Ukraine Project

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2025

Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones ... [but] remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment

A small group of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2025

Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating. This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.

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