The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
- Iran is trying to deter expanded US strikes by signaling that it could escalate against international shipping around the Bab al Mandeb, using the Houthis. It is unclear whether the Houthis would act on the Iranian threats, though the risk is very high.
- The United States has continued its effort to degrade the Iranian ability to attack commercial traffic around the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has also conducted strikes further inland, the purpose of which is unclear.
- The IRGC is trying to send FPV, fiber-optic drones to Lebanese Hezbollah. Such drones have posed a significant threat to Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. The drone hardware derives from Russia and China.
Toplines
Iran is trying to deter the United States from striking Iranian energy infrastructure by threatening Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. Two senior Iranian sources and a regional source familiar with the matter told Reuters on July 16 that Iran requested that the Houthis prepare to attack Red Sea shipping if the United States expands its airstrikes to Iranian energy infrastructure.[1] An unspecified source close to the Houthis said that the Houthis have deployed missile and drone assets near the Bab al Mandeb and are awaiting orders.[2] Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, have previously threatened that the Houthis could launch another campaign against shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait.[3] The comments to Reuters are part of an Iranian effort to signal that the Axis of Resistance could create another crisis for international shipping — this time around the Bab al Mandeb. This report comes as Western media has reported on the possibility that the United States could intensify operations against Iran.[4] US President Donald Trump recently threatened to expand US strikes to include ”power plants and bridges.”[5]
It is unclear whether the Houthis would follow through on Iran’s threats. The Houthis have not yet closed the Bab al Mandeb to shipping despite numerous threats throughout the war to do so. Houthis Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi noted on July 16 that the Houthis are continuing to prevent Israeli vessels from transiting the Bab el Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden but made no reference to expanding this campaign to close the strait to all commercial shipping.[6] The risk that the Houthis escalate against maritime traffic around the Bab al Mandeb remains high, however.
Iranian efforts to stoke global concerns about Houthi attacks in the Red Sea coincide with rising tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Abdul Malik asserted in his speech that Saudi Arabia had “embroiled itself” in conflict against the Houthis, referring to recent exchange in fire with Saudi Arabia over Iran’s attempt to land a flight at Sanaa Airport earlier on July 14.[7] Abdul Malik threatened to launch drone and missile attacks targeting “all Saudi oil installations and highly vital facilities“ if it attacks the Houthis again.[8] The Houthis previously attacked Saudi energy infrastructure in 2022.[9] Abdul Malik’s statement follows the Houthis’ warning commercial airlines against using Saudi airspace.[10] Two regional sources close to Saudi leadership told Reuters on July 16 that Saudi Arabia is seriously concerned about Iran and the Houthis’ threat and is aware of Iran-Houthi coordination regarding the Red Sea.[11] Saudi Arabia has diverted 70 percent of its energy exports to its Red Sea port of Yanbu to circumvent Iranian attacks through the Strait of Hormuz.[12]
The United States is striking Iranian targets further inland in southeastern and southwestern Iran. The purpose of these strikes is not immediately clear. US forces struck a hangar at Semnan Airport in Semnan Province, according to a local official.[13] Semnan Province hosts several missile test and space launch sites.[14] Iranian media reported that US forces struck more targets in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, including an IRGC base near Rask, which is approximately 130 kilometers from Iran’s southern coastline.[15] The United States has struck at least three inland targets in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since July 14.[16] Iranian media also reported that the United States struck unspecified sites near Kabudarahang in Hamedan Province, Khorramabad in Lorestan Province, Khondab City in Markazi Province, and Ahvaz in Khuzestan Province.[17] A US official told Reuters on July 15 that recent US airstrikes could be seen as “shaping operations” to degrade Iranian defenses in case the US military was ordered to conduct more intensive operations.[18]
The United States continued to strike Iranian naval and coastal installations that Iran uses to threaten maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on July 15 and 16. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on July 15 that US forces struck Iranian command centers, air defense sites, missile and drone capabilities, and coastal surveillance facilities, including near Bandar Abbas and Greater Tunb Island.[19] Iranian media and open-source intelligence accounts on X recorded US airstrikes targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy and Aerospace Force sites in Hormozgan, Bushehr, Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchistan provinces near its southern coastline.[20]
