Toplines
The Ukrainian government approved a series of personnel changes in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed an interim defense minister on July 16. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) approved on July 16 Zelensky’s endorsement to appoint former state-owned energy company Naftogaz CEO, Serhiy Koretsky, as the Ukrainian prime minister to replace Yulia Svyrydenko.[1] The Rada approved the reappointment of the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal and Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko. [2] The Rada approved the appointment of Chief of Ukraine’s National Police General Ivan Vyhivskyi as the minister of internal affairs; McKinsey & Company partner Oleksandr Kravchenko as the minister of economy; acting Digital Transformation Minister Oksana Ferchuk as the minister of digital transformation; Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaliy Kim as the minister of veterans affairs; former Deputy Chair of the Rada Committee on State Power Organization, Local Self-Government, Regional Development, and Urban Planning Vitaliy Bezgin as minister of communities, territories, and internally displaced persons; and Kyiv Oblast Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk as minister of reconstruction, infrastructure, and transport.
Zelensky appointed on July 16 former acting head of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Yevheny Khmara as the interim defense minister to replace Mykhailo Fedorov, but the Rada has not considered Khmara’s appointment at this time.[3] Fedorov stated that he rejected Zelensky’s offer to become a presidential adviser or to remain on Zelensky’s team in another unspecified manner.[4] Fedorov’s dismissal sparked large-scale protests in cities across at least 18 Ukrainian cities, including in Kyiv, Lviv, and Kharkiv.[5] Former Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov announced on July 15 that he will no longer assist the Ukrainian MoD following Fedorov’s dismissal.[6] Former adviser to the Ukrainian defense minister Serhii Sternenko also announced on July 15 that he no longer works at the Ukrainian MoD.[7] Ukrainian Air Force Deputy Commander Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov announced on July 16 his resignation following Fedorov’s dismissal.[8]
Ukraine’s drone strike campaign aimed at denying Russia the ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea is likely further degrading Russia’s already outstretched air defenses and imposing new protection dilemmas. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain 2nd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on July 16 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces’ (USF) operations in the Azov Sea have paralyzed Russian fuel shipping and complicated Russian supply deliveries to occupied Crimea.[9] Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces have expanded their drone strike campaign against Russian maritime supply routes to the Black Sea and are threatening Russian seaborne lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly the Novorossiysk-Bosphorus and Don-Bosphorus SLOCs. Pletenchuk noted that the Azov-Black Sea region accounts for up to 20 percent of the Russian crude oil exports and that the Novorossiysk Port in Krasnodar Krai is the largest seaport in Russia. Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian efforts to transport fuel via small river-to-sea tankers. Pletenchuk also noted that Russian forces are increasingly relying on SLOCs after Ukrainian forces started to effectively interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea to Rostov Oblast via southern Ukraine. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces failed to bolster air defenses along Azov-Black Sea SLOCs despite repeated Ukrainian coastal warnings about navigation restrictions in the area over the past three years. Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces will be unable to protect all vessels due to air defense shortages and that Russian warships will be in danger of Ukrainian strikes if they escort cargo ships. Pletenchuk reported that Ukrainian strikes are disrupting Russia’s aviation fuel supplies to airfields in occupied Crimea and will likely lead to future aviation fuel shortages and impact Russia’s ability to defend the Black Sea region against Ukrainian drones. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces are avoiding relying on the Kerch Strait Bridge for logistics because of previous Ukrainian operations against the bridge and concerns of Ukrainian strikes. Pletenchuk implied that Ukrainian forces reportedly have not targeted the bridge because Russian forces will need to rely on the bridge to withdraw from occupied Crimea to Russia. Ukraine’s intensifying intermediate- and long-range strike campaign targeting Russian ground and maritime supply routes in the Azov-Black Sea region will likely continue to isolate occupied Crimea and disrupt Russian military logistics, likely degrading Russian offensive operations and impeding further Russian advances in southern Ukraine.[10] ISW continues to assess that the increasing frequency, size, and depth of Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaign, now expanding to include strikes in the Azov-Black Sea region, will continue forcing Russia to overstretch its air defenses across a wide swathe of territory.[11]
