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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2026

August 1, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2026

Toplines

The Russian rate of advance in Ukraine remains low two and a half months into the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which has failed to make any operationally significant gains. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in 37.85 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine (smaller than the area of Manhattan) in July 2026 for an average of 1.22 square kilometers per day. Russia’s monthly rate of advance has not changed significantly since February 2026, prior to the start of its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which began in mid-March 2026.[1] Russian forces have infiltrated into more territory in July 2026 than in recent months, advancing or infiltrating into about 121.56 square kilometers of territory in all. Even the Russian rate of advance and infiltration in July 2026 is a fraction of Russia’s rate of advance in July 2025, when Russian forces seized 455.74 square kilometers. Russian forces leaned into conducting additional infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast in July 2026, but Russia’s increased infiltrations have not resulted in the seizure of Kostyantynivka or the achievement of any operationally significant objectives.[2] The Russian monthly rate of advance in 2026 has been much lower than Russia’s rate of advance during the same period in 2025, even when including infiltrations.

Continued Ukrainian counterattacks, Ukraine’s intermediate range strike campaign, and Ukrainian drone dominance continue to constrain Russia’s rate of advance and ability to field mechanized vehicles. Russian forces have conducted a few mechanized assaults in isolated areas of the theater in July 2026, but these assaults did not result in meaningful gains.[3] The Kremlin has been optimizing the Russian military for positional warfare rather than maneuver warfare for several years, but Ukrainian adaptations are significantly slowing Russian advances in 2026 compared with previous years.[4] There is no indication that Russian forces will be able to accelerate their advances dramatically or restore maneuver to the battlefield at this time.

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Russian Territorial Gains in Ukraine Including Infiltrations, February-July 2026

Russian Territorial Gains in Ukraine, February-July 2025 and February-July 2026

Russian Territorial Gains in Ukraine Including Infiltrations, February-July 2025 and February-July 2026

Russian forces reportedly suffered the highest casualty rate of 2026 thus far in July, paying an increasingly high price for no significant increase in the rate of advance — despite the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to deny this fact. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,860 casualties in July 2026, a new monthly high for the war.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff’s data indicates that Russian casualties have been steadily increasing since February 2026, when Russian forces suffered 26,090 casualties. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 31 that Russian forces have suffered almost 700,000 killed in action (KIA) and about 1.6 million total casualties since February 2022.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff’s casualty rates indicate that Russian forces suffered an average of 353 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated in July 2026, and a staggering 1,132 casualties per square kilometer seized.

Reported Russian Casualties by Month, January-July 2026

The Kremlin is desperately attempting to disguise its slow rate of advance in Ukraine through exaggerated claims of advance, but even Moscow’s claimed rate of advance is only about footpace. Russian forces have advanced, infiltrated, or claimed to have advanced in 18.49 square kilometers per day in July 2026. The Kremlin and senior Russian military command have leaned into their cognitive warfare campaign, attempting to falsely show that Russian forces are advancing in all sectors of the front, that Ukrainian lines are collapsing, and that the West should abandon Ukraine as a hopeless cause.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin newswire TASS each made exaggerated claims on July 31 about the number of settlements that Russian forces allegedly seized in July 2026 as part of this informational effort.[8] This Russian informational effort also likely aims to convince Russians that the sacrifices they are making for the war, including the staggering casualty rates, economic burden, Ukrainian strikes in Russia, and Kremlin censorship measures, are worth it.[9] But even the Kremlin’s most extensive claims do not have Russian forces advancing faster than footpace, a rate of advance far slower than the Kremlin would need to collapse Ukrainian lines and rapidly seize the areas Moscow reportedly aims to capture by the end of 2026.

