7679
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37598
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20503
[19] https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/2046880706056389014 ; https://t.me/ompbr57/1728
[20] https://t.me/rybar/79673
[21] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1295353-posilenna-udariv-po-bogoduhovu-u-14-mu-armijskomu-korpusi-rozpovili-ci-e-oznaki-pidgotovki-nastupu-rf-na-misto/
[22] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1295725-rujnuvan-bilse-niz-za-roki-povnomasstabnogo-vtorgnenna-110-droniv-rosiani-spramuvali-na-bogoduhiv-za-cotiri-dobi/
[23] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28393
[24] https://t.me/gvZapad/18369; https://t.me/wargonzo/33706; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20503; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42192; https://t.me/gvZapad/18369
[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/vyjty-u-vikno-pereviryty-gravitacziyu-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-namagayutsya-proryvatysya-do-kupyanska/
[26] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2046942596644135015; https://t.me/kcaebirds/2714; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11749
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/33706;
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37411
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613; https://t.me/wargonzo/33706; https://t.me/wargonzo/33706; https://t.me/gvZapad/18369; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42204
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207776
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613; https://t.me/rybar/79682
[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/vony-bilshe-praczyuyut-na-kazyno-poblyzu-chasovogo-yaru-dronamy-spalyly-motoshturm/
[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/projshov-piv-godyny-i-ne-vbyly-to-zavodyat-inshogo-poblyzu-kostyantynivky-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-demaskuyut-motoczykly/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/
[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207785
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613; https://t.me/wargonzo/33706
[37] https://t.me/osirskiy/1466
[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046590364664897665; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046590396143194275
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613; https://t.me/dva_majors/91740
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37598
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71938; https://t.me/voin_dv/19321
[42] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2046850521051341148; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/2834; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11747
[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71938; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33428
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33706
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51025
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37566 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37613
[47] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/55115 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/55130
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37598
[49] https://t.me/kpszsu/60485
[50] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28682; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28898; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/uranczi-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-dnipru/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28898; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1295125-ataki-po-dnipru-ta-nikopolsini-bezpekova-situacia-na-ranok-22-kvitna/; https://t.me/synegubov/21271; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3833; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3834; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8592; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/vorog-atakuvav-zaliznyczyu-u-zaporizhzhi-zagynuv-pomichnyk-mashynista/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/62246; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/rosiyany-masovano-atakuvaly-odeshhynu-poshkodzheni-portovi-obyekty/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1295107-v-odesi-prolunav-vibuh-so-vidomo-pro-dronovu-ataku-na-misto/ ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1295119-rf-atakuvala-odesu-dvoma-hvilami-droniv-cillu-bula-infrastruktura/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1295181-u-portu-velikoi-odesi-bpla-vluciv-u-trum-sudna/; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/501; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15601; https://t.me/odesaMVA/1917;
[51] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8592; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/22/vorog-atakuvav-zaliznyczyu-u-zaporizhzhi-zagynuv-pomichnyk-mashynista/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38658; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1295129-udar-po-transportnij-infrastrukturi-zaporizkogo-regionu-odna-ludina-zaginula-se-odna-poranena/
[52] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4891; https://suspilne dot media/1295361-v-ukraini-problemi-z-elektropostacannam-pisla-obstriliv-castina-regioniv-zalisilasa-bez-svitla/