Russia is reportedly turning to India for additional gasoline supplies as Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to reduce Russian oil refining capacity. Reuters reported on July 15, citing two sources familiar with the matter, that top Russian energy companies — including state-owned companies such as Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil — are approaching Indian oil refiners for additional gasoline supplies.[12] A source told Reuters that at least one cargo of Indian gasoline has sailed to Russia and that there will be additional shipments in the future. Reuters reported, citing maritime intelligence firm Kpler and its satellite imagery, that the Comoros-flagged Agni tanker departed the Vadinar Port, India, with 42,000 metric tons of gasoline between June 18 and 20, transferred the gasoline to the Garnet tanker near Egypt between July 6 and 7, and that the Garnet tanker is expected to arrive in Vitino Port, Murmansk Oblast around July 26. Shipping sources told Reuters that the Varg tanker departed from Vadinar Port with unspecified quantities of gasoline and is expected to travel through the Suez Canal to transfer gasoline onto an unspecified vessel off the coast of Egypt to sail toward Russia. A source told Reuters that Russia is unlikely to regain about 40 percent of its refining capacity for at least two months (until about mid-September 2026) even if Ukraine stops striking Russian oil refineries. Sources at three Indian state oil refineries stated that Russian companies approached them for additional gasoline supplies but noted that the Indian oil refiners have no surplus gasoline volumes to export. A source familiar with the matter stated that further Indian gasoline supplies could reach Russia through a network of intermediary ship-to-ship transfers and noted that Russia could seek diesel supplies, although the source claimed that Russian diesel supplies are currently sufficient. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refining infrastructure has been decreasing Russian oil refining capacity, exacerbating gasoline shortages in most Russian regions and in occupied Ukraine for the past several weeks, and forcing Russia to export its crude oil supplies and import refined gasoline from countries like India.[13] Ukraine will likely continue its long-range strike campaign to further force Russia to seek refined gasoline from external sources.
Russian elites are reportedly moving money abroad to protect their financial assets from Russian economic risk and the Kremlin’s effort to nationalize private assets. Bloomberg reported on July 16 — citing six “wealthy Russians,” additional sources familiar with the thinking of several Russian billionaires, corporate filings, and property purchase records — that several of Russia’s richest people, including some close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, are shifting their financial portfolios toward cryptocurrency, gold, foreign properties, and other private investments abroad.[14] Bloomberg noted that informal financial outflows through cryptocurrency have increased, including through the A7A5 stablecoin that pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor’s company A7 owns. Bloomberg reported that Russian elites are increasingly concerned about recent high-profile asset seizures and the state of the Russian banking sector and wider economy. The Kremlin has recently taken steps that challenge the status quo relationship between Putin and Russia’s oligarchs, stemming from the privatization of assets during the 1990s.[15] Putin reportedly requested that Russian oligarchs donate to the war effort during a meeting with Russia’s top businessmen on March 26, 2026, breaking a promise he made to the oligarchs in July 2000 that he would uphold the privatization of Soviet assets as long as the oligarchs remained out of Russian politics and pledged allegiance to Putin. Russia’s Prosecutor General nationalized Russia’s largest agricultural holding on May 5, 2026.[16] The Russian economy continues to show increasing strain from the war effort and structural issues affecting economic growth, inflation, and the banking sector.[17] Elements of the Russian elite appear to be increasingly concerned about these developments and the security of their domestic assets amidst the Kremlin’s creeping expropriation and nationalization efforts and appear willing to take measures to secure their assets.
Polish authorities are warning that Russia is conducting surveillance of NATO air defense integration exercises near the Baltic Sea, likely as part of Russia’s Phase Zero efforts. Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz warned on July 15 about the Russian surveillance of NATO’s air defense integration and reported that Poland scrambled fighter aircraft and intercepted two Russian Su-30SM2 fighters operating from Kaliningrad Oblast and that Swedish aircraft escorted the Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea.[18] Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that the Russian aircraft did not approach Polish airspace. ISW continues to assess that Russia is conducting a “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[19]
Key Takeaways
- The Ukrainian government approved a series of personnel changes in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed an interim defense minister on July 16.
- Ukraine’s drone strike campaign aimed at denying Russia the ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea is likely further degrading Russia’s already outstretched air defenses and imposing new protection dilemmas.
- Russia is reportedly turning to India for additional gasoline supplies as Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to reduce Russian oil refining capacity.
- Russian elites are reportedly moving money abroad to protect their financial assets from Russian economic risk and the Kremlin’s effort to nationalize private assets.
