Toplines
Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a train leaving Ukraine and infrastructure at the Yahodyn border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border on September 13, as European officials were crossing the border. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russia conducted a drone strike against a passenger train locomotive and a gas station in Volyn Oblast near the Ukrainian-Polish border.[1] The Ukrzaliznytsia deputy director for passenger transportation stated that a Russian drone hit the locomotive of a train traveling from Kyiv City to Warsaw, and Ukrzaliznytsia reported that the drone struck the locomotive two kilometers from the Polish border.[2] Volyn Customs Spokesperson Valentyna Chernysh stated that a Russian strike also damaged a gas station near the Yahodyn-Dorohusk border checkpoint on the morning of September 13, causing a fire.[3] Geolocated footage published on September 13 shows the aftermath of the Russian strike against the train locomotive and the gas station.[4] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed Russian strikes against the Ukrainian-Polish border crossing and the gas station and stated that Russian escalation is becoming a fact.[5] Polish Armed Forces Operational Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Jacek Goryszewski stated on September 13 that the Russian threat is “real and imminent.”[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense acknowledged on September 13 that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in western Ukraine that allegedly facilitates the transport of military cargo from Europe to Ukraine, although the struck passenger train departing Ukraine was clearly not bringing military cargo to Ukraine.[7]
German outlet Der Spiegel reported on September 13 that German Advisor on Foreign and Security Policy Günter Sautter, Bundestag member Robin Wagener, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and other European security officials were returning from Ukraine’s Yalta European Strategy (YES) annual conference through a Polish border via train.[8] The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 13 that a Russian drone hit a train at the Ukrainian-Polish border shortly after Ukrainian authorities had evacuated the train with European officials who had passed through the Yahodyn-Dorohusk crossing.[9] Western officials have regularly used a train line from Poland to Ukraine to travel to Kyiv City since the closure of Ukrainian airspace resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukrzaliznytsia confirmed on September 13 that European security officials had been traveling to Poland from Ukraine via the Yahodyn border crossing and that the Ukrainian Central Monitoring Group evacuated the diplomatic train 15 minutes before Russian forces struck a locomotive at the Polish border.[10] Ukrzaliznytsia stated that it is quite likely that the target of the Russian strike was the train with European officials on board, which departed from the station earlier than planned due to a drone threat. The available reporting strongly supports the conclusion that the Kremlin conducted a precision drone strike intended to injure or kill current and former European government officials as they were leaving Ukraine.
Russia is increasingly targeting Ukrainian border crossings and is escalating its drone incursions into European airspace in order to intimidate NATO into abandoning its support for Ukraine. Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiha stated on September 13 that Russian strikes against the Yahodyn border crossing are Russia’s terror “knocking” on NATO’s doors.[11] Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson called on Western officials to provide Ukraine with necessary air defense systems to protect against such strikes following the incident.[12] Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna stated that Russia is intensifying its strikes and is increasingly striking targets closer to NATO borders, and called on the West to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses and provide Ukraine with military assistance.[13] Russian forces have struck four Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings since August 2026.[14] Russian forces reportedly almost struck Zelensky’s plane on September 8 as it prepared to depart Chisinau Airport in Moldova.[15] Russian forces and agents continuously conduct sabotage activities, railway and infrastructure attacks, maritime blockades, and aerial drone incursions targeting European states in an effort to undermine NATO’s resolve and invalidate NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision.[16] Russia’s increasingly aggressive activity targeting NATO member states should prompt NATO to reassess its current policy of intercepting Russian aerial targets only once they enter European airspace rather than over Ukraine as they approach NATO borders, in addition to rushing to provide Ukraine with additional air defense capabilities and the ability to strike Russian drone and missile launchers before they can release their weapons.
