Toplines
A leaked European intelligence report highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasing concern over his personal safety and the safety of his senior officials. Western and Russian opposition sources reported on May 4, citing the intelligence report, that Russian security forces have increased security measures as Putin fears possible assassination attempts, including targeted drone strikes.[1] The intelligence report noted that Putin spends most of his time in underground bunkers in Krasnodar Krai and has stopped going to his residences in Moscow Oblast and Valdai, Novgorod Oblast. The intelligence report also cited sources in Russia familiar with Putin as stating that the recent internet shutdowns in Moscow City were at least partially related to Putin’s security and anti-drone protection.[2] The intelligence report stated that Putin amended Federal Protective Service (FSO) regulations to provide security to 10 high-ranking generals after a December 2025 meeting of security officials in which the officials shifted blame onto each other for the December 22 assassination of Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff’s Operational Training Department, in Moscow City.[3]
ISW has observed corroborating evidence of enhanced security measures for Putin and high-ranking Russian officials. There have been numerous assassinations and assassination attempts against high-ranking Russian officials throughout the war, some of which have been credited to Ukraine, that could be pushing Putin to worry about his safety and the safety of other senior officials.[4] ISW has also observed reports between May 2023 and December 2025 of Russian authorities moving an increased number of short and medium-range air defense systems, including Pantsir-S1 and S-400 systems, near Putin’s Valdai and Moscow City residences.[5] Ukraine has also been increasing the range, intensity, and frequency of its long-range drone strike campaign, including a drone strike against Moscow City on May 4 that damaged the Mosfilm Tower.[6]
ISW has not observed independent evidence to support other aspects of the leaked intelligence report about Putin’s fears of a coup attempt in Russia. The European intelligence report portrayed former Russian Defense Minister and current Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu as “associated with the risk of a coup.”[7] CNN, which obtained the intelligence report, noted that it does not provide evidence to support these claims.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Alexander Chayko to the position of commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) after recent domestic criticisms of Russian air defense and air campaign failures. A source close to the Russian MoD told Russian outlet RBK on May 4 that the Russian MoD appointed Chayko commander-in-chief of the VKS, replacing General Viktor Afzalov.[8] Chayko served as the chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and September to December 2022.[9] Chayko was one of the commanders responsible for Russian strikes targeting Syrian civilians and critical infrastructure throughout the Russian intervention in the Syria Civil War in 2015.[10] Chayko subsequently served as commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD) between February 24, 2022 and May 26, 2022, and oversaw Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv City.[11] Chayko also commanded Russian forces responsible for widespread violence against civilians in Kyiv Oblast, including in Bucha.[12] The Russian MoD again appointed Chayko as the commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in December 2024 during the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.[13] Russian business newspaper Kommersant recently reported that Chayko then became the deputy chief of the General Staff at an unspecified time.[14] Chayko’s latest appointment as commander-in-chief of the VKS comes amidst recent Russian milblogger criticism of VKS failures, including poor targeting practices and aircraft and maintenance personnel shortages.[15] Russian milbloggers have also long criticized Russian air defenses for failing to prevent Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia.[16] Chayko was the first military district commander whom Putin removed from his post at the start of the full-scale invasion, and his latest appointment is consistent with Putin’s pattern of rotating commanders with poor performance rather than outright dismissing them.[17]
Russian forces first infiltrated into the outskirts of Kostyantynivka in late October 2025 but have yet to achieve meaningful operational progress in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Western media sources recently reported that fighting has reached the outskirts of the city.[18] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated in 10.14 percent of Kostyantynivka and advanced in only 0.7 percent of its eastern outskirts. Russian forces first infiltrated the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka on October 24, 2025, and have failed to make even tactically significant gains in the subsequent six months despite numerous exaggerated claims from senior Russian officials about alleged Russian successes in the city.[19] Russian milbloggers have offered criticism of these exaggerated claims and noted the slow tempo of Russian progress in Kostyantynivka.[20] Russian forces also conducted two mechanized assaults near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) in April 2026 that did not result in tactically significant gains.[21]