Russian forces continued to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles by launching another large ballistic missile and drone strike series against Ukraine overnight on July 31 to August 1, primarily targeting Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 1 that Russian forces launched 35 missiles and 185 drones and prioritized targeting Kyiv Oblast while also targeting Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship/ cruise missiles from Kursk and Rostov oblasts; 27 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; and two Kh-31 anti-radar missiles and two Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles from the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force added that Russian forces launched 185 Shahed, jet-powered Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type drones; Banderol cruise missile/loitering munitions; and Parodiya-type decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities and occupied Donetsk City and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that four Zirkon/Onyx and 26 Iskander-M/S-400 missiles as well as 23 strike drones struck 23 locations; that drone debris fell at two locations; and that three missiles did not reach their targets as of 0930 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted or suppressed one Iskander-M/S-400 missile, one Kh-59/69 missile, and 154 strike drones, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attributed Ukraine’s inability to intercept more ballistic missiles to Patriot interceptor missile shortages.[11]

Russian Drone and Missile Strikes on Ukraine, November 1, 2025 to August 1 2026

Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that Russian ballistic strikes on Kyiv City killed nine people and wounded 33, including four children, and that the strikes caused fires and damage in seven Kyiv City districts.[12] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian forces twice struck the territory of the Kyivmedspetstrans emergency and transport organization, destroying five ambulances and damaging four buildings and vehicles that service healthcare institutions.[13] Zelensky added that Russian strikes damaged 18 residential buildings, a school, and the Lithuanian Embassy in Kyiv City.[14] Lithuanian President Gitānas Naūseda confirmed that a Russian missile exploded near the Lithuanian Embassy in Kyiv City, damaging the embassy building.[15] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kēstutis Budris announced that the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry (MFA) will summon a Russian embassy representative in Lithuania in response to the strike.[16] Mufti of Ukraine’s Umma Religious Administration of Muslims Murat Suleymanov reported that Russian strikes damaged the Umma’s main mosque for the third time.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been escalating its missile strikes — particularly ballistic missile strikes — against Kyiv City in an effort to take advantage of Patriot interceptor shortages and inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian civilian, defense, and energy infrastructure.[18]

Russian forces launched a record number of missiles against Ukraine in July 2026 — notably firing more missiles than it is producing per month and increasingly leveraging its S-400 and Zirkon missiles to compensate for shortfalls in ballistic missile stockpiles. The Ukrainian Air Force data suggests that Russia launched at least 376 missiles against Ukraine in July 2026, the highest number of missiles launched in a single month since Russia began large-scale missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.[19] Russia launched nearly 90 more missiles in July 2026 than the 288 missiles launched in February 2026, the second-highest monthly total.[20] Russia previously conducted comparable large-scale missile strike series in October 2025 and December 2022, launching 270 missiles in each series. Russian forces reportedly launched over 30 Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles; over 120 Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles; over 140 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles; and over 60 Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles in July 2026.[21]

Reported Russian Missile Launches by Month, July 2025-July 2026

Reported Russian Missile Launches by Month, October 2022-July 2026

Russian forces have likely increasingly tapped into their stockpiles and used newly produced missiles to sustain the higher intensity of ballistic missile strikes in July 2026. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 18 that Russia had over 100 Iskander-M and around 50 KN-23 ballistic missiles; over 60 Iskander-K and over 450 Kalibr cruise missiles; up to 100 Kh-101 cruise missiles; over 120 Zirkon anti-ship missiles; over 600 Onyx cruise missiles; over 400 S-300/S-400 missiles, and up to Kh-69 guided missiles in stocks.[22] The GUR had previously reported that Russian stockpiles had up to 110 Iskander-M, 200 Iskander-K, 690 Onyx, 230 Zirkon, 120 Kh-101, and 460 Kalibr missiles as of April 2026, indicating that Russia’s escalating strikes in the Summer 2026 have marginally depleted Russian stockpiles while Ukrainian forces conduct strikes on the Russian defense industry to disrupt production.[23] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi, citing unspecified Ukrainian intelligence reports, reported on July 19 that Russia produces about 60 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 40 missiles for the S-400 complex monthly.[24] A Ukrainian defense expert, citing data from GUR, reported on July 23 that Russia produced 50 Iskander-M, 60 Kh-101, and three Zirkon missiles per month as of July 18.[25]

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly tapping into its comparatively larger Zirkon and S-400 stockpiles, likely to offset the strain on Russian ballistic missile production and stockpiles. The Ukrainian defense expert noted that Russian forces have been able to intensify their ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine by increasingly relying on refurbished S-400 systems.[26] An open-source intelligence analyst also assessed in June 2026 that Russia has been increasingly relying on Zirkon missiles and that these missiles do not function as hypersonic cruise missiles but rather as maneuverable quasi-ballistic systems.[27] Militarnyi also estimated on July 19 that Russia had used up to two-thirds of its planned annual production of Zirkon missiles in July 2026.[28]