US officials continue to report that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are getting closer to reaching a peace agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, while Kremlin officials reiterate their insistence that Ukraine surrender to Russia’s full demands. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner stated on September 12 that Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have reached an agreement to end the war on all issues except territorial ones.[17] Kushner stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has outlined his territorial demands, and that if Ukraine wanted to retreat to that line, then the rest of the agreement is already developed and agreed upon. Kushner acknowledged that the situation on the battlefield, which is quite dynamic, will determine territorial issues to some extent. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov contradicted Kushner, stating on September 13 that there are many unresolved issues in negotiations including territorial ones, and that if there is a “shift” on territorial positions, then negotiations would become easier — not that an agreement was otherwise in hand.[18] Kremlin officials have frequently claimed that Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving a peace settlement, and Putin has reiterated that he remains committed to his June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede territories which Russia does not occupy and has struggled and failed to seize since 2014 and 2022.[19] Those demands require Ukrainian withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces have never occupied; the demilitarization and “denazification” of the Ukrainian government and society, by which Putin means the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian one; and future Ukrainian neutrality, specifically excluding NATO membership.[20] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations across the entire frontline in Ukraine in ways that are unnecessary if their focus is only, or even primarily, on seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces are demonstrating that they are able to contest the initiative at the strategic and operational levels, contrary to Moscow’s portrayal of Russian victory as inevitable. Russian forces have tried and failed to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt numerous times since 2014.[21] Ukrainian forces have held Russian forces to near-zero net gains since March 2026 and recently eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman, disrupting the Russian military command’s plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast from the Lyman and Dobropillya areas.[22] Ukrainian forces retook over 745 square kilometers in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts in Winter and Spring 2026 (a figure that does not include recent Ukrainian gains).[23] Russian forces, on the other hand, continue struggling to reach, let alone seize, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka — Ukraine’s heavily defended Fortress Belt.[24] Russian forces have made significant tactical gains within Kostyantynivka (the southernmost Fortress Belt city) but have been unable to complete the seizure of the town since first infiltrating into the city in October 2025. Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all.[25] Ukrainian forces have also launched successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil refineries, airfields, marketplaces, and other military assets that are damaging the Russian economy and degrading Russia’s military capabilities.[26] The Russian war effort is failing to achieve its operational and strategic objectives as Russia’s recruitment numbers have decreased and Russian officials are setting conditions for possible involuntary reserve call-ups after Russia’s September 2026 State Duma elections.[27]
The Kremlin is therefore trying to convince the United States to force Ukraine to cede territory that Russian forces have shown no ability to take on the battlefield. Russia’s cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West to cede this heavily defended territory to Russia without a fight, allowing Russia to avoid spending significant amounts of time and resources to try to seize it in combat — if Russian forces will even be able to do so. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would also set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from far more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing, particularly as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to indicate that their longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine — not only its southern and eastern regions — remains unchanged.[28]
Kremlin officials are indicating that they will agree to US-Ukrainian proposed trilateral talks in the UAE, though the timing and the level of the delegations remain unclear. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 13 that Russia expects trilateral talks between Russia, the United States, and Ukraine in the foreseeable future.[29] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov noted that the UAE has confirmed its willingness to host the talks and that Russian President Vladimir Putin will personally decide the makeup of the Russian delegation.[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US negotiators have continued to support and push for a trilateral meeting and efforts to restart peace talks with Russia.[31] The Kremlin has previously either refused trilateral meetings and attempted to delay such meetings or sent lower-level officials to participate, and it is unclear at this time what level of delegation Putin may send to participate in the talks.[32]
US President Donald Trump called on Ukraine to cease strikes against Russian diesel infrastructure — a key aspect of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign intended in part to bring about a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure. Trump stated on September 13 that Ukraine needs to halt strikes against Russian diesel fuel infrastructure and should instead strike other unspecified targets.[33] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly offered a mutual ceasefire in which both Ukraine and Russia refrain from attacking each other’s energy infrastructure, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected all of Zelensky’s offers.[34] Ukraine‘s ongoing strikes against Russian energy infrastructure aim in part to force Russia to stop striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which Russia does consistently each winter as part of its long-standing campaign to demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[35] Pressuring Putin to accept Zelensky’s offer of a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure would address the diesel price issue Trump has raised while protecting the Ukrainian people from the serious harm that the Russian attacks cause.
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure is also intended to reduce Russia’s ability to fund Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, as oil and gas exports are one of Russia’s main sources of government revenues.[36] ISW has previously observed that Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated Russia’s existing economic challenges, with Russian oil and gas revenues from January to May 2026 falling by about a third year-on-year to three trillion rubles (roughly $42.1 billion) and consumer gasoline prices rising 6.88 percent in June 2026 amidst ongoing inflationary pressure.[37] Russian opposition outlet Sota reported on September 13 that the Russian fuel crisis forced the Russian Central Bank to keep the key interest rate at 14 percent despite continued Russian efforts to lower the key rate to curb inflation.[38] Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure have also degraded Russian military capabilities, leaving Russian military forces on the frontline with limited fuel supplies and degrading Russian air defense capabilities on the Black Sea and elsewhere.[39]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a train leaving Ukraine and infrastructure at the Yahodyn border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border on September 13 as European officials were crossing the border.