ISW continues to assess that Russia’s priority objective is to seize the Fortress Belt, including Kostyantynivka, but the Russian military command appears to be choosing to reinforce the Pokrovsk direction instead.[22] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 4 that the Russian military command has redeployed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), including of its 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th and 429th motorized rifle regiments, and 30th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, to Pokrovsk.[23] The deputy commander added that the Russian military command plans to also redeploy the 90th Tank Division’s 80th Tank Regiment and an unspecified motorized rifle brigade to the Pokrovsk direction and that the estimated strength of the redeployed forces is up to 3,000 servicemembers. ISW has observed elements of the 90th Tank Division operating in the Novopavlivka direction since early 2025 and in the Oleksandrivka direction since late 2025.[24] The Russian military command previously redeployed elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]) from near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya to the Hulyaipole direction in early March 2026, likely to reorient all EMD elements in the Eastern Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility (AoR).[25] The redeployment of the 90th Tank Division may be an attempt to reorient CMD elements into the Central Grouping of Forces’ AoR after the redeployment of the 68th AC.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared a unilateral ceasefire on the night of May 5 to 6 in response to Russian rhetoric regarding a May 9 “Victory Day” ceasefire, urging Russian forces to reciprocate.[26] Zelensky stated on May 4 that Ukraine has not received an official Russian appeal about a Victory Day ceasefire but will unilaterally enact a ceasefire starting at midnight on the night of May 5 to 6. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will maintain the ceasefire if Russia reciprocates it. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed on April 29 that Russian President Vladimir Putin used a phone call with US President Donald Trump to call for a short-term ceasefire for the May 9 Victory Day holiday, which celebrates the Soviet Union’s role in the victory over Germany in the Second World War.[27]
Swedish authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on May 3. The Swedish Police Authority and Swedish Coast Guard boarded the Jin Hui oil tanker southwest of Trelleborg, Sweden, on May 3.[28] Swedish officials identified the ship as part of the Russian shadow fleet.[29] Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Jin Hui was sailing under a Syrian flag and was in the port of Limas, Turkey, from April 11 to 16 before sailing toward the Baltic Sea. A spokesperson for the Swedish Coast Guard stated on May 4 that Swedish authorities initiated a criminal investigation into the lack of the ship’s seaworthiness.[30] The Jin Hui is on the European Union’s (EU), the United Kingdom’s (UK), and Ukraine’s sanctions lists.[31] ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued European efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[32] European states, and Sweden in particular, have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in recent months.[33]
Key Takeaways
- A leaked European intelligence report highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasing concern over his personal safety and the safety of his senior officials.
- ISW has not observed independent evidence to support other aspects of the leaked intelligence report about Putin’s fears of a coup attempt in Russia.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Alexander Chayko to the position of commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) after recent domestic criticisms of Russian air defense and air campaign failures.
- Russian forces first infiltrated into the outskirts of Kostyantynivka in late October 2025 but have yet to achieve meaningful operational progress in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared a unilateral ceasefire on the night of May 5 to 6 in response to Russian rhetoric regarding a May 9 “Victory Day” ceasefire, urging Russian forces to reciprocate.
- Swedish authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on May 3.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on the frontline.
- Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 234 drones toward Ukraine during the day on May 3, and 155 drones overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for Ukrainian strikes in Russia.