Iran is continuing to retaliate against the United States by firing at US bases in the region. The IRGC and Artesh launched several drone and missile attacks at US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan on July 15 and 16.[21] All three countries appeared to have intercepted the Iranian attacks. Kuwait reported that it intercepted 21 drones and four cruise missiles.[22]
ISW-CTP has not observed Iranian attacks on vessels in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz since July 13.[23] Western media reported on July 15 that crews in the strait remain concerned about transiting the strait through the ”southern route” in Omani waters due to the ongoing threat of Iranian attacks.[24]
The IRGC is trying to supply Lebanese Hezbollah with first-person view (FPV), fiber-optic drones and other weapons that the group has used to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon and Israeli towns since March 2026. Syrian Interior Ministry forces thwarted an IRGC attempt to smuggle advanced weapons, including FPV drones, from Iraq through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon on July 7.[25] Syrian forces seized the shipment in a vehicle near al Tanf around the Iraq-Syria border.[26] The shipment included hundreds of 13-inch FPV drones and FPV drone components, including Chinese-made fiber-optic spools, Iranian-made PG-7V anti-tank warheads converted for FPV use, and FPV drone batteries.[27] Syrian forces also seized dozens of Iranian Almas anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) manufactured in 2026 and Iranian Paveh-351 cruise missile components.[28] Hezbollah deployed FPV fiber-optic drones to attack Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for the first time in March 2026 and has deployed them at an increasing scale in the subsequent months.[29] Hezbollah has used fiber-optics systems, including drones equipped with thermal cameras, to impose physical and psychological costs on Israeli ground forces and attempt to compel the IDF to withdraw from Lebanese territory.[30] Unspecified Israeli officials told Western media in May 2026 that the IRGC had sent fiber-optic drones to Hezbollah.[31] A Syrian source reported that the IRGC smuggled the weapons on Iraqi oil tanker trucks traveling in daily convoys to export Iraqi oil through Syrian ports after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz.[32]
Russia may have supplied Iran with some of the seized fiber-optic drones or drone components. Russia reportedly offered to provide Iran with 5,000 short-range, fiber-optic drones in May 2026, though it is unclear if this transfer ever occurred.[33] Russia would be the most likely actor to have provided Iran with fiber-optic drone capabilities.[34] Some of the equipment seized by Syrian forces contains commercially available Russian- or Chinese-manufactured components. The FPV drones that Syrian forces seized appear to have originated from a Russian company that sells standard and thermal camera-equipped FPV drones for 1,000 to 2,000 US dollars.[35] The seized Chinese fiber-optic spools were reportedly produced in Guangdong and are advertised on Alibaba.[36] These spools range from three to 30 kilometers, though it is unclear which variant and length Syrian authorities seized.[37]
Iran has also likely provided Hezbollah with technical support and knowledge on drone development. Syria- and Iraq-focused analysts have reported that Hezbollah has praised “Dr. Zain” for his role in developing Hezbollah’s FPV drone program. Zain reportedly “regularly” visited Iran and worked with the IRGC Quds Force.[38] Israeli media reported that Iran supplies Hezbollah with the technical expertise and funding to develop its drones.[39]
US-Iran Negotiations
Iran’s Judiciary-run outlet, Mizan News Agency, denied reports that Iran released or exchanged a US prisoner.[40] US President Donald Trump stated on July 15 that Iran allowed an American citizen ”wrongfully detained” in December 2024 to leave Iran.[41] Iranian authorities detained an Iranian-American dual national who worked for a US technology company and operated a children’s charity in December 2024, according to Western media.[42] Iranian authorities later released the woman from prison but confiscated her passports, prevented her from leaving Iran, and charged her with espionage.[43] Mizan News Agency reported that Iranian prisons had not released or exchanged any convicted US prisoner or “American spy” matching Trump’s description or any other description.[44]
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
Iran is seeking to maintain its oil exports through the Persian Gulf despite the reinstated US naval blockade on Iranian ports. US naval forces disabled a Curacao-flagged oil tanker, M/T Belma, on July 15 as the vessel sailed for Kharg Island.[45] US aircraft struck the smokestack after the ship ignored multiple warnings to stop its course.[46] Tanker Trackers reported on July 16 that M/T Belma has transported at least 38 million barrels of Iranian crude oil over an unspecified number of years in service.[47]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