- The available reporting strongly supports the conclusion that the Kremlin conducted a precision drone strike intended to injure or kill European government officials and former officials as they were leaving Ukraine.
- Russia is increasingly targeting Ukrainian border crossings and is escalating its drone incursions into European airspace in order to intimidate NATO into abandoning its support for Ukraine.
- Russia’s increasingly aggressive activity targeting NATO member states should prompt NATO to reassess its current policy of intercepting Russian aerial targets only once they enter European airspace rather than over Ukraine as they approach NATO borders, in addition to rushing to provide Ukraine with additional air defense capabilities and the ability to strike Russian drone and missile launchers before they can release their weapons.
- US officials continue to report that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are getting closer to reaching a peace agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, while Kremlin officials reiterate their insistence that Ukraine surrender to Russia’s full demands.
- Ukrainian forces are demonstrating that they are able to contest the initiative at the strategic and operational levels, contrary to Moscow’s portrayal of Russian victory as inevitable.
- The Kremlin is therefore trying to convince the United States to force Ukraine to cede territory that Russian forces have shown no ability to take on the battlefield.
- Kremlin officials are indicating that they will agree to US-Ukrainian proposed trilateral talks in the UAE, though the timing and the level of the delegations remain unclear.
- US President Donald Trump called on Ukraine to cease strikes against Russian diesel infrastructure — a key aspect of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign intended in part to bring about a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure.
- Pressuring Putin to accept Zelensky’s offer of a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure would address the diesel price issue Trump has raised while protecting the Ukrainian people from the serious harm that the Russian attacks cause.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Fortress Belt Eastern Flank and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets.
- Russian forces launched 453 drones and Banderol loitering munitions overnight and an additional 323 drones and 10 Banderol loitering munitions during the day on September 13.
ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to better reflect the Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. ISW will analyze the Russian campaign in Donetsk Oblast in more detail in a forthcoming special edition.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russia’s oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of September 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavyansk Oil Refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 300 kilometers from the frontline); the TANEKO Oil Refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan; and a Russian strike drone storage, preparation, and launch site in Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[40] Russian regional authorities acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes caused fires at the refineries in Slavyansk-on-Kuban and Nizhnekamsk, and footage published on September 13 shows a fire at the Slavyansk Oil Refinery.[41] Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar acknowledged that Ukrainian forces targeted Rostov Oblast overnight.[42]
Russian authorities continue to develop counter-drone measures to protect Russian oil infrastructure. Satellite imagery collected on an unspecified date and published on September 12 shows Russian authorities erecting walls using cargo containers, anti-drone nets, and metal frames at the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kostovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast to defend against Ukrainian strikes.[43]
Ukrainian and open sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Saratov, Volgograd, and Oryol oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 13 that Ukraine’s September 11 strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov City damaged an ELOU-AVT-6 primary processing unit and a section of the main oil pipeline.[44] Satellite imagery published on September 13 indicates that Ukraine‘s September 11 strike against the Volgogradpromproekt chemical plant south of Volgograd City destroyed part of the facility’s main workshop.[45] Additional satellite imagery published on September 13 indicates that recent Ukrainian strikes against the Tsimbulova droneport in Oryol Oblast damaged drone storage hangars and Shahed-type strike drone launchers.[46]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[47]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian target-tracking radar station near Rovnoye (roughly 74 kilometers from the international border) and a Russian military equipment storage near Rechitsa (one of multiple settlements between 27 and 110 kilometers from the international border) on September 12 or on the night of September 12 to 13.[48]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[49]
Russian sources continue to make baseless claims of the encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City. Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces have encircled roughly 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City.[50] ISW has not observed any evidence to substantiate these claims since Russian sources first made claims about encircling these Ukrainian forces on September 3.