- Polish authorities are warning that Russia is conducting surveillance of NATO air defense integration exercises near the Baltic Sea, likely as part of Russia’s Phase Zero efforts.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia on July 15 and 16.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Russia launched eight Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, four Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, one Kh-21P anti-radar missile, and 146 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia on July 15 and 16. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows fires in the direction of the Russian Engels-2 Air Base following Ukrainian drone strikes against Engels, Saratov Oblast.[20] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin confirmed on July 15 that Ukrainian drones struck Engels, claiming that the strike damaged unspecified civilian infrastructure.[21] Russian opposition source Astra reported on July 16 that a fire broke out at the Engels-2 military airfield overnight on July 15 to 16.[22] Astra reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the storage tank farm at the Slavneft-YANOS oil tank farm in Yaroslavl Oblast, causing a fire.[23] Astra noted that the oil tank farm has a capacity of over 620,000 cubic meters and is the main logistics hub for the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery. Saratov Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevrayev confirmed that Ukrainian forces targeted Yaroslavl Oblast overnight.[24]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 15 and 16 but did not advance.[25] Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Russian forces using a Kh-39 air-to-surface tactical missile and three FAB-500 bombs to strike Ukrainian positions in Krasnopillya and Uhroidy (both southeast of Sumy City).[26]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of the Travyanske Reservoir (northeast of Kharkiv City).[27]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 15 and 16 but did not advance.[28]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on July 15 and 16 but did not advance.[29] Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position west of Holubivka (just north of Kupyansk), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[30]
Ukrainian Postal Service (Ukraposhta) Chief Executive Officer Igor Smelyansky stated on July 15 that Russian forces struck and destroyed a Ukraposhta post office in Oskil (southeast of Borova).[31]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck a Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) equipment warehouse near occupied Novodarivka (one of two settlements that are roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 15 to 16.[32] A Ukrainian detachment operating in Luhansk Oblast reported on July 15 that it struck a Tor air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces are reportedly intensifying offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction. A Ukrainian officer reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on July 16 that Russian forces have recently increased their number of assaults from five to seven per day in Spring 2026 to between 22 and 26 attacks per day.[34] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces continue attacking in small groups and conduct attacks either using motorized vehicles or as dismounted infantry. The Ukrainian officer noted that Russian glide bomb and drone strikes are complicating Ukrainian logistics in the rear and along the frontline and that Russian forces have an advantage in glide bombs. The officer reported that Ukrainian fiber-optic drone crews are targeting Russian drone crew, artillery crew, infantry, and tank positions.
Russian forces continue to infiltrate in small groups rather than conduct mechanized assaults in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northwestern of Vasyutynke (northeast of Druzhkivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[35] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on July 16 that Russian forces continue deploying small groups of dismounted infantry in the Kostyantynivka direction and are not conducting mechanized assaults.[36] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on July 16 that Russian forces are adopting some of Ukraine’s unspecified, successful tactics and quickly scaling them.xl The commander noted that Russian forces previously relied on strict discipline and coercion to integrate Russian servicemen on the battlefield but now rely on professional technical specialists that help rapidly adapt personnel to the modern battlefield.
Russian forces appear to be intensifying strikes against civilian areas in the near-rear of the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on July 16 that Russian forces are intensifying the use of first-person view (FPV) drone to strike civilians evacuating on foot toward Druzhkivka.[37] Ukrainian officials reported on July 16 that Russian forces struck residential buildings and a post office in Kramatorsk, injuring three civilians.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on July 15 and 16 but did not advance.[39] Footage published on July 16 shows Russian forces using three FAB-500 glide bombs to strike a Ukrainian position purportedly near Krasnopodillya (south of Dobropillya).[40]
Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 16 that Ukrainian forces are operating in Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk), contrary to previous Russian claims.[42]
Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian 7th Airborne Assault Corps Commander Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk reported on July 15 that Ukrainian forces seek to cut off Russian GLOCs around Pokrovsk to halt Russian ammunition and personnel movement.[43] The commander noted that Ukrainian forces seek to form a 100-kilometer kill zone using intermediate-range drones and long-range tube and rocket artillery to strike Russian forces at a distance before they disperse into infiltration groups.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 237th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian servicemembers in Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[44] ISW previously observed evidence of the 237th VDV Regiment operating north or northwest of Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) on May 20.[45] ISW has observed evidence of the 76th VDV Division, the 237th VDV’s parent regiment, operating in the Pokrovsk direction since Russian forces reportedly redeployed elements of the division to rear areas in Donetsk Oblast in September 2025.[46]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 15 and 16 but did not advance.[47]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Andriivka-Klevstove (northeast of Oleksandrivka), likely clearing the settlement of Russian infiltrators.[48]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure that likely supports military operations in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck the Shakhtarsk oil depot in occupied Shakhtarsk (roughly 77 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on July 15 to 16.[49]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 15 and 16 but did not advance.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 14 and 15 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk and Plavni and near Mali Shcherbaky and Shcherbaky (all west of Orikhiv).[52]
Ukrainian drone strikes continue to interdict Russian logistics in the Zaporizhia direction as Russian forces struggle to adapt. The Ukrainian 1st Separate Assault Regiment Commander Dmytro “Perun” Filatov reported on July 16 that Russian forces decreased their use of artillery by 60 percent and use of drones by 30 percent in the Zaporizhia direction due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics.[53] Filatov noted that Russian forces are increasingly using mobile fire teams hidden in windbreaks to shoot down Ukrainian drones, which has increased the Russian interception rate of Ukrainian drones to 40 percent from a previous 20 percent at an unspecified date. Filatov reported that Russian forces are still not using heavy armored vehicles near the frontline and only use light vehicles to transport cargo about 30 kilometers from the frontline. Filatov added that Russian forces are implementing new active protection systems that intercept Ukrainian drones that are targeting Russian armored vehicles. Filatov added that the intensity of Russian assaults has decreased by 10 percent.