See topline.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Elements of the Iranian regime continue to debate how much effort Iran should commit to controlling the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian outlet, Asr Iran, published an op-ed on July 15 that argued that Iran successfully diverted US attention to the Strait of Hormuz and away from the US war aims, such as collapsing the regime and ending Iran’s nuclear program.[48] Asr Iran previously had ties to Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is currently leading the regime’s pro-negotiations camp.[49] It is unclear if the outlet is still affiliated with Ghalibaf. The op-ed implied that it is unnecessary for Iran to allocate excessive resources to controlling the strait, particularly if doing so requires Iran to sacrifice other objectives, such as preserving its nuclear program or ensuring regime stability.[50] It remains unclear how widely the author’s proposal to shift Iran’s priorities away from the strait resonates within mainstream circles in the Iranian regime. Iranian hardliners continue to extol the value of maintaining control over the strait at all costs. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfghari described the strait as Iran’s “unbreakable red line” on June 16 and noted that Iran will not allow the United States to interfere in the strait’s affairs, for example.[51]
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began to deploy forces to and near one of the “pilot zones” defined by the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[52] The LAF announced that its forces began to conduct patrols and establish checkpoints and observation posts in the towns of Ghandouriyeh, Froun, Qalaouiyeh, and Kfar Dounine in Bint Jbeil District, Qaaqaaiyet al Jisr in Nabatieh District, and Srifa in Tyre District on July 16.[53] The Agreement stipulates that Israeli forces will eventually withdraw from areas in southern Lebanon, after which the LAF would secure the pilot zones and disarm and dismantle local armed groups.[54] One of these pilot zones is expected to be centered around Ghandouriyeh and Froun, according to an Israeli government press conference on June 27.[55] An unspecified security source told Lebanese media on July 16 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is not currently deployed in Ghandouriyeh and Froun.[56] ISW-CTP has not observed any LAF deployments to Zawtar el Gharbiyeh yet, which is expected to be the second pilot zone.[57] The LAF deployments follow recent US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon in Rome on July 14 and 15, in which the parties discussed the implementation of the pilot zone plan.[58] US, Israeli, and Lebanese military delegations will reportedly meet virtually on July 17 to discuss further implementation of the pilot zones.[59]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Iran likely launched two drones that struck Iraqi energy infrastructure in Basra Province, Iraq, on July 15 and 16 and briefly halted Iraqi oil exports.[60] Iraqi sources told Reuters that a likely Iranian drone struck an oil tanker vessel at Basra’s oil terminal on July 16, forcing the terminal to briefly suspend oil loading.[61] There were no casualties. The sources said that the origin of the drone was unclear.[62] The director general of Iraq’s state oil company SOMO asserted that the drone did mistakenly strike the Basra Oil Terminal and had a different target.[63] Iraqi media separately reported on July 15 that an “unidentified” drone struck al Faw Port, Basra Province, and ed caused damage but no casualties.[64] Iraqi media published an image of drone wreckage at the port, with Persian writing on the drone commemorating Iranian officials killed in the war, which indicates the drone may have originated from Iran.[65] An Iraqi source claimed that Iran was targeting Kuwait but accidentally struck al Faw port instead.[66] These likely Iranian strikes on Iraqi energy infrastructure coincide with Iraqi efforts to develop oil export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz.[67]
An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia denied responsibility for a July 15 drone attack that targeted the US consulate in Erbil and Erbil Airport.[68] Multiple Iraqi sources reported that an unknown actor launched at least eight drones at the US Consulate in Erbil and a US base at Erbil International Airport on July 15.[69] Iraqi air defenses intercepted the drones.[70] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi told Iraqi media on July 16 that neither the group nor any other militia launched any operations ”toward Erbil.” The spokesperson added that the attacks on US bases and interests in Iraq are part of the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the United States.[71] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada has conducted numerous attacks on US bases in Iraq during this conflict through its front group, Saraya Awliya al Dam.[72] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias use front groups to conduct attacks and obfuscate responsibility.[73]
