Toplines

The United States conducted a wave of strikes in Iran on July 29 in response to Iranian attacks on US forces on July 28. The majority of recorded US airstrikes targeted Iranian military sites in southern Iran, including targets along the Persian Gulf coastline. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that US forces struck dozens of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) targets, including military command centers, missile and drone facilities, coastal surveillance and defense sites, and maritime capabilities to diminish threats that Iran and its proxies pose to US forces, commercial shipping, and neighboring Gulf countries.[1] Iranian media and open-source intelligence accounts on X reported airstrikes across Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Fars, and Bushehr provinces.[2] Local authorities also reported that a US strike targeted a sports hall in Farashband, western Fars Province.[3] Iran previously repurposed sports halls and other civilian sites as military and internal security sites during US and Israeli strikes on Iran in March 2026.[4]

The United States likely struck the IRGC Ground Forces Ansar ol Mahdi Provincial Unit in Zanjan Province in northwestern Iran. The IRGC announced that US strikes killed three IRGC Ground Forces Ansar ol Mahdi Provincial Unit members.[5] IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Units are responsible for countering external and internal threats across population centers and are established to conduct operations independently in times of crisis.[6]

Iranian media also reported that the United States struck an unspecified site in Bandar Anzali on Iran’s northern coastline with the Caspian Sea on July 29.[7] Israel previously struck sites in Bandar Anzali, including facilities to disrupt Russian shipments of military equipment, such as Shahed drones and artillery shells and other munitions, to Iran.[8] Ukraine more recently struck several sanctioned cargo vessels in the Caspian Sea on July 25 that Russia reportedly used to transport military cargo between Russia and Iran.[9] US and Ukrainian intelligence have assessed that Russia may be supporting Iran’s drone capabilities by providing targeting intelligence and Russian-modified drones.[10] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia’s provision of targeting intelligence to Iran would likely improve the accuracy and effectiveness of Iran’s drone and missile attacks.[11]

Iran is attempting to weaken the United States’ resolve to continue the war against Iran by increasing the economic and political costs of ongoing US military operations. Iran possibly conducted or directed the drone attack on a US gas tanker at Damietta Port in northeastern Egypt on July 29.[12] Two Iranian officials did not directly claim the attack but told the New York Times on July 29 that the attack “was designed” to show that global shipping and energy supplies could be disrupted further if Iran chose to escalate.[13] Egyptian authorities initially blamed Iran for the attack, according to the Wall Street Journal.[14] The Houthis denied their involvement in the attack.[15] Iran almost certainly recognizes that the northern Red Sea and Suez Canal corridor provides a viable alternative route for international shipping and energy markets to circumvent Iran’s disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[16] The IRGC has continued to claim attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and threaten to attack any actor that collaborates with the United States to restore shipping through the strait.[17] The Iranian regime is certainly aware of the impact that these reported attacks and threats have on the risk calculations of ship captains and shipping companies, which are generally risk-averse. Iran’s actions to disrupt global shipping and energy markets are part of a concerted effort to increase the economic cost of US military operations in Iran.

Iran also seeks to increase domestic pressure on the US government by inflicting casualties on US forces and material damage to regional bases. Iran has continued to launch ballistic missiles at US forces at Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, including with Emad and Kheybar Shekan missile systems in recent attacks.[18] The IRGC falsely claimed that its missile attacks on July 30 killed several US officers and technical staff and destroyed three F-35s.[19] CENTCOM denied the IRGC’s claim.[20] The IRGC also claimed to have destroyed two drone hangars and a fuel depot at Ali al Salem Base in Kuwait and US facilities at the Sheikh Isa base in Bahrain.[21] Iran’s claims of inflicting civilian and material damage aim to generate an informational effect on the US domestic population and thus increase political pressure on the United States. Iranian attacks on US critical infrastructure aim to achieve a similar effect. US officials told Western media on July 30 that Iran or hackers associated with Iran may have conducted the cyber-attacks on more than 30 water plants in Minnesota, causing mass disruption earlier this week.[22]