Satellite imagery provided an additional battle damage assessment (BDA) of the April 23 Ukrainian strike against the Gorky oil pumping station in Neshikha, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[34] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst assessed on May 4 that satellite imagery confirms the destruction of two fuel tanks with a capacity of 50,000 cubic meters, damage to filtration equipment, and likely damage to storage facilities at the pumping station.[35]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 4 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked northeast of Sumy City.[36]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on May 4 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[37] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on May 4 that Russian forces continue to unsuccessfully deploy small infantry groups for assault operations, using motorcycles, electric scooters and buggy-type vehicles.[38]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 4.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults southeast of Kupyansk and in the Borova direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[40]
Geolocated footage published on May 3 visually confirms Ukrainian mid to long-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of May 2 to 3. Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Tor air defense system northwest of occupied Kreydyane (roughly 111 kilometers from the frontline), a P-18 radar system southwest of occupied Herasivka (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline), and a Russian repair base in occupied Kadiivka (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline).[41] ISW reported on these strikes in its May 3 update.[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances. Geolocated footage posted on May 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the Donetska Railway southeast of Lyman after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[43]
Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Slovyansk direction and conducted counterattacks, contrary to Russian claims.[44] Geolocated footage posted on May 4 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in a forested area east of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of Rai-Oleksandrivka despite Russian claims.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on May 4 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[46]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dobropillya direction on May 4 but did not advance.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations and conducted a marginal infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction on May 4, but did not advance.[48] Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[49]
The Russian military command may be preparing to intensify offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction by regrouping Russian forces in the area and establishing drone control points in northwestern Pokrovsk to gain control of the low-altitude tactical airspace. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 4 that the Russian military command is attempting to intensify assaults in the area of responsibility of the Russian 2nd (Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st (Southern Military District [SMD]) combined arms armies (CAAs) by regrouping forces and means in the direction.[50] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command redeployed several detachments of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to the Pokrovsk direction, which have been installing Russian equipment and establishing drone control points at elevated locations in urban areas of northwestern Pokrovsk, striking Ukrainian logistics, and providing aerial cover for Russian infantry during assault operations.
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 4 but did not advance.[53]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Hulyaipole direction on May 4 but did not advance.[54]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations and airstrikes in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 4 but did not advance.[55]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 4, including in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[56]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted missile strikes and a large-scale drone strike against Ukraine during the day on May 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 234 Shahed (including jet-propelled), Gerbera, Italmas, Parodiya, and other drones over the course of the day.[57] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 175 drones. ISW previously reported that Russian forces have begun launching daytime strike packages, in addition to overnight strikes, in what ISW assesses is an effort to maximize visibility for long-range strikes and disrupt civilian and commercial activity.[58]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 155 Shahed (including jet-propelled), Gerbera, Italmas, Parodiya, and other drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[59] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 135 drones, that 14 drones struck 10 locations, and that downed debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and non-residential infrastructure in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts.[60] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck residential and commercial infrastructure in Merefa, Kharkiv Oblast midmorning on May 4, likely with an Iskander-M ballistic missile, killing seven and injuring 35 people.[61]
Russian forces are increasingly targeting gas stations in Kharkiv City to disrupt civilian life. Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on May 4 that Russian forces struck gas stations in Kharkiv City 15 times between April 27 and May 3.[62] Terekhov stated that Russian forces are attempting to generate fear amongst Kharkiv City residents but that the strikes have not caused a fuel shortage. Ukrainian petroleum products market expert Leonid Kosyanchuk stated that Ukrainian gas stations cannot effectively defend themselves against Russian strikes due to the hazard posed by flammable ammunition fragments and debris, and that targeting gas stations has a greater psychological impact than targeting commercial warehouses and depots.[63]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.ft.com/content/fe70c89e-b5d7-4f89-8eb4-83afbe721d7c?accessToken=zwAAAZ30v2qYkdP-cMietddPidOOtIOvvnIdfA.MEYCIQCT9hiOZ1JrGWoeqv1IY81ZTLpfo1e7EjYmRt1awpllfgIhAK9JP-F5WvT8OO2V0xP_i-dVt-nVPRLyHTlSPrOfI55f&sharetype=gift&token=083d0dcc-2f90-47be-abc6-165f91d1dcac&syn-25a6b1a6=1; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2026/05/04/vladimir-putin-fear/index.html
[2] https://www.ft.com/content/fe70c89e-b5d7-4f89-8eb4-83afbe721d7c?accessToken=zwAAAZ30S-IwkdP-cMietddPidOOtIOvvnIdfA.MEUCIQDa0b9ujfrD78ZPZbgOqKRcMyC25q_RxVnkrr4ApfGKrAIgJrX4CmJ_X9N3Snck-2U72cw06CeChkH7GTvNNBODEtQ&sharetype=gift&token=083d0dcc-2f90-47be-abc6-165f91d1dcac&syn-25a6b1a6=1