Ukrainian forces continued intermediate and frontline strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge that Russian forces used for logistics near occupied Prymorsk (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 16 to 17.[54] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on July 15 that Ukrainian forces twice struck a Zemledeliye remote minelaying system in the Zaporizhia direction, causing the system to catch fire.[55] The brigade reported that the system can create minefields at a distance of five to 15 kilometers.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground operations in the Kherson direction on July 16.
Ukrainian forces continue striking ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck the Syvash railway bridge between occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea near Chonhar (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) that Russian forces use for military logistics.[56] Geolocated footage published on July 16 shows a Ukrainian strike on a Russian Su-24 aircraft at the Saky Airbase near Novofedorivka (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline).[57] A Ukrainian special forces unit reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Su-24 aircraft twice as it was preparing to take off.[58]
Russian forces’ persistent weaknesses in maritime and air defense coverage in occupied Crimea are forcing the Kremlin to scapegoat local authorities to escape reputational damage. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 16 that Ukraine’s expanded intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian assets in occupied Crimea, the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea is exposing persistent weaknesses in Russian maritime and air-defense coverage and harming the Russian government’s reputation.[59] The Russian milblogger claimed that Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov is touring occupied Crimea to criticize municipal officials and alleviate negative social pressures on the federal government while the Kremlin engages in an information campaign that seeks to portray Russian President Putin as attentive to fuel and energy shortages and Ukrainian strikes on the peninsula. Russian forces largely rely on ground fire to intercept Ukrainian strikes because local air defense units of the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) do not have access to fighter aircraft, which could more effectively shoot down Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck six Russian tankers and two tugboats in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov on the night of July 15 to 16, and that Russian forces use these tankers to transport oil and petroleum to circumvent international sanctions and to support Russian forces.[60] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi elaborated on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck five oil tankers in the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov and one gas tanker, three dry cargo ships, and two tugboats in the Black Sea on July 16, likely referring to several of the same ships that the Ukrainian General Staff referenced.[61] Brovdi added that Ukrainian forces struck a total of 147 Russian vessels between July 6 and 16. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 16 that Ukrainian Mamai naval drones struck the Russian shadow fleet tankers Louise 1 and Banda in the Black Sea, likely referring to two ships included in the Ukrainian General Staff and Brovdi report numbers.[62] The SBU noted that both vessels transported crude oil from Russian ports.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; four Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from the Black Sea; and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, five Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 146 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and 129 drones, that five Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, and 16 strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) struck 15 locations, that drone debris struck seven locations, and that the four Kh-22/32 cruise missiles did not reach their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, industrial, and medical infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts.[64] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[65]
Ukraine’s main farmers union, Ukrainian Agri Council, told Reuters on July 15 that Ukraine has lost about one third of its grain export capacity due to intensifying Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure and Ukrainian supply chains.[66]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www dot rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/274296.html
[2] https://www dot rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/274325.html
[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19984 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-parliament-elect-new-government-amid-outcry-over-defence-chief-2026-07-16/
[4] https://www.ft.com/content/06865b90-5b62-46c5-ae8d-147842b41cd0?syn-25a6b1a6=1 ; https://www dot kyivpost.com/post/80398
[5] https://suspilne dot media/1356356-u-kievi-zbirautsa-na-kartonkovij-protest-na-pidtrimku-fedorova/
[6] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7576
[7] https://www.facebook.com/sternenko/posts/pfbid0Er4SD9EfmcQuyVedLj1TBbxJL1aZJfLkrhWe4KHWk455es9CDrmuDc2RWwGpTy1ml?locale=uk_UA
[8] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CLqi4bdHS/
[9] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/16/%c2%absytuacziya-krytychna-i%c2%a0tupykova%c2%bb-u%c2%a0krymu-dlya-rosijskyh-vijsk-stvoryuyut-logistychnyj-lokdaun/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-template-020426/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/
[12] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-seeks-more-gasoline-india-after-ukraine-attacks-refineries-sources-say-2026-07-15/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/;
[14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-16/russia-s-elite-are-moving-billions-beyond-putin-s-wartime-grasp
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/
[18] https://x.com/KosiniakKamysz/status/2077382658749780391
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/
[20] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2077539477820506154; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2077561265292280200
[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/385446
[22] https://t.me/astrapress/118726; https://t.me/idelrealii/45618
[23] https://t.me/astrapress/118739
