Toplines
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that all aim to increase the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing to wage war on Ukraine. The SBU announced on August 4 that its drone operators conducted over 100 strikes against strategic Russian objects, including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, air bases, air defense assets, command posts, warships, tankers, oil refineries, and transport and military logistics since starting the campaign on June 26.[1] The SBU highlighted that its operators struck the Yevpatoria Aircraft Plant and airbases in occupied Saky, Hvardiiske, Belbek, and Baherove in Crimea; hit Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast and Khanskaya Airbase in the Adygea Republic; destroyed a Tu-95MS strategic bomber, two Su-35 fighter jets, and two L-39 combat training aircraft; and hit 14 Russian oil refineries and other oil infrastructure objects, two cargo ships, and two shadow fleet oil tankers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 4 that he approved another SBU operation but did not specify the duration, type, or target set.[2]
Ukraine’s escalating strike campaigns against Russian military, logistics, DIB, and economic assets include far more than the SBU strikes. Ukrainian forces have struck at least 19 Wildberries warehouses across Russia since the first strike against Wildberries facilities on July 18.[3] Ukrainian forces have reportedly conducted at least 200 strikes against Russian cargo ships and oil tankers in the Black and Azov seas and at least 24 oil and gasoline infrastructure objects, degrading Russia’s refining capacity by at least one third.[4] Some Kremlin-coopted Russian milbloggers attempted to dismiss the Ukrainian strike campaign as unsuccessful, but one milblogger acknowledged that the Ukrainian strikes were “painful” for Russia.[5] Ukrainian forces have also conducted an intensive strike campaign against electricity infrastructure in Crimea, causing protracted blackouts.[6] Additional Ukrainian strikes have targeted bridges and other transportation infrastructure in and around the peninsula.[7]
Ukraine’s strike campaigns are increasing the strain on Russian businesses, people, and air defenses. Bloomberg reported on August 4 that Ukraine’s strikes forced Russia to export near-record amounts of crude oil as Russia’s oil refining capacity reached the lowest rates since May 2002.[8] Bloomberg reported, citing energy markets analysis platform EA Analytics, that Russia’s crude processing rates averaged 3.6 million barrels per day in July 2026, about a third below the seasonal norm. Russian business outlet RBK reported on August 4, citing sources in the Russian shipping and insurance industries, that Russian insurance companies have effectively stopped covering military and terrorist risks for cargo ships operating in the Black and Azov seas after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sent out a navigational warning for these waters from July 12 to 18 amid increased Ukrainian vessel strikes.[9] RBK noted that foreign insurance companies have raised their rates for war insurance in the Black and Azov seas. Ukraine’s strike campaign has increased the cost of the war for small and medium-sized Russian businesses reliant on the Wildberries platform, as well as on the Russian consumers who utilize the Wildberries service, largely in urban areas that the Kremlin has sought to shield from the war.[10] The Ukrainian strikes have also likely inhibited the operations of at least some DIB enterprises.
Ukrainian forces have also continued their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign across the theater, making Russia’s rear areas even more vulnerable to further Ukrainian strikes beyond the initial 40-day operation and forcing Russia to utilize valuable and sparse Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.[11] Russia has failed to adequately respond to Ukraine’s intensifying strike campaigns in recent months, pulling manpower and resources to defend rear areas and strategic targets that Russia could have instead allocated to the frontline.[12] Russia will likely continue to struggle to develop countermeasures to the Ukrainian strike campaigns in the near term.
Key Takeaways
- Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that all aim to increase the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing to wage war on Ukraine.
- Ukraine’s strike campaigns are increasing the strain on Russian businesses, people, and air defenses.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
- Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and over 100 long-range strike drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets on August 4.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse in Leningrad Oblast on the night of August 3 to 4. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Wildberries warehouse near St. Petersburg.[13] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko and Wildberries’ press service acknowledged a drone strike against the Wildberries warehouse in Krasny Bor, Leningrad Oblast (just southeast of St. Petersburg).[14]
Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on August 4. Russian opposition source Astra assessed on August 4 that footage shows smoke rising from the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast.[15] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, implied on August 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the refinery.[16]
Ukrainian forces may have struck a cargo ship off the coast of Krasnodar Krai on August 3. Turkish officials and Russian opposition media reported on August 3 that drones struck a vessel near the Novorossiysk port, as it was travelling from Samsun, Turkey.[17] Russian opposition sources assessed that the drones likely struck the Cameroon-flagged Nadezhda roll-on/roll-off cargo vessel, not the Russian-flagged Nadezhda dry cargo vessel sanctioned by Ukraine for exporting Ukrainian grain.[18]
Ukrainian forces reportedly recently struck a university in Belgorod City that served as a Russian military training ground. An employee of the Shukhov Belgorod State Technological University told independent Belarusian outlet Vot Tak that the Ukrainian strike against the school on the night of August 2 to 3 hit a building that served as a Russian training ground for first-person view (FPV) drone operators.[19]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 3 and 4 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[21] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 4 that fighting in northern Sumy Oblast is ongoing but decreasing in intensity, including near Turya (east of Sumy City along the international border).[22] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to enter Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City near the international border) from the north.[23]
Russian forces are increasingly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics missions in northern Sumy Oblast but continue to use servicemembers to deliver supplies on foot. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on August 4 that Russian forces are increasingly using UGVs but that single Russian servicemembers are also delivering ammunition and supplies closer to the frontline on foot.[24] The spokesperson stated that most Russian UGVs do not reach the frontline, as they cannot cross rivers.