Ukrainian forces continue interdicting Russian near rear logistics to the Vovchansk area. Ukrainian forces struck a reported logistics hub and Molniya strike drone production site of the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Shebekino (about six kilometers from the international border and 11 kilometers from the frontline).[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 12 and 13 but did not make confirmed advances.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 13 that Russian forces seized Chernyakiv (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[53] Russian sources credited the 12th Rifle Battalion of the 61st Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army, LMD) with the claimed seizure of Chernyakiv.[54]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces either recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk) contrary to Russian claims, according to geolocated footage published on September 12.[55]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna, Olhivka, and Druzhelyubivka on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[56]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces appear to be prioritizing attacks aimed at advancing frontally on the Fortress Belt from the south and encircling the Fortress Belt from the southwest over efforts to advance on the Fortress Belt from the east. Ukrainian General Staff offensive intensity data since August 1, 2026, indicates that Russian forces supporting the effort to seize the Fortress Belt have maintained the highest offensive tempo toward Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya, averaging 24 and 32 attacks per day, respectively.[57] Russian forces averaged 14 attacks per day in the Slovyansk direction in August 2026 but have slowed their offensive tempo in September 2026 to an average of four attacks per day. Ukrainian forces recently eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman, effectively disrupting the Russian military command’s unrealistic plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast from the north near Lyman and the southwest near Dobropillya.[58] The Russian military command has likely not yet internalized recent Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman and the subsequent collapse of its pincer effort from the north, so the Russian Central Grouping of Forces continues a high offensive tempo to encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest. The Russian military command may also decide to continue efforts from the southwest, even after realizing that the Lyman effort has failed to try and cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Fortress Belt from the south and west. The Russian Southern Grouping of Forces has slowed its offensive tempo toward Slovyansk from the east for the moment, potentially to regroup, as Russian offensive operations east of Slovyansk were likely intended to synergize with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ efforts against Slovyansk from the northeast.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces concentrated offensive operations toward Lyman itself and northwest of the town on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[59]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces advanced or maintained positions southeast of Slovyansk as Russian forces concentrated attacks east of Slovyansk toward Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka on September 12 and 13.[60] Ukrainian forces control Yurkivka (southeast of Slovyansk) — a settlement where Russian forces previously conducted infiltration missions — and hold positions to the north, according to geolocated footage published on September 12.[61]
Russian forces continue glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk, setting conditions for future offensive operations by indiscriminately striking vehicles. The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on September 13 that Russian forces conducted four FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk, striking a civilian vehicle, killing at least two civilians, and injuring at least 10 more.[62] Russian forces intentionally strike civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear to stop all use of roads as part of their wider operational battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template, weaponizing civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[63]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kostyantynivka and southwest of the city on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting at the junction between Kostyantynivka and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (just northwest of Kostyantynivka).[65]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya area on September 12 and 13 but did not make confirmed advances.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka and Novohryhorivka and advanced to central Novoandriivka (all west of Druzhkivka and at least 10 kilometers from the current furthest extent of assessed Russian advances).[67]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on September 12 and 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strike drone storage, preparation, and launch site in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 12 to 13.[68]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Novopavlivka direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northeast of Marivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) after a likely Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on September 13.[69]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[70]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 12 and 13 but did not advance.[71]
Russian forces have reportedly decreased the intensity of their assaults in the Hulyaipole direction. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on September 13 that Russian forces have reduced the number of assaults per day from about 20 to 30 to about 10 per day in the brigade’s area of responsibility.[72] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue infiltration missions in small groups of one to three personnel and only use armored vehicles to transport personnel and replenish ammunition.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Zaporizhia direction.[73] ISW most recently observed evidence of the 77th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction in July 2025.[74] This unit may have withdrawn for rest and reconstitution after July 2025 and since redeployed to the nearby Zaporizhia direction (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).
Russian forces have advanced and infiltrated along the immediate flanks of Orikhiv in recent weeks but have reportedly failed to capitalize on these gains amid successful Ukrainian counterattacks west and southwest of Orikhiv. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 13 that Russian forces are conducting simultaneous operations on the left flank of Orikhiv to reach the Mahdanylivka-Zapasne-Pavlivka-Lukyanivske area (all northwest of Orikhiv) and on the immediate western to southwestern outskirts of Orikhiv.[75] Mashovets stated that Russian forces likely seized Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky (both west of Orikhiv) before attempting to advance toward Novopavlivka and Novoandriivka (northeast and east of Shcherbaky), likely to seize heights for better firing positions to interdict Ukrainian logistics and support the envelopment of Orikhiv from the west. Mashovets stated that Russian forces have infiltrated to the intersection of the T-0408 Orikhiv-Tokmak and T-0803 Mariupol-Orikhiv highways in southern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), into Orikhiv itself, and between Orikhiv and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv); and near Novoboikivske, Pavlivka, and Novoyakovlivka (all northeast of Orikhiv).[76] Russian forces additionally infiltrated into southern Preobrazhenka (immediately north of Orikhiv), central Mala Tokmachka, and northern Chervona Krynytsia (northeast of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on September 12 and 13.[77]
Mashovets indicated that Russian forces made these tactically significant gains in the Orikhiv direction prior to September 1 but stated that Russian forces have since failed to exploit these gains.[78] Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces have constrained Russian forces west and northwest of Orikhiv, interdicting supply deliveries to these infiltration groups for a few weeks before conducting heavy drone strikes and clearing operations to eliminate the Russian presence.[79] Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from northern and central Novodanylivka and that Ukrainian advances west of Orikhiv are constraining Russian efforts to advance on Zaporizhzhia City.[80] Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking northwest and west of Orikhiv since Spring 2026 and have made tactically significant gains, making it more difficult for Russian forces operating west and southwest of Orikhiv to conduct their intended double envelopment of Orikhiv from the west and east.[81] Russian forces will likely continue to struggle advancing on the flanks of or directly on Orikhiv while Ukraine continues such counterattacks.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 13.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 13 that Ukrainian forces struck ground-based relay stations used to control Geran- and Gerbera-type strike drones near occupied Chornomorske and Olenivka, Crimea and in Zaliznyi Port and Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast (all between 54 and 287 kilometers from the frontline) on September 12 or overnight on September 12 to 13.[82] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian antenna in occupied Olenivka. Geolocated footage published on September 12 shows damage to a gas station in Novotroitske (roughly 78 kilometers from the frontline) after a Ukrainian drone strike.[83] A local Crimean-based Telegram channel claimed on September 13 that locals reported an explosion and subsequent fire at the Kacha Airfield (roughly 223 kilometers from the frontline) and the Belbek Airfield (roughly 236 kilometers from the frontline).[84] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from September 13 indicates that there was a fire near the Kacha Airfield.[85]
A Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) likely destroyed a Russian USV using an automatic turret for the first time. The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 12 that Ukrainian forces successfully used a Ukrainian Sargan 3000 USV equipped with an automatic turret to search for and destroy a Russian USV in the Black Sea, the first reported instance of a USV intercepting another USV.[86]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[87]
See topline text for reporting on Russian strikes against a passenger train and gas station near the Volyn Oblast-Polish international border.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 12 to 13 and during the day on September 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 453 Shahed-type strike drones (including jet-powered drones), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and the Azov Sea overnight.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 405 drones and four Banderol loitering munitions, that unspecified air vehicles struck 13 locations, and that air vehicle debris fell on seven locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an additional 323 drones (14 of which were jet-powered drones) and 10 Banderol loitering munitions from 0630 to 1800 local time, that Ukrainian forces downed 310 of these drones including nine jet-powered drones, and that 10 drones struck unspecified locations.[89] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, civilian, industrial, railway, port, commercial, and logistics infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr, and Ternopil oblasts.[90]
Russian forces are leveraging poor weather conditions that inhibit Ukrainian air defense operations to launch larger numbers of jet-powered drones, but that poor weather also constrains these drones. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 12 that Russian forces waited until a cloudy day, when Ukrainian interceptor drone operators struggle more to down Russian strike drones, to launch larger numbers of jet-powered strike drones, which Ukrainian forces also struggle to intercept due to the high speeds.[91] Beskrestnov reported that reduced visibility from poor weather also inhibits Russian jet-powered drone targeting abilities and allows Ukrainian forces to jam more jet drones with electronic warfare (EW).