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-19/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_12-14/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[6] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2051067748684382661 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/51318 ; https://x.com/jembobineuse/status/2051070915195081086; https://t.me/astrapress/111507; https://t.me/astrapress/111510; https://t.me/astrapress/111511; https://t.me/astrapress/111522; https://t.me/idelrealii/45008
[7] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2026/05/04/vladimir-putin-fear/index.html; https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/04/europe/putin-russia-security-intelligence-intl
[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/04/05/2026/69f868af9a7947dd750ab765?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2F
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-1-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Russian20General20Officer20Guide20ISW20May2011202022.pdf
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-26/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-18/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-32/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/The-Russian-Military-Forecasting-the-Threat.pdf
[12] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-middle-east-government-and-politics-e3756976cf33cf5de29aa62d61ea7eb6
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-1-2024/
[14] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8635284
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/; https://t.me/rybar/79947; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/268698; https://t.me/bomber_fighter/25120
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-23/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-18/
[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fighting-reaches-outskirts-ukraines-stronghold-kostiantynivka-2026-05-02/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/
[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/04/dyviziya-povnistyu-sterlasya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zavodyat-u-bij-svoyi-rezervy/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[26] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2051372128637800760?s=20
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/
[28] https://www.facebook.com/100064878962788/posts/1439129511593001/?rdid=3Hs2rD4CJwsoTzj3#
[29] https://x.com/SwedishPM/status/2050984348934107420?s=20; https://x.com/CarlOskar/status/2050930485560238182
[30] https://www.svt dot se/nyheter/lokalt/skane/kustbevakningen-bordat-fartyg-utanfor-trelleborg
[31] https://x.com/CarlOskar/status/2050930485560238182; https://war-sanctions.gur.gov dot ua/en/transport/ships/1378 ; https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk/designations/RUS3403/Ships; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R2618
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2026/
[35] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7500
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/209325; https://t.me/dva_majors/92396; https://t.me/wargonzo/33960; https://t.me/severnnyi/7859; https://t.me/severnnyi/7861;
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152; https://t.me/severnnyi/7859; https://t.me/dva_majors/92396; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15492; https://t.me/wargonzo/33960; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/209325
[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/04/nihto-yizhi-ne-skydav-ale-buly-doshhi-poblyzu-vovchanska-okupanty-zbyrayut-vodu-z-kalyuzh/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/dva_majors/92396; https://t.me/motopatriot78/51389; https://t.me/wargonzo/33960; https://t.me/gvZapad/18465; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/20019; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/209283
[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51389
[41] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2300; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2050944941723979869; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35392; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2050951283532501315
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/
[43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11830; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1704780610708174
[44] https://t.me/rybar/79977 ; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/20016
[45] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2051234814418723202; https://t.me/shock3OA/6701
[46] https://t.me/rybar/79979 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42652 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/22870 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/92396 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152; https://t.me/dva_majors/92396; https://t.me/wargonzo/33960; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/114395;
[49] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2051014837724217647; https://t.me/ombr_155/1333
[50] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18wEK8enT4/
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152
[52] https://t.me/zovpobedy/17897
[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/19411 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/114395 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/92396 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13910 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128
[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/19411 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33960 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/04/shturmuye-hvylya-za-hvyleyu-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-vorog-namagayetsya-izolyuvaty-pidrozdily-syl-oborony/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13910 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38152; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13910; https://t.me/wargonzo/33960
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38128; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38130; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13910
[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/61223
[58] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026
[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/61254
[60] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/62984 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/39340
[61] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28623 ; https://t.me/synegubov/21536 ; https://t.me/synegubov/21529 ; https://t.me/synegubov/21520 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/62992 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missile-attack-kills-five-ukraines-kharkiv-region-officials-say-2026-05-04/
[62] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3896
[63] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1304927-comu-rosia-atakue-azs-u-harkovi-ci-zahistat-ih-miski-z-piskom-ta-ci-moze-palne-zdorozcati-cerez-udari-dumka-eksperta/