Russia’s alternative to the Starlink satellite network is reportedly already providing Russian forces the connectivity over Ukraine necessary to conduct precision drone strikes, increasing Ukraine’s urgent need for expanded Starlink connectivity over Russia to disrupt Russian strike packages before they are launched. Ukrainian satellite communications expert Volodymyr Stepanets told Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi that the first operational batch of 12 of 16 Russian Rassvet satellites has largely completed its deployment into orbit as of July 31.[29] Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 developed Rassvet satellites as an alternative to SpaceX’s Starlink and launched the first batch of satellites in late March 2026, shortly after SpaceX cut off Russia’s unauthorized access to Starlink terminals in early February 2026.[30] Stepanets stated that the deployed Rassvet satellites already provide Russian forces “quite dense coverage,” particularly during two windows per day. N2YO satellite tracking service suggested that Rassvet satellites are positioned in orbits that allow them to pass over Ukraine four times a day and ensure a stable connection with the ground terminal during two or three flyovers, creating a temporary connectivity window for an hour to an hour and a half.[31] Militarnyi reported that Russian forces can use these connectivity windows to operate unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and heavy strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in real time. Such capabilities can support attacking moving targets deep in the rear of Ukrainian forces, among other things. Militarnyi reported that Russia could gain two additional connectivity windows after the second batch of 16 Rassvet satellites reaches operational altitudes between October and November 2026. The Kremlin had previously stated that Rassvet will begin commercial operations in 2027, and Militarnyi estimated that Russia could secure 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine by mid-summer 2027.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly asked US President Donald Trump to widen Ukraine’s Starlink access in an effort to expand Ukraine’s mid- and long-range strike capabilities over Russia.[32] Such access would allow Ukrainian forces to attack moving targets deep in Russian rear areas, particularly the launchers of Russian ballistic missiles. Starlink support to such Ukrainian operations could help offset the global shortage of Patriot missile interceptors.

Key Takeaways

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against oil and gasoline infrastructure in Russia on July 31 and August 1. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-UNPZ, Bashneft-Novoil, and Bashneft-Ufanaftokhim oil refineries in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the international border) overnight from July 31 to August 1.[33] The SBU stated that these three oil refineries comprise one of Russia’s largest oil refining clusters with a total refining capacity of over 23 million tons of oil per year. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows multiple fires at the refinery cluster in Ufa.[34] Republic of Bashkortostan Head Radiy Khabirov claimed that Russian forces repelled a drone strike against Ufa but that a downed drone struck the city’s industrial zone.[35] Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows a fire at Russian petrochemical enterprise Nizhnekamskneftekhim near Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,100 kilometers from the international border).[36] Nizhnekamsknefekhim acknowledged on July 31 that a fire broke out at the facility but claimed that authorities had contained the fire.[37] Geolocated footage published on July 30 shows a damaged Gazprom-owned gas station following a reported Ukrainian drone strike south of Belgorod City (roughly 40 kilometers from the international border).[38]

The SBU reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck three Podlet-K1 radar stations and one Kasta-2E2 radar station in Krasnodar Krai.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on July 31 and August 1 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pysarivka (north of Sumy City).[41]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 31 and August 1 but did not advance.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in northern and central Kupyansk and in the western outskirts of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[43]

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Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued attacks southeast of Borova on July 31 and August 1, but neither side advanced.[44] The Russian MoD claimed on August 1 that Russian forces seized Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[45] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces stated that claims of advances near Olhivka are unconfirmed, however.[46]

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 31 and August 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that Russian forces advanced west of Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk).[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on July 31 and August 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 31 and August 1 that Russian forces seized Torske and advanced east of Torske, west of Pryiut, and southwest of Novopavlivka (all west of Kostyantynivka).[50]

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Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 31 and August 1 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that Russian forces seized Matyasheve (immediately southeast of Dobropillya) as part of an effort to advance on the approaches to Dobropillya after failing to enter Dobropillya itself.[52] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko (southeast of Dobropillya).