Iran is also likely attempting to coerce US partner states into revoking US basing access within the region or in nearby locations from which Iran could be threatened. Expelling US forces from the region is one of Iran’s long-standing strategic objectives. Iran is attempting to rally civilian populations in regional states to pressure their governments to decrease or entirely remove any US force presence from their countries. These attempts also have an informational effect by suggesting to regional leaders that US presence may generate instability for the governments. Iran has repeatedly called on the Jordanian people to “dismantle” US bases in Jordan, for example.[23] The IRGC claimed that it attacked Muwaffaq Salti Air Base on July 30 in part to help the Jordanian people “liberate” Jordan from its “American occupiers.”[24] Regime media also amplified a July 29 New York Times article featuring an open letter from “hundreds” of Jordanian politicians, lawyers, academics, retired officers, and other public figures that called for the removal of US troop presence from Jordan.[25] The Iranian outlet assessed that the letter demonstrated how US troop presence has “exposed” Jordan to “security, political, and economic threats” and increased the risk that Jordan would be drawn into a war that it did not start.[26] The IRGC is simultaneously asserting that US forces and air defense systems cannot protect US troops or bases, almost certainly as part of a broader information operation that portrays US military presence as a source of insecurity for regional states.[27]

Iran also seeks to discourage countries from hosting US forces in the region by inflicting economic damage upon US allies in the region, particularly those in the Gulf. The Kuwait Armed Forces reported on July 30 that an Iranian ballistic missile struck a Chinese company-owned building in northern Kuwait, killing one worker and causing severe material damage.[28] Iran’s attacks on critical and civilian infrastructure likely aim to raise the costs for regional allies of hosting US forces. Iran has repeatedly attacked Kuwaiti power and water desalination facilities in recent weeks, for example.[29]

Saudi Arabia is assembling a multinational “maritime defense coalition” to protect Red Sea shipping from Houthi and Iranian threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[30] The Saudi Defense Ministry held a meeting in Riyadh on July 30 to establish a multinational maritime defense coalition to protect shared maritime interests in the Bab al Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.[31] Representatives from 43 countries attended the meeting, including the United States, the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), the United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey, as well as several Gulf and regional countries.[32] It is unclear whether the United States will join the coalition. Fourteen countries issued a joint statement following the meeting expressing support for the alliance, including the ROYG, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, and Sudan, as well as other African and South Asian countries.[33]

Saudi Arabia likely formed the coalition in response to the July 20 Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia, recent Houthi threats to expand attacks on Saudi infrastructure, and reports that the Houthis may impose transit fees in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandab Strait.[34] The New York Times reported on July 30 that the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia has reduced vessel traffic through the Bab al Mandeb by one-fifth, citing Windward maritime data.[35] The report added that Saudi Arabia has diverted oil shipments from the Bab al Mandeb to the Suez Canal, which increases transit times to Asia by about a month.[36]

The Houthis and Iran will likely view this coalition’s formation as a direct threat to their current regional objectives. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi condemned countries that “pledge allegiance” to Israel and the United States in a speech on July 30, possibly in reference to reports about the Saudi-led maritime coalition.[37] It is unclear when Abdulmalik filmed his message, but rumors about the formation of the coalition began circulating in Western media on July 29. His statement suggests that the Houthis view the coalition as a threat to their blockade of Saudi ports and vessels and the broader Houthi campaign to coerce Saudi Arabia into lifting its blockade of Houthi-controlled ports and airports.[38] Iran will also likely oppose the coalition’s formation because the ongoing Houthi blockade advances Iranian efforts to impose economic costs on the United States and its regional partners to erode US willingness to continue the war with Iran and achieve Iranian strategic objectives, including securing recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz.[39]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are discussing how to respond to recent US-Saudi airstrikes on militia positions in Iraq. The United States and Saudi Arabia struck militia weapons and logistics supply sites across Iraq on July 28 in retaliation for Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[40] An unspecified Iraqi militia leader told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on July 30 that the militias aim to respond within 72 hours.[41] A Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada official added that the militias’ response will be “seismic” and threatened to target US and Saudi interests if military operations, likely against Iraq or Iran, continue.[42] Informed sources told Iraqi media on July 30 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq held a meeting to discuss how the militias should respond, including possibly through retaliatory strikes.[43] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The coalition includes Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, which were the three most kinetically active Iraqi militias in March and April 2026 and share the strongest ideological alignment with Iran.[44] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released a statement on July 29 warning that it will “inevitably” respond after the Arbaeen pilgrimage concludes on August 6, potentially by striking US targets in Saudi Arabia. The statement also demanded an Iraqi government response before the pilgrimage concludes.[45] The Arbaeen pilgrimage is an annual religious pilgrimage in which millions of Shia Muslims walk to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein bin Ali.[46] The militias could also target US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan or in Baghdad. Informed sources told Iraqi media on July 30 that the Iraqi federal government is pressuring the militias to avoid military escalation to avoid security and political repercussions for Iraq.[47]

The Houthis may participate in the Iraqi militias’ response to the US-Saudi strikes.[48] The unspecified Iraqi militia leader speaking to Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media said that the Iraqi militias are consulting with other Axis of Resistance members, including the Houthis, to coordinate a broader regional response to the US-Saudi strikes.[49] Two regional sources told Reuters on July 30 that Saudi Arabia and unspecified regional partners assess that the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia on July 27 from Iraqi territory in coordination with the Iraqi militias and under IRGC supervision.[50] Regional and Western media have repeatedly reported that the IRGC has directed Iraqi militia attacks against the Gulf states in recent months.[51] US-Saudi airstrikes reportedly killed a senior Houthi member on July 29, according to a Yemeni journalist.[52] The Houthis also reportedly established a new operational headquarters in a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold south of Baghdad in order to coordinate with the militias.[53] The Houthis’ ability to launch attacks in the region from Iraqi territory expands the group’s options to obfuscate responsibility for the attacks that it is conducting. Reuters added that Iraq’s large, sparsely populated terrain provides favorable conditions for actors to conduct covert attacks as well as conceal personnel and equipment.[54]

Iraqi authorities have deliberately avoided publicly attributing recent militia attacks against Gulf states to the Iraqi militias due to Iranian pressure and a desire to avoid military escalation, according to Iraqi and Saudi reporting.[55] Informed sources told Iraqi media on July 30 that Iran pressured the Iraqi federal government not to identify the militias responsible for recent attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan and regional countries.[56] Iraqi militias attacked US and foreign targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and regional countries in March and April 2026.[57] The militias have also attacked Gulf countries and possibly tried to attack US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent weeks.[58] The sources added that Iraqi authorities prepared to release the information but instead sought to shift responsibility to other actors.[59] Western diplomatic sources similarly told Saudi media that Iraqi authorities have refrained from acknowledging that recent attacks against Gulf states originated from Iraqi territory to avoid a “premature conflict.” The spokesperson for Commander-In-Chief Major General Sabah al Numan said on July 30 that there is “no evidence” that attacks have been launched from Iraq, for example.[60] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General Jasem al Budaiwi reportedly told the Iraqi federal government that the GCC had evidence proving that attacks on Gulf countries originated from Iraqi territory, according to the Western diplomatic sources speaking to Saudi media.[61] The sources assessed that the militia attacks on Gulf countries in recent months aimed to undermine Iraq’s relations with GCC states, embarrass Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi ahead of his planned visit to Saudi Arabia, and respond to his recent engagement with the United States.[62] Iraqi media reported on July 29 that Zaydi’s visit has been postponed. However, neither the Iraqi federal government nor Saudi Arabia has publicly confirmed the cancellation at the time of this writing.[63] The Iraqi federal government has for years refused to acknowledge that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias take part in these attacks.[64] The federal government accused “outlaws” of conducting the November 2025 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan, a term often used to accuse the militias without explicitly implicating the militias, for example.[65]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using the US-Saudi strikes to reject Baghdad’s disarmament efforts and will likely continue to use a variety of excuses to justify retaining their weapons. The unspecified militia leader speaking to Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on July 30 said that weapons will remain “in the hands of the resistance” and that the recent US-Saudi strikes have ended any discussion of militia disarmament.[66] Unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) sources speaking to Iraqi media on July 30 said that unidentified militias have called on Zaydi to halt government efforts to restrict weapons to the state because the Iraqi state is “incapable of protecting Iraqi lives.”[67] US-Saudi airstrikes killed at least 20 PMF members and injured 32 members, according to the PMF.[68] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes multiple Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[69] An Iraq analyst posted a video on July 30 of PMF Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi sarcastically demanding to know who will disarm the militias of their weapons.[70] The militias have used varying reasons to justify their armament over the years, including the US presence in Iraq — which is set to end in September — and sectarian violence in Syria.[71] The Iraqi federal government launched a disarmament campaign in early June to restrict weapons to the state, largely in response to US pressure.[72] The militias have attempted to circumvent Baghdad’s disarmament efforts by surrendering “older and lower-quality” weapons as well as “scrap” missiles and inoperable drones.[73] Iran has reportedly urged its Iraqi partners to resist disarmament.[74]