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-houthis-close-red-sea-gateway-if-us-hits-power-network-sources-say-2026-07-16/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-houthis-close-red-sea-gateway-if-us-hits-power-network-sources-say-2026-07-16/
[3] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606088809 https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2026/07/16/could-bab-al-mandeb-be-the-next-strait-of-hormuz-iran-reportedly-asked-houthis-to-prepare-closure/
[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-leans-toward-expanding-u-s-military-operations-in-iran-6c230462; https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/15/politics/trump-iran-military-options
[5] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/15/trump-iran-hormuz-strikes-power-plants-targeted.html
[6] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3744467.htm?cid=1
[7] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3744467.htm?cid=1
[8] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3744467.htm?cid=1
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-leader-threatens-saudi-oil-facilities-if-riyadh-escalates-yemen-2026-07-16/
[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemeni-military-targets-sanaa-airport-runway-stop-iranian-plane-landing-defence-2026-07-13/
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-houthis-close-red-sea-gateway-if-us-hits-power-network-sources-say-2026-07-16/
[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-houthis-close-red-sea-gateway-if-us-hits-power-network-sources-say-2026-07-16/
[13] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2077627690132136208?s=20; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2077767956247753158?s=20
[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/16/world/middleeast/iran-war-us-strikes.html?smid=url-share; https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/semnan-missile-complex/
[15] https://t.me/mehrnews/397170; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2077494606871028054?s=20
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-15-2026/; https://t.me/farsna/450098 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2077398313255469552?s=20; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2077420226598010955
[17] https://t.me/farsna/450347 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/397231 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/397236 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2077481061852844224?s=20 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/397159
[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-strikes-iran-strengthen-trumps-options-new-escalation-officials-say-2026-07-15/
[19] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2077563991069499714?s=20
[20] https://t.me/mehrnews/397147 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/397155 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/397173;
https://t.me/mehrnews/397201 ;
https://t.me/mehrnews/397203; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2077489273062748369; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2077777379489992978; https://x.com/GEOIMINT/status/2075611932703261179 ; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/375037
[21] https://petra.gov dot jo/ar/news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7%D9%86%D8%A7-8-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9;
https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2077526623633502632?s=20 ;
https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2077710521378168995?s=20;
https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2077652956808122382?s=20
[22]
https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2077526623633502632?s=20;
https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2077710521378168995?s=20;
https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2077468258970619949
[23]
https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2076931405922136545?s=20
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/some-ships-refusing-us-military-guided-hormuz-transits-after-attacks-sources-say-2026-07-15/; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/controlling-hormuz-would-take-more-u-s-troopsand-even-more-risk-fa77a35d?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
[25] https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2077695368825917619?s=20
[26] https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2077695368825917619?s=20
[27] https://www.instagram.com/p/Da2z06lDeTj/?img_index=2 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ;
[28] https://www.instagram.com/p/Da2z06lDeTj/?img_index=2 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ;
[29] https://t.me/mmirleb/11834 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/12714
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-26-2026/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11834 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/12714 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/17026
[31] https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/05/07/secret-document-reveals-russias-plans-to-aid-iran
[32] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drones-shahed-war-israel-ukraine-840b4f885d99714bdb7813c0d56213cf ; https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drones-shahed-war-israel-ukraine-840b4f885d99714bdb7813c0d56213cf ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/13/us/politics/china-iran-weapons-trump-xi.html