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kursk Oblast border area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces struck an automobile bridge over the Seim River near Zvannoye, Kursk Oblast (roughly 13 kilometers from the international border), on the night of August 3 to 4.[25]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[26] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Chaikivka (northeast of Kharkiv City), after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[27]
Ukrainian strikes are reportedly threatening Russian infiltration routes into Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City). A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks in central Kozacha Lopan, which the source claimed is a contested “gray zone.”[28] The source claimed that Russian forces are infiltrating into central Kozacha Lopan from Hraniv (northeast of Kozacha Lopan along the international border) but are making little progress and have not consolidated their positions. The source claimed that the main Russian infiltration route along an unspecified highway is under threat of Ukrainian strikes, so Russian forces are infiltrating slowly along dirt roads to the north.
Russian officials continue to make false claims about Russian advances in northern Ukraine. The Russian MoD claimed on August 4 that Russian forces seized Baksheivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with seizing the settlement.[30] ISW continues to assess that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater.[31]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 4 but did not advance.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[33] Russian sources claimed on August 4 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from the outskirts of Kupyansk.[34]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Borova. Geolocated footage published on August 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub (southwest of Borova).[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 3 to 4 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[37] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces have been unable to outflank Lyman from the west as Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the approaches to Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[38] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continue to clear urban areas in the Lyman sector, likely referring to Lyman itself.[39] The source claimed that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are striking Ukrainian positions near Shchurove (just west of Lyman), likely with glide bombs.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northeast of Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka), after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40]
Small Russian infiltration groups in Kostyantynivka are reportedly increasingly including Russian officers. The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Kostyantynivka area reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces are controlling the situation in the city but that small Russian assault groups, including well-trained personnel and officers, continue to try to infiltrate Kostyantynivka.[41] The commander reported that Russian forces send about three small groups per day, which only infiltrate about 500 meters deep into the city. The commander added that Russian military authorities will send the next group along the same path even if Ukrainian forces destroy the first group. The commander reported that Russian authorities have tasked the groups with conducting flag-raising missions for footage claiming Russian advances. The commander added that FPV drones supply the soldiers with provisions only once every three days.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian communications infrastructure near Kostyantynivka. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian control point and communications hub in occupied Bakhmut (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[42]
Russian forces are reportedly increasingly abandoning direct assaults on Dobropillya in favor of attempting to outflank the town from the north and south. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya tactical area stated on August 4 that Russian forces are abandoning frontal attacks on Dobropillya after their previous frontal attacks, including mechanized and motorized assaults, failed.[43] The servicemember also stated that Russia’s inability to seize Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya and northeast of Pokrovsk) is hindering Russian plans to outflank Dobropillya. The servicemember noted that Russian forces are learning from Ukrainian technological adaptations and began fielding Molniya drones with longer ranges and video signal encryption technology that prevents Ukrainian forces from intercepting and quickly analyzing the Molniyas’ video feeds.
Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 2 and 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southeastern Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and central Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), respectively, after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[44]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on August 3 and 4 but did not advance.[45]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair center in occupied Vilne, Donetsk Oblast (approximately 59 kilometers from the frontline).[46]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Hulyaipole direction, as Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole.[47] Geolocated footage published on August 3 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position south of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in the area contrary to Russian claims.[48]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in southeastern Orikhiv. Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southeastern Orikhiv after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 4 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Mali Shcherbaky, northeast of Stepove, and northeast of Kamyanske (all west of Orikhiv).[50]
Russian forces are adapting their drone tactics in strikes against Zaporizhzhia City to avoid increasingly effective Ukrainian air defenses. The commander of a Ukrainian drone interceptor battalion operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on August 4 that Russian forces are intensifying FPV drone strikes against civilian targets in Zaporizhzhia City due to Ukraine’s 95 to 100 percent interception rate of Russian Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions in the area.[51] The commander added that Ukrainian forces have more difficulty detecting Russian FPV drones on radar due to their small size and flight at extremely low altitudes.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and GLOCs in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge over the Molochna River near occupied Svitlodolynske (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian military repair unit in occupied Vovchanske (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[52]
The International Atomic Energy Agency reported on August 4 that the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) briefly lost off-site power due to the plant’s increasingly fragile connection to the Ukrainian power grid.[53]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 4.
Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Ukrainian officials published footage of a Russian FPV drone intentionally circling a man selling vegetables in Kherson City before detonating close by, injuring the civilian.[54] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike mainly civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear, especially in Kherson City, is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[55]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian accumulation points and drone strike and counter-drone capabilities in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a temporary deployment point of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in Shchaslyvtsevo, Kherson Oblast (on the Kherson Oblast-Crimea border about 130 kilometers from the front); a repeater communication and power point for Geran/Gerbera drones in Olenivka, Crimea (one of multiple settlements 130 to 230 kilometers from the front); and a tower with electronic warfare (EW) equipment in Toka, Crimea (roughly 120 kilometers from the front) on the night of August 3 to 4.[56]
Russian occupation authorities are attempting to portray the fuel situation in Crimea as under control, despite continued local reporting on widespread gasoline shortages on the peninsula. Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov and Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev announced on August 3 that Russian authorities implemented a price cap of 100 rubles per liter (about $4.70 per gallon) on AI-92 gasoline at TES and ATAN gas stations, starting on August 4.[57] Aksyonov and Razvozhaev stated that federal authorities plan to introduce a similar price cap on AI-95 gasoline and diesel fuel by mid-August 2026. Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on August 4 that TES and ATAN gas stations in Crimea, however, had no supplies of AI-92 gasoline and that many of the gas stations ran out on August 3.[58]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces struck Ukraine with one ballistic missile and over 100 long-range strike drones on the night of August 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 4 that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from the direction of Rostov Oblast and 136 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Millerovo cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[59] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian Forces downed 117 drones, that the Iskander-M ballistic missile and 14 drones struck 14 locations, and that drone debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transportation, residential, commercial, and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[60]
Ukraine warned that Russia has not abandoned its campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure ahead of the coming winter. Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal told Politico in an article published on August 3 that Russian forces aim to destroy Ukraine’s energy system and derail Ukraine’s economy and weapons production.[61] Shmyhal also assessed that Russia’s wintertime strikes aim to exhaust Ukrainian society and push them to pressure Ukrainian leadership to surrender. Shmyhal added that Russian forces also aim to destroy Ukraine’s water supply and that surviving Russia’s winter energy infrastructure strikes will become harder without water or sewage services amid power outages. Shmyhal stated that Russia’s strike campaign in Winter 2025 to 2026 damaged or destroyed facilities accounting for about 80 percent of Ukraine’s power generation and left Ukraine with a six-gigawatt power generation shortfall. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is building protective covers for water and gas storage facilities and distributing power generators and boilers to dispersed energy infrastructure.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian businesses are appealing to Belarusian authorities for support because Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries facilities have financially affected Belarusian sellers. The Minsk Capital Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers appealed to Belarusian First Deputy Economic Minister Ivan Vezhnovets on August 3 regarding the consequences of Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries warehouses in Russia on Belarusian businesses, particularly to protect the rights of and to recover funds for Belarusian sellers.[62] The Minsk Capital Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposed a meeting with the Belarusian Economic Ministry to develop and implement a joint action plan. Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that, according to some estimates, there are more than 22,000 products belonging to Belarusian businesses in Wildberries warehouses in Russia.[63]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-vrazyla-ponad-100-stratehichnykh-obiektiv-v-tylu-voroha-ta-bilshe-21-tys-tsilei-na-fronti-protiahom-40dennoi-operatsii-vplyvu-na-rf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20295; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20294; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/vazhlivo-shob-partneri-chuli-ukrayinu-j-znali-sho-kozhen-pak-105709
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2698 ;
[4] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/08/04/v-kontse-iyunya-zelenskiy-ob-yavil-40-dnevnuyu-operatsiyu-vliyaniya-na-rossiyu-chtoby-pobudit-ee-zakonchit-voynu-40-dney-istekli-chto-iz-etogo-vyshlo; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/gorili-npz-skladi-wildberries-i-tilki-hronologiya-1785755840.html; https://www.dw.com/ru/molocka-porazeny-svyse-200-sudov-rf/a-78181315
[5] https://t.me/rybar/82197; https://t.me/sashakots/63523
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[8] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-03/ukraine-s-shifting-strikes-deepen-uncertainty-around-russian-oil
[9] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/04/rbk-rossiyskie-strahovye-kompanii-perestali-pokryvat-voennye-riski-dlya-gruzovyh-sudov-v-azovskom-i-chernom-moryah; https://pro.rbc dot ru/demo/6a68c1429a7947560c57dd22
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-23/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_94/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_29-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_94/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-21/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/
[13] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2698
[14] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/11425; https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1674
[15] https://t.me/astrapress/121167
[16] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/11053
[17] https://t.me/astrapress/121125; https://www.iha dot com.tr/haber-rusya-aciklarinda-turk-ro-ro-gemisine-saldiri-4-yarali-1197042; https://t.me/mediazzzona/32409; https://www.reuters.com/world/three-crew-injured-cargo-ship-hit-by-drone-attack-near-russias-novorossiysk-2026-08-04/
[18] https://t.me/astrapress/121125; https://t.me/mediazzzona/32409
[19] https://t.me/vot_tak_exclusive/18542; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/03/vsu-atakovali-belgorod-telegram-kanal-pepel-utverzhdaet-chto-pod-udar-popal-belgorodskiy-tehnologicheskiy-universitet-gde-velas-razrabotka-dronov;
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41739; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41744; https://t.me/wargonzo/36001; https://t.me/severnnyi/8914; https://t.me/dva_majors/96991;
[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/36001; https://t.me/dva_majors/96991
[22] https://t.me/severnnyi/8914
[23] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1371224-rosijski-armijci-prosunulis-poblizu-rasnogo-krasnopilskoi-gromadi-deepstate/
[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/04/verblyudy-z-ryukzakamy-i-nrk-yak-diye-vorog-na-pivdenno-slobozhanskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/MVdtWmEbXN8?t=2854
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41756
[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12604
[27] https://www.facebook.com/reel/27917600161183603
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/8916 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8914
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/66263
[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/97005; https://t.me/rybar/82203 ; https://t.me/rybar/82203
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/
[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/36001; https://t.me/rybar/82203
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41739 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41744 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/96991 ; https://t.me/rybar/82203 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73942 ;
[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/36001 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19340
[35] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2084404931449298982?s=20 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2084404933789684081?s=20 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2084404936125841748?s=20 ; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/16570
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/96991
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41739; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41744; https://t.me/wargonzo/36019; https://t.me/dva_majors/96991
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/8914
[39] https://t.me/grvZapad/19340
[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12605; https://t.me/Rarog_427/978
[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/04/rozgornuty-trykolor-za-bud-yaku-czinu-rosiyany-vperto-proryvayutsya-v-kostyantynivku/; https://youtu.be/MVdtWmEbXN8?t=1724
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41756
[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/04/molniyi-staly-nebezpechnishymy-u-ngu-rozpovily-pro-novu-taktyku-rosiyan-bilya-dobropill/;
[44] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2084355318037749826?s=20; https://t.me/svoboda_army/3874; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2084379951734689917; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2084377869656989913; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1689
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41739; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41744
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41756
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41739 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41744 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36019 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20527
[48] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2084347314181656621?s=20 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20518 ; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2084347420289146923?s=20
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12608 ; https://t.me/bolgarodessaanbu/280 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2084602691217424470?s=20
[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33630
[51] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1370920-nova-taktika-rosijskoi-armii-ak-zaporizza-atakuut-fpv-dronami-ta-comu-ih-vazko-zbiti/
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41756
[53] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2084645489132068882
[54] *GRAPHIC FOOTAGE* https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20286; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/73249; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/04/cholovik-dyvom-vyzhyv-pislya-udaru-rosijskogo-fpv-na-rynku-u-hersoni/
[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41756
[57] https://t.me/Aksenov82/9846; https://t.me/razvozhaev/22807
[58] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106397
[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/71450
[60] https://t.me/gunpvdp/34344; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17143 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17147 ; https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid033VK9WKWQovTtQHyABsYx52f5tL1jFNLNHGRm8N7U11jLadJkPLJsQpMoa4cdQPnWl; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70636?single; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18307; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18308; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18317; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3025; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3026
[61] https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-energy-denys-shmyhal-winter-war/
[62] https://allminsk dot biz/65524-soyuz-napravil-pismo-v-ministerstvo-ekonomiki-v-svyazi-s-situatsiej-vokrug-marketplejsa-wildberries
[63] https://suspilne dot media/1371214-u-bilorusi-vimagaut-kompensacij-pisla-atak-na-skladi-wildberries-u-rosii/
