Toplines
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sent an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 4 proposing an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline and a face-to-face bilateral meeting in a third country to end the war.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is ready to observe a complete ceasefire during the negotiations process and that the United States can monitor the frontline ceasefire and proposed an “all for all” prisoners of war (POW) exchange.
Russian officials continued to ignore the economic problems and fuel shortages that Russia is facing at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and instead presented a facade of economic stability. Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Maxim Oreshkin stated on the sidelines at SPIEF on June 4 that Russia’s economy has grown by 10 percent over the past three years, while Europe’s economy grew by only three percent in the same period, that Russian unemployment is the lowest in the world, and that there are no failures in the Russian economy.[2] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated on June 4 that the Russian government will soon repay its external debt (debt owed to nonresident debtors) and that Russian real income (an individual’s income after adjusting for inflation rates) grew by more than 24 percent in just over three years.[3] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated that Russia’s largest banks provided a positive forecast for mortgage lending growth at SPIEF.[4] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak claimed on June 4 that the Russian domestic fuel market remains “stable” and gas station prices are rising in line with inflation.[5]
Russia’s economy is doing much worse than Russian officials claimed, however, as the Kremlin prioritizes maintaining the facade of economic stability while also pursuing economically sub-optimal policies thatwill have long-term economic implications. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation.[6] Russia has also been increasingly struggling with liquidity problems and high levels of external debt after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on May 18 that Russia’s federal budget deficit is already almost $80 billion in the first five months of 2026, for example.[8] Russian officials in Belgorod, Kursk, Moscow, and Leningrad oblasts began restricting gasoline sales in recent days in response to increasing gasoline shortages due to a successful Ukrainian intermediate- to long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. [9] Russia’s own shortages may mature in the coming weeks and months.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Russia’s second-largest bank VTB Andrei Kostin told Reuters on June 4that Russia’s economic growth could stagnate this year as high borrowing costs chose capital investment. VTB does not expect the Russian economy to grow by the 0.5 percent that Russian officials are forecasting for 2026.[10] Russian officials at SPIEF are pushing a narrative of a stable and growing economic situation despite growing fuel shortages, increasing debt, and stagnating economic growth as the Kremlin prioritizes funding its war in Ukraine despite the economic costs.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) demonstrated a new battle management information system for Russian forces operating in Ukraine that Russia will likely deploy with international exercise partners during Russia’s Center 2026 strategic command-and-staff exercise in September. The Russian MoD announced on June 3 during a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states defense ministerial meeting in Moscow City that Russia is currently testing a new battle management information system for Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[11] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec presented components of reconnaissance and strike systems, including an information management system that integrates and supports command and control at all levels in a single network from the platoon level to the level of military formations. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed during the CSTO meeting that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) operating in Ukraine is completing combat testing of the newly developed system and that the Russian military command will deploy the system across all GoFs by September 2026. Russian sources claimed in early May that newly appointed Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Shcherbinin began overseeing the development and implementation of a new digital system for tactical situational awareness and commander decision support.[12] Belousov’s rollout date for the system coincides with Russia’s planned main strategic command-and-staff exercise, Center-2026, which is scheduled for September 28 to October 3 and is expected to include over 10 foreign military units, including several CSTO countries.[13] The Russian military command will likely deploy its new information management system during the Center-2026 exercise in September to share best practices in battlefield management and operational experience from the war in Ukraine with CSTO member states, including operationalizing foreign CSTO military contingents under a Russian operational command.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sent an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 4 proposing an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline and a face-to-face bilateral meeting in a third country to end the war.
- Russian officials continued to ignore the economic problems and fuel shortages that Russia is facing at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and instead presented a facade of economic stability.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) demonstrated a new battle management information system for Russian forces operating in Ukraine that Russia will likely deploy with international exercise partners during Russia’s Center 2026 strategic command-and-staff exercise in September.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in Russia on June 4. Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 293 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in Russia on the night of June 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Elastik propellant powder plant of the Gefest-M company in Ryazan Oblast, causing a fire of over 400 square meters.[14]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine’s June 3 strike against the Michurinsk Progress Plant in Tambov Oblast caused a fire covering over 200 square meters.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine’s June 3 strike against the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal destroyed one reservoir and damaged six reservoirs and two technical overpasses.[16] A Ukrainian OSINT source published satellite imagery on June 3 indicating damage to the primarily oil processing unit ELOU-AVT-6, visbreaking equipment, and several tanks and technological platforms at the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast and assessed that the Refinery will likely have to partially or fully suspend activity for some time.[17] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery on May 31.[18]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operation northwest, north and southeast of Sumy City on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Bila Bereza (northwest of Sumy City).[20]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Shevchenka (north of Kharkiv City).[22]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 4 but did not advance.[23]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances.[24]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported June 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian weapons and military equipment concentration point near Novoyehorivka (northeast of Kupyansk, roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline).[25]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 4 but did not advance.[26]
Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a commuter train in occupied Luhansk.[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Lyman direction as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces operating east of Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian forces had previously infiltrated.[28] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Russian forces operating in eastern Lyman after what ISW assessed was a Russian infiltration mission.[29] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[30]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Lyman.[31]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area but did not make confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32]
Evidence of Russian forces operating in Kostyantynivka does not indicate that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in the central part of the city, despite claims from Russian sources. Russian milbloggers claimed on June 3 and 4 that Russian forces advanced in the industrial zone in central Kostyantynivka on both sides of the Kryvyi Torets River and in the residential area in western Kostyantynivka.[33] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger called these claimed advances a Russian semi-encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the residential area in central Kostyantynivka.[34] The milblogger noted, however, that Russian forces operating in this area are unlikely to clear the area soon. ISW has observed Russian infiltrators operating in central Kostyantynivka and western Kostyantynivka.[35] Russian infiltration missions establish a temporary presence in some areas and do not constitute a consolidated forward line. ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces have established a consolidated presence anywhere except the far southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka. ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces are encircling Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.
Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) to Kostyantynivka. A Ukrainian brigade reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian military logistics near Horlivka (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline), a key Russian GLOC to Kostyantynivka.[36]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 4 but did not advance.[37]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations Novopavlivka directions on June 4 but did not advance.[39]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in Danylivka (south of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 3 to 4. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported, and geolocated footage confirms, that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricant tank in occupied Makiivka (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) and transformers in occupied Bulavinske and Vuhlerhirsk (roughly 45 and 40 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near occupied Ocheretyne (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot near occupied Hrintal (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[42] The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military trucks and armored vehicles in occupied Donetsk Oblast and flew over the Donbas Arena in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline).[43]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising Russian flags in Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) subsequently claimed that the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment seized the settlement.[45] Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 4 that Russian forces produced staged videos of a demonstrative nature by showing themselves with flags in Hulyaipilske and that Russian forces have not seized the village.[46] ISW continues to assess that these flag raisings are part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances to falsely portray the Ukrainian line as collapsing across the theater.[47]
Voloshyn reported on June 4 that Russian forces have increased drone and artillery strikes in the Hulyaipole direction and have generally increased offensive tempo, reportedly due to deadlines from the Russian military command.[48]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 2 and June 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in southern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and southern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[49]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as part of their intermediate-range strike campaign. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian fuel and lubricant warehouses near occupied Melitopol (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline).[50] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows smoke rising from a gas station following a Ukrainian drone strike near occupied Melitipol.[51] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian tanker truck near occupied Tarasivka (roughly 56 kilometers from the frontline).[52] A Ukrainian regiment reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces conducted two follow-up strikes on the Russian “Leonid Pestrykov” dry cargo ship in the port of occupied Berdyansk (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) after first striking the ship on June 1, and that the strike significantly damaged the ship, including the ship’s engine room.[53]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 4 but did not advance.[54]
Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian forces from using artillery against Kherson City. The commander of a Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces’ (USF) battalion reported on June 2 that Ukrainian drone strikes have prevented Russian forces from conducting artillery shelling against Kherson City and that Russian forces now mostly conduct drone strikes against the city.[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship near occupied Yurkyne (on the Kerch Peninsula and roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Brovdi reported that the ship is responsible for protecting ports, air defense, and anti-submarine activity. Brovdi reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces struck locomotives near occupied Vladyslavivka and Rozdolne (roughly 240 and 195 kilometers from the frontline, respectively) and a Pantsir-S1 air defense systems near occupied Strilkove (roughly 152 kilometers from the frontline).[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse in occupied Simferopol (roughly 215 kilometers from the frontline).[58]
Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a commuter train in occupied Crimea.[59]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 293 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, Banderol, and Parodiya drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 264 drones, that the missile and 24 drones struck 11 locations, and that debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts.[61]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/vidkritij-list-prezidentu-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-vid-preziden-104769
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/378985; https://t.me/tass_agency/378989
[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/378979 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/379020; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27638123; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27641451
[4] https://t.me/slutsky_l/4835 ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/371259
[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/378991
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/gasoline-shortages-in-occupied-ukraine-show-the-synergy-of-ukraines-long-range-and-mid-range-strike-campaigns/
[10] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russias-vtb-says-china-gulf-countries-started-invest-more-russia-2026-06-04/
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/64252
[12] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/08/05/2026/69fe032f9a794741476fcaca; https://t.me/astrapress/112094; https://t.me/wargonzo/34048; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27857; https://t.me/sashakots/61600;
[13] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1092965
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[17] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21884
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39486; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39483; https://t.me/wargonzo/34607; https://t.me/severnnyi/8289; https://t.me/dva_majors/94043;
[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/213206
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39486 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20830; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39483; https://t.me/wargonzo/34607; https://t.me/severnnyi/8289; https://t.me /rybar/80809; https://t.me/dva_majors/94043; https://t.me/hart_brigade/1069;
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/213199
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39483; https://t.me/wargonzo/34607; https://t.me/dva_majors/94043; https://t.me/grvZapad/18760;
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[26] https://t.me/grvZapad/18760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39483
[27] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/5110
[28] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2062312749171081219; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2062312751322779782; https://t.me/okovsevidyashee/3097
[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12085; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2062195382038176082; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1316543023900217
[30] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2062485507175579710; https://t [dot] me/shock3OA/7306; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062440138496446740; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062440405510033716; https://t [dot] me/OMSBr_123/2176
[31] https:// t.me/wargonzo/34607
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12086; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DZHGQrhCEzq
[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/34607; https://t.me/rybar/80802 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43824
[34] https://t.me/rybar/80802
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/04/vse-shho-zayizhdzhaye-tam-i-zgoraye-gorlivka-pid-vognevyj-kontrol-lyczariv/; https://t.me/ombr_28/3075
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39486 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39483
[38] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2062239425342361909;
https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2062239429528277258;
https://t.me/rotafavorit/581
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39486 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39483
[40] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062423898939916469;
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062424210455073017;
https://t.me/BBS_110/667; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12090
[41] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2436; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2062503420821442612?s=20; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2062503423036064126?s=20; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2062503425602974123?s=20
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[43] https://t.me/ab3army/7159
[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062453304924242310;
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062455175512539465;
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062456529610039807;
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062458163543027972;
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2062458658462519568;
https://t.me/voin_dv/19717;
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/64265 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64266
[46] http://ukrinform. dot ua/amp/rubric-ato/4130586-volosin-informacia-pro-vzatta-pid-kontrol-gulajpilskogo-vorozij-fejk.html
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/04/provalyly-odni-dedlajny-yim-postavyly-nastupni-okupantiv-na-pivdni-zhenut-v-ataky-strokamy/; https://youtu.be/n7iUcOMVSz4?t=711
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12088; https://t.me/intelligencecompany/242; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2062243515409588596; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2062447110558040274; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2062235304832979118; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2062235308687597679; https://t.me/BDK022/443 ; https://t.me/BDK022/443
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[51] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2062426804057518419 ; https://t.me/riamelitopolua/87396
[52] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2062218472273100895;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2062218953007477087; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/942
[53] https://t.me/luftwaffe422/944; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36208
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39518
[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/03/vtratyly-garmaty-perejshly-na-drony-rosijsku-artyleriyu-vybyly-pid-hersonom/; https://youtu.be/nrKTQq6VZO4
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/04/sbs-atakuvaly-korabel-rosiyan-gorlivku-kontrolyuyut-drony-okupantu-zapalyly-zad-strim/; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2436
[57] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2436; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2062503415884689416?s=20; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2062503418426478803?s=20 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/04/storozhovyj-korabel-ppo-lokomotyvy-sbs-urazyly-nyzku-vorozhyh-czilej-v-operatyvnij-glybyni/; https://t.me/dva_majors/94057 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2062474361794113678 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/4583038721915182; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1322959-sili-bezpilotnih-sistem-urazili-vnoci-u-krimu-storozovij-korabel-lokomotivi-i-radiotehnicnu-sistemu-bliznoi-navigacii/; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2062513932191903820;
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39517
[59] https://t.me/Aksenov82/9647 ; https://t.me/Aksenov82/9647
[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/63867
[61] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29573 ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1322655-unaslidok-ataki-rf-na-cernigivsini-poskodzeni-zaliznicni-kolii-sonacni-paneli-budinki-transport/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2925570347787762 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1322677-udar-po-patipoverhivci-u-pavlogradi-na-dnipropetrovsini-so-vidbuvaetsa-ni-misci-ataki-stanom-na-ranok-4-cervna/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/22516 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4064 ; https://t.me/synegubov/22514; https://t.me/synegubov/22515; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16533; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1322663-ataka-droniv-na-odesinu-4-cervna-poskodzeno-obekt-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10396; https://t.me/kyivoda/49775; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1322665-e-poranenij-rosiani-atakuvali-kiivsinu-bezpilotnikami/