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-8-2026/ ; https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/05/07/secret-document-reveals-russias-plans-to-aid-iran
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/
[35] https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ; https://beastfpv dot ru/category/fpv/13-inch/
[36] https://www.instagram.com/p/Da2z06lDeTj/?img_index=2 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ; https://www.aliexpress dot us/item/3256812037252916.html?gatewayAdapt=isr2usa4itemAdapt#nav-store
[37] https://www.instagram.com/p/Da2z06lDeTj/?img_index=2 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/30993 ; https://www.aliexpress dot us/item/3256812037252916.html?gatewayAdapt=isr2usa4itemAdapt#nav-store
[38] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2054240860808565102?s=20
[39] https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/hezbollahs-drones-challenge-israels-edge/
[40] https://www.mizanonline dot ir/fa/news/4908441
[41] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116926450735170990
[42] https://www.axios.com/2026/07/15/iran-releases-american-detainee-trump
[43] https://www.axios.com/2026/07/15/iran-releases-american-detainee-trump
[44] https://www.mizanonline dot ir/fa/news/4908441
[45] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4546626/us-forces-disable-non-compliant-vessel-in-arabian-gulf/
[46] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4546626/us-forces-disable-non-compliant-vessel-in-arabian-gulf/
[47] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2077654473220972966
[48] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1177470/
[49] https://web.archive.org/web/20131213034509/http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f12_iran_s_reaction_to_ghaddafi_s_death/24366754.html ; https://web.archive.org/web/20131215180009/http://www.kayhanpublishing.uk.com/Pages/archive/weekly/sale1390/1371/Service%20Siasi_1371.htm ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-ghalibaf-us-talks.html
[50] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1177470/
[51] https://t.me/farsna/450352
[53] https://www.facebook.com/LebaneseArmedForcesOfficial/posts/pfbid0VtRv444PauqBPuRgNVzc9CHyfRNi4B4v5ew42zAJ3ZRSFkXMTiuCYu9D2i5xQ6HGl ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5296807-الجيش-اللبناني-يستبق-الجلسة-التقنية-مع-إسرائيل-بإجراءات-أمنية
[54] https://www.facebook.com/LebaneseArmedForcesOfficial/posts/pfbid0VtRv444PauqBPuRgNVzc9CHyfRNi4B4v5ew42zAJ3ZRSFkXMTiuCYu9D2i5xQ6HGl ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5296807-الجيش-اللبناني-يستبق-الجلسة-التقنية-مع-إسرائيل-بإجراءات-أمنية
[55] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/
[56] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2070940344967893212?s=20
https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1541559/lebanese-army-bolsters-presence-around-pilot-zones.html
[58] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2070940344967893212?s=20
[59] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2077396931777556940 ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/
[60] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321291-virtual-israeli-lebanese-us-meeting-to-be-held-friday; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/78582
[61] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/crude-oil-loading-suspended-all-iraqi-terminals-after-drone-incident-sources-say-2026-07-16/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسي-رة-داخل-مينا-الفاو-الكبير-في-البصرة
[62] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/crude-oil-loading-suspended-all-iraqi-terminals-after-drone-incident-sources-say-2026-07-16/ ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/بطا-رة-مسيرة-استهداف-باخرة-شحن-محملة-بسيارات-قادمة-من-ال-مارات-لى-البصرة
[63] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/crude-oil-loading-suspended-all-iraqi-terminals-after-drone-incident-sources-say-2026-07-16/
[64] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/crude-oil-loading-suspended-all-iraqi-terminals-after-drone-incident-sources-say-2026-07-16/
[65] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسي-رة-داخل-مينا-الفاو-الكبير-في-البصرة
[66] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسي-رة-داخل-مينا-الفاو-الكبير-في-البصرة
[67] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسي-رة-داخل-مينا-الفاو-الكبير-في-البصرة
[68] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-supporting-efforts-revive-iraq-syria-crude-oil-pipeline-us-official-says-2026-07-14/
[69] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الفصا-ل-العراقية-تن-ى-بنفسها-عن-قصف-ربيل-سلاحنا-باق-والتحرك-بوقت-مناسب
[70] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/2077491979881980255 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/2077462290816000177 ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Kurdistan/Three-drones-downed-near-US-Consulate-in-Erbil
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[74] https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/iraq/958915 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq