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20861
[2] https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1402226-rosijskij-bpla-atakuvav-azs-bila-mpp-agodin-dorogusk-na-kordoni-z-polseu/ ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8483; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1402302-rosijskij-dron-vluciv-u-potag-kiiv-varsava-na-punkti-propusku-agodin-na-volini/
[3] https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1402226-rosijskij-bpla-atakuvav-azs-bila-mpp-agodin-dorogusk-na-kordoni-z-polseu/
[4] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2099062491779043786; https://t.me/rivne_golovne/55998; https://t.me/lvivych_news/74901; https://t.me/lvivych_news/74900; https://t.me/suspilne_lutsk/30307 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2099131377220309129; https://x.com/nexta_tv/status/2099122172828491980; https://x.com/nexta_tv/status/2099061774729552105; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2099138336598131197?s=20
[5] https://www dot pap.pl/aktualnosci/premier-eskalacja-dzialan-ze-strony-rosji-staje-sie-faktem
[6] https://www dot rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-zagrozenie-bylo-realne-rzecznik-dorsz-o-nocnym-ataku-rosjan,nIdn,1017477
[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/67268 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/395205
[8] https://www dot spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ukraine-russland-greift-wichtigen-grenzuebergang-nach-polen-an-a-597b54ae-99fd-4a3a-a686-0d21d8f50070
[9] https://www.ft.com/content/cdce9cd6-4857-4332-af34-ffc9ce45eadf?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[10] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8485
[11] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/2099044240382632379?s=20
[12] https://x.com/BorisJohnson/status/2099158349040214162
[13] https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/2099062983439552611 ; https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/2099183877877051461
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/
[17] https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/1203194.html
[18] https://iz dot ru/2166224/2026-09-13/naslednyi-printc-oae-podtverdil-putinu-gotovnost-priniat-peregovory-po-ukraine ; https://t.me/tass_agency/395141
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025/
[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/24771955 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-31/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-32/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-9/
[29] https://t.me/izvestia/251187 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/395139 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/395140
[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/395159 ; https://iz dot ru/2166224/2026-09-13/naslednyi-printc-oae-podtverdil-putinu-gotovnost-priniat-peregovory-po-ukraine ; https://t.me/tass_agency/395141
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2025/
[33] https://suspilne dot media/1402506-ce-skodit-svitovi-tramp-zaklikav-zelenskogo-pripiniti-udari-po-obektah-virobnictva-dizpaliva-v-rf/ ; https://kyivindependent dot com/trump-tells-zelensky-to-stop-striking-russian-diesel-infrastructure/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXD–aoI5i8; https://x.com/FoxNews/status/2099126709232492864
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/
[38] https://t.me/sotaproject/118556
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/ ; https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1105110 ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9293 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42217
[41] https://t.me/opershtab23/17173 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2099006885215060004 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/13/v-nizhnekamske-v-rezultate-udara-ukrainskih-dronov-pogibli-dva-cheloveka-v-krasnodarskom-krae-atakovan-slavyanskiy-npz ; https://t.me/astrapress/125058 ; https://t.me/radmirbelyaev/18305
[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/395134
[43] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8144?single ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosijski-npz-pochaly-zahyshhaty-morskymy-kontejneramy/
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42217 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/
[45] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/znimky-urazhennya-zavodu-raketamy-flamingo/ ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30921 ; https://t.me/exile_plus/2538
[46] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8153
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36906 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9302
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42218
[49]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212; https://t.me/wargonzo/36906; https://t.me/severnnyi/9302
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/36906; https://t.me/tass_agency/395128; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/
[51] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38270; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4304
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/67272
[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/21093 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21913 ; https://t.me/sashakots/64413; https://t.me/divgen/83915
[55] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2098830965657280759; https://t.me/kypyansk/10612
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212; https://t.me/grvZapad/19755
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 [Data taken from the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily 0800 SITREP]
[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36906 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19755
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212
[61] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2099101785407332804; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2099106490724352081; https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/593 ; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2099104541211861391
[62] https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/6651; https://t.me/bbcrussian/99284
[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2026/
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36906
[65] https://t.me/rybar/83107
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123207 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36906
[67] https://t.me/rybar/83107
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42218
[69] https://t.me/armyUA59/366; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12942
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42212; https://t.me/wargonzo/36906
[72] https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/13/myaso-zakinchuyetsya-rosiyany-zmusheni-zmenshyty-nastupalnu-aktyvnist-na-pivdni/
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/21092
[74] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2025/
[75] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3591
[76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3592; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3591
[77] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12941; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1397207015172889; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12936; https://t.me/bolgarodessaanbu/286; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2098820856352768148
[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3591
[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3592
[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3592
[81] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42218
[83] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2099031195069690083?s=20; https://x.com/hochu_dodomu/status/2098691673295327346?s=20; https://t.me/region22ua/4400
[84] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/109351; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/109376; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/109386; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/109404;
[85] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:2026-09-13;@33.592,44.690,15.000z
[86] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/22284; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9467
[87] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[88] https://t.me/kpszsu/78070
[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/78115
[90] https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/sankciyi-povinni-pracyuvati-i-nadali-tak-shob-z-boku-rosijsk-106369; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31759; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32056; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28639; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74634; https://t.me/kyivoda/56928; https://t.me/kyivoda/56931; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3998; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3232; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1402134-v-odesi-prolunali-vibuhi-misto-atakuvali-banderoli-ta-kabi/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20026; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20041; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20048; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20055 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20047 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63221 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63227 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3231 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3233 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3235; https://t.me/MinInfraUA/17146; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18404; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74676l; https://t.me/vilkul/17901
[91] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7749