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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 31 and August 1 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Novopavlivka on July 31 and August 1 but did not advance.[55]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Oleksandrivka. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in western Voskresenka, Donetsk Oblast (east of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[56]

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Ukrainian forces reportedly struck energy infrastructure in a rear area of occupied Donetsk Oblast recently. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows a large fire at the Zuivska Power Station in occupied Zuhres, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 69 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 31 to August 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[58] The Russian MoD claimed on August 1 that Russian forces seized Lyubytske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[59] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov credited elements of the 36th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Lyubytske.[60]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Orikhiv. Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[61]

A Ukrainian military source warned that Russian forces may intensify their offensive efforts towards Zaporizhzhia City in August and September. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction stated on August 1 that Russian forces continue efforts to advance towards Zaporizhzhia City and assessed that Russian forces may attempt a more concerted push in this direction in August and September 2026.[62] ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces are preparing for a new major offensive effort in this direction beyond their current efforts to advance on Orikhiv from the south in western Zaporizhia Oblast and from the east in the Hulyaipole direction.

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Russian forces are increasing glide bomb strikes and decreasing Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions in the Zaporizhia direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on August 1 that Russian forces are no longer launching a large number of Molniya loitering munitions but that they continue to conduct glide bomb strikes several times per day in the brigade’s area of responsibility.[63] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces now launch no more than 30 Molniyas within an 18-hour period in the brigade’s area of responsibility, compared to 60 Molniyas within an 18-hour period in the past.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics and energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone warehouse near occupied Tokmak (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[64] Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows Ukrainian forces striking a KamAZ logistics vehicle and the aftermath of a recent strike against a Russian Ural truck, both along the M-14 Melitopol-Mariupol highway east of occupied Shevchenka (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline).[65] Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted several waves of strikes against occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) overnight from July 31 to August 1, hitting at least one substation roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline, causing a large fire.[66]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 1.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Kherson Oblast overnight on July 29 to 30.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian warehouse containing material and technical equipment near occupied Podove (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline).[68] Geolocated footage published on July 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian KamAZ logistics vehicle along the E-97 Oleshky-Sahy-Radensk highway east of Kalanchak (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[69]

Russian forces continue to target civilian vehicles in Kherson Oblast as part of their human safari strike campaign. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows Russian forces striking a civilian grocery vehicle in Komyshany (west of Kherson City), killing two occupants.[70]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting to and in occupied Crimea from July 29 to August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Syvash railway bridge between occupied Kherson Oblast near Chonhar (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline), a railway bridge near Vladyslavivka (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline), a repair and restoration base near Pervomaiske (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline), and a Russian Black Sea Fleet radio-electric intelligence detachment south of Sevastopol (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline).[71] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Syvash railway bridge on July 16, 2026.[72] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Project 1100M Sargan patrol boat near Kerch and a Forpost drone control station near Yevpatoria on the night of July 29 to July 30.[73] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse of Russian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), which Russian forces use to conduct combat and special operations missions in the Black Sea, near Chornomorske, Crimea.[74]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian naval assets in the Black Sea on August 1. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 1 that Ukrainian USVs struck the sanctioned Yanina Russian-flagged container ship.[75] Starboard Maritime Intelligence data reviewed by ISW on August 1 indicates that the Yanina turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) transponder at 1300 UTC on July 31 after sailing with its AIS on since July 2026. The vessel had visited ports in Mumbai and Mundra, India, in the past month. Russian business newspaper Kommersant claimed on August 1 that the Yanina is owned by FESCO — a subsidiary of Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom.[76] Kommersant claimed that Ukrainian USV strikes sank the Yanina roughly 130 nautical miles from Novorossiysk. Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev acknowledged the strike against the Yanina and claimed that authorities rescued all 17 crew members. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows a Ukrainian USV striking the Bourda crude oil tanker, a Liberian-flagged vessel, in the Black Sea.[77] Commercially available data from Starboard reviewed by ISW on August 1 indicates that Bourda abruptly turned off its AIS transponder at 0110 UTC on JUL 31 and loitered off the coast of Sochi until 0600 UTC on August 1, after which the vessel abruptly turned around and self-reported its destination as Istanbul, despite departing from Istanbul on July 29. The vessel had previously been heading towards Taman, Krasnodar Krai.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

See topline text for Russian overnight missile and drone strikes on Ukraine.

Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian civilian logistical centers and warehouses. Ukrainian postal service Nova Poshta reported on July 31 that Russian strikes destroyed its sorting terminal in Poltava City and damaged its facilities in Haisyn, Vinnytsia Oblast on the night of July 30 and July 31.[78] Russian strikes also damaged the Nova Poshta sorting terminal in Poltava City on the night of July 29 to 30.[79] Ukrainian officials reported on August 1 that Russian drones struck the warehouse of a local publishing house in Kharkiv City; warehouses and a marketplace in Brovary, Kyiv Oblast; a warehouse of humanitarian organization Proliska in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and an unspecified critical infrastructure facility in Poltava Raion.[80] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on August 1 that a Russian Geran-4 jet-powered drone struck a warehouse of Ukrainian online retailer Rozetka in an unspecified location for the second time, hitting minibuses in the parking lot and inflicting casualties.[81] Beskrestnov noted that different Russian military commanders are responsible for targeting decisions for ballistic missile strikes and for drone strikes, using ballistic missiles against strategic targets or informationally significant targets, while a lower level of decision-makers determines targeting for jet-powered Shahed drones.

Odesa City officials reported that Russian strikes damaged a high-rise apartment building in Odesa City in the late morning of August 1, injuring at least three people.[82]

Russian forces are reportedly increasing the intensity of drone and glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure, including gas stations. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 1 that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of strikes on Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure and struck at least 60 Ukrainian gas stations between July 19 and July 31.[83] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces primarily used Geran and Gerbera (Shahed-type) strike drones to strike gas stations but also used at least one Italmas drone and UMPK-equipped FAB aerial bombs for these strikes. Ukrainian officials reported on July 31 and August 1 that a Russian Lancet drone struck a gas station in Novhorod-Siversky, Chernihiv Oblast, and that an unspecified Russian drone struck a gas station in Kharkiv City.[84] The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies published footage on July 25 footage reportedly showing Russian drone strikes against at least nine gas stations in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[85]

Russian forces continue to employ human safari tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Hanzha reported on August 1 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian minibus in Chernohryhorivka Hromada (southwest of Dnipro City), injuring at least seven civilians.[86]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/;

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/;

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-forecasting-the-threat/

[5] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41692

[6] https://suspilne dot media/1368318-vid-pocatku-povnomasstabnoi-vijni-zaginulo-blizko-50-tisac-ukrainskih-oboronciv-zelenskij/; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6402490895112

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/

[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/388125 https://t.me/mod_russia/66151

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/

[10] https://t.me/kpszsu/71026

[11] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2083446294777909371 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20254

[12] https://t.me/dsns_kyiv/3524; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1368982-rosia-atakuvala-kiiv-balisticnimi-raketami-e-zagibli-i-poraneni/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7187; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7186 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/53340; https://t.me/astrapress/120808 ; https://t.me/astrapress/120821 ; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2083406376852762629

[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/01/vorog-dvoma-raketamy-spalyv-u-kyyevi-5-mashyn-shvydkoyi/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7187;

[14] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2083446294777909371 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20254

[15] https://x.com/GitanasNauseda/status/2083441209284989011; https://x.com/BudrysKestutis/status/2083444125353816138; https://suspilne dot media/1369092-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-poskodzeno-posolstvo-litvi-u-kievi/

[16] https://x.com/BudrysKestutis/status/2083444125353816138

[17] https://suspilne dot media/1368956-detonacia-na-poligoni-na-hmelniccini-na-komandira-hartii-skoili-zamah-1620-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1785580967&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/