[24] https://t.me/evraevmikhail/20931
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146; https://t.me/rybar/81776; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73532; https://t.me/dva_majors/96204; https://t.me/severnnyi/8699; https://t.me/wargonzo/35583;
[26] https://t.me/Osintpen/3142; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30016
[27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12477; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Da2NBRmAfRB
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146; https://t.me/severnnyi/8699
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41176; https://t.me/grvZapad/19151; https://t.me/wargonzo/35583
[30] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2077744605383045371 ; https://t.me/hisnikii/1496
[31] https://www.facebook.com/igor.smelyansky/posts/pfbid0oqy3rty1SvbvWZWivQjnsB7buhcSCfnZgyVEh3288qyqRFmMthwrE6s82XsDcgF2l#?ded
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41167
[33] https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10140
[34] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1356376-aviacia-zalisaetsa-golovnou-perevagou-rf-na-slovanskomu-napramku-vijskovij/
[35] https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/812; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12479
[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eb_3nvipGes ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/16/fpv-polyuyut-navit-na-czyvilnyh-u-brygadi-hyzhak-rozpovily-pro-novu-realnist-boyiv-pid-kostyantynivkoyu/
[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/16/fpv-polyuyut-navit-na-czyvilnyh-u-brygadi-hyzhak-rozpovily-pro-novu-realnist-boyiv-pid-kostyantynivkoyu/
[38] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/68946 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1356506-pisla-nicnogo-obstrilu-kramatorska-ludi-opinilisa-zablokovanimi-u-vlasnih-oselah/; https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid0dX4NZTzxGS3BtfQyQVkAFLWVEy3JGk5Ud4fbqHQG4a5JeG6Fsj6AH5T7udsrWMgEl ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1356528-zranku-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-postovomu-viddilennu-u-kramatorsku-e-poraneni/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41176; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146; https://t.me/wargonzo/35583
[40] https://t.me/Osintpen/3142; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30016
[41] https://t.me/svoboda_army/3854; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12475
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45356
[43] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/meta-vijsk-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-100-kilometrova-kill-zone/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nf_70gKpiaE&t=1070s
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45356
[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3413
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146
[48] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2077753306458263737 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2077753310560264655
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41167
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35583 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20232
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41176; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41146; https://t.me/wargonzo/35583; https://t.me/motopatriot78/53911
[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/53911; https://t.me/motopatriot78/53930
[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/16/tanky-u-protyvnyka-ye-ale-vony-staly-rezervom-komandyr-shturmovogo-polku-pro-sytuacziyu-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eb_3nvipGes
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41167
[55] https://t.me/nemesis_412/1625; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/15/spalyly-zyemlyedyeliye-dronari-brygady-nemesis-urazyly-systemu-dystanczijnogo-minuvannya/
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41167
[57] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2077746096856785077?s=20; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2077742827610; https://t.me/Pivnenko_NGU/4456; https://t.me/milinfolive/176229 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/16/na-aerodromi-%c2%absaky%c2%bb-u-krymu-urazheno-rosijskyj-bombarduvalnyk-su-24m/
[58] https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10143
[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/96218
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41167
[61] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2609
[62] https://t.me/SBUkr/18099
[63] https://t.me/kpszsu/68667
[64] https://suspilne.media/cherkasy/1355562-na-cerkasini-vnaslidok-padinna-rosijskogo-drona-gorila-psenica/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2077654391545299318 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30807 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27606 ; https://t.me/vilkul/17169; https://t.me/synegubov/23827 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23828; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4329; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2603 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/68913 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7114 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17649 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17655 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2794 ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2873; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44210 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4330 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4331 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7115 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17649 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2793 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/60184 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/60192 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2795 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/60193 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44215 ; https://t.me/regina_harchenko/14609 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44151 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/64358
[65] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5218
[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-black-sea-ports-lose-third-grain-export-capacity-farmers-union-says-2026-07-15/