[19] https://t.me/kpszsu/66963; https://t.me/kpszsu/67095; https://t.me/kpszsu/67183; https://t.me/kpszsu/67304; https://t.me/kpszsu/67362 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/67506; https://t.me/kpszsu/67633 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/67709; https://t.me/kpszsu/67858; https://t.me/kpszsu/67924; https://t.me/kpszsu/68010; https://t.me/kpszsu/68150; https://t.me/kpszsu/68283; https://t.me/kpszsu/68398 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/68521; https://t.me/kpszsu/68667; https://t.me/kpszsu/68838; https://t.me/kpszsu/68985; https://t.me/kpszsu/69144; https://t.me/kpszsu/69330; https://t.me/kpszsu/69455; https://t.me/kpszsu/69602; https://t.me/kpszsu/69780; https://t.me/kpszsu/69891; https://t.me/kpszsu/70048; https://t.me/kpszsu/70134;

https://t.me/kpszsu/70292; https://t.me/kpszsu/70462; https://t.me/kpszsu/70584; https://t.me/kpszsu/70754; https://t.me/kpszsu/70844; https://t.me/kpszsu/71026

[20] https://t.me/kpszsu/54184; https://t.me/kpszsu/54308; https://t.me/kpszsu/54449; https://t.me/kpszsu/54533; https://t.me/kpszsu/54626; https://t.me/kpszsu/54777; https://t.me/kpszsu/54980; https://t.me/kpszsu/55046; https://t.me/kpszsu/55140; https://t.me/kpszsu/55224; https://t.me/kpszsu/55273; https://t.me/kpszsu/55398; https://t.me/kpszsu/55472; https://t.me/kpszsu/55563; https://t.me/kpszsu/55651; https://t.me/kpszsu/55715; https://t.me/kpszsu/55822; https://t.me/kpszsu/55901; https://t.me/kpszsu/55944; https://t.me/kpszsu/56012; https://t.me/kpszsu/56134; https://t.me/kpszsu/56278; https://t.me/kpszsu/56323; https://t.me/kpszsu/56374; https://t.me/kpszsu/56480; https://t.me/kpszsu/56598; https://t.me/kpszsu/56649; https://t.me/kpszsu/56719

[21] https://x.com/M0nstas/status/2083320094336098386; https://t.me/ShrikeNews/31690; https://t.me/kpszsu/66963; https://t.me/kpszsu/67095; https://t.me/kpszsu/67183; https://t.me/kpszsu/67304; https://t.me/kpszsu/67362 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/67506; https://t.me/kpszsu/67633 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/67709; https://t.me/kpszsu/67858; https://t.me/kpszsu/67924; https://t.me/kpszsu/68010; https://t.me/kpszsu/68150; https://t.me/kpszsu/68283; https://t.me/kpszsu/68398 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/68521; https://t.me/kpszsu/68667; https://t.me/kpszsu/68838; https://t.me/kpszsu/68985; https://t.me/kpszsu/69144; https://t.me/kpszsu/69330; https://t.me/kpszsu/69455; https://t.me/kpszsu/69602; https://t.me/kpszsu/69780; https://t.me/kpszsu/69891; https://t.me/kpszsu/70048; https://t.me/kpszsu/70134;

https://t.me/kpszsu/70292; https://t.me/kpszsu/70462; https://t.me/kpszsu/70584; https://t.me/kpszsu/70754; https://t.me/kpszsu/70844; https://t.me/kpszsu/71026

[22] https://t.me/nvua_official/182247

[23] https://nv dot ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/virobnictvo-rosiyskih-raket-vpalo-pislya-ukrajinskih-udariv-romanenko-pro-novi-dani-gur-50626462.html; https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/parad-9-travnya-chim-putin-mozhe-biti-po-kiyevu-za-mozhlivu-ataku-droniv-spisok-raket-kilkist-50605479.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/; https://t.me/astrapress/108115

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2026/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-dvi-tretyny-vyrobnytstva-tsyrkon/

[25] https://nv dot ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/virobnictvo-rosiyskih-raket-vpalo-pislya-ukrajinskih-udariv-romanenko-pro-novi-dani-gur-50626462.html

[26] https://nv dot ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/virobnictvo-rosiyskih-raket-vpalo-pislya-ukrajinskih-udariv-romanenko-pro-novi-dani-gur-50626462.html

[27] https://luftlage dot substack.com/p/not-quite-a-diamond

[28] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-dvi-tretyny-vyrobnytstva-tsyrkon/

[29] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rassvet-zmozhut-zabezpechyty-rosiyi-zvyazok/

[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/

[31] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rassvet-zmozhut-zabezpechyty-rosiyi-zvyazok/

[32] https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/07/zelensky-asked-trump-for-a-favor-from-elon-musk/688122/

[33] https://t.me/SBUkr/18250;

[34] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/2083455483294216212; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/2083461505299689664; https://t.me/andriyshTime/64558 ; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2083447534408614289

[35] https://t.me/radiyhabirov/13537

[36] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083290883386900931; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27672; https://t.me/region_22ua/65653

[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/388128

[38] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2083188677618884799; https://t.me/belpepel/23420

[39] https://t.me/SBUkr/18250

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41693; https://t.me/severnnyi/8879

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/35929

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41693; https://t.me/wargonzo/35929; https://t.me/severnnyi/8879

[43] https://t.me/ombr41/2959; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2083470985101983925; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2083524162346262747; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12585; https://t.me/army_9th_sbus/968

[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/35929; https://t.me/grvZapad/19307

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/66172

[46] https://t.me/grvZapad/19307

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41693; https://t.me/wargonzo/35929; https://t.me/grvZapad/19307

[48] https://t.me/divgen/82807

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41693

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54727 ; https://t.me/divgen/82835

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41693

[52] https://t.me/arx_spn/30512

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41693; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120432

[54] https://t.me/arx_spn/30512

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674;

[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12581; https://t.me/boryviter_95/21

[57] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2083361470499430849; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2083331706145444189; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083365690677846130; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-urazyly-tes-na-donechchyni/

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41672 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35929

[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/66173

[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/66176

[61] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2083270528601895346; https://t.me/zapravdu_1429/3165

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/01/zaruba-bude-duzhe-zhorstokoyu-vorog-gotuye-sprobu-velykogo-nastupu-na-zaporizhzhi/

[63] liii https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/01/pislya-rekordnogo-zbyttya-molnij-vorog-zmenshyv-yih-vykorystannya-na-zaporizhzhi/

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41688

[65] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083227575376093187; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083228289779355884; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27657; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2082925261847204093

[66] https://t.me/andriyshTime/64553

[67] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9020

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41688

[69] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083285813215846577; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1948880972467453

[70] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083257794468196491; https://www.instagram.com/andry_boxer/reel/DbdorMmsZGb/; https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/32734

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41688

[72] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/

[73] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9020

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41688

[75] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20264

[76] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8860634?tg

[77] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2083517220458479634

[78] https://t.me/novapostcorp/5002; https://t.me/novapostcorp/5003

[79] https://t.me/novapostcorp/4994 ; https://t.me/novapostcorp/5003; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1367184-na-poltavsini-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-zaginula-ludina-poskodzeni-pidpriemstvo-ta-terminal-novoi-posti/;

[80] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4410; https://t.me/synegubov/24429; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1369138-reaktivnij-sahed-vluciv-u-sevcenkivskomu-rajoni-harkova-so-vidomo/; https://suspilne dot media/1368956-detonacia-na-poligoni-na-hmelniccini-na-komandira-hartii-skoili-zamah-1620-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1785580125&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2607; https://t.me/press_kobl/4304 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/53357; https://www.facebook.com/yevhen.kaplin/posts/4117496168383063?ref=embed_post; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1369286-rf-znisila-sklad-gummisii-proliska-u-pavlogradi-zbitki-sagnuli-150-tisac-dolariv/; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1369050-rosijskij-bpla-vluciv-v-obekt-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi-u-poltavskomu-rajoni/; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1368958-unaslidok-rosijskoi-ataki-na-poltavu-bulo-zrujnovano-sortuvalnij-terminal-novoi-posti/

[81] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7637; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02PEi46BWTd518sU2VMoB6nm6iuhmSHzzmov1RMqbAuVfyZnZ9kwyyCnBBVF4hxHMal

[82] https://t.me/odesaMVA/2923; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18234; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18229; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1369154-rf-atakuvala-odesu-e-vlucanna-u-budinok/; https://t.me/astrapress/120840; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2083484779211583821; https://t.me/xydessa/68958; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083489897369776245

[83] https://t.me/rybar/82133

[84] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30826; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4409

[85] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2207; https://lostarmour dot info/news/udar-azs-shostka-18618

[86] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31142

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