Iran Project

An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) commander, Iranian security officials, and Hamas leadership discussed capitalizing on Israeli unrest in a three-hour meeting in mid-July, according to an Iranian diplomat and a Hamas source who spoke with Reuters.

Bolivian Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo Aguilar expressed interest in purchasing Iranian drones on July 25. CTP previously assessed that Iran may seek to sell drones to Bolivia as part of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that the two signed on July 20.

The Raisi administration seeks to bolster electricity cooperation with Russia. Connecting Iran’s electricity grid to Russia’s could increase domestic stability in Iran.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with newly-appointed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24.

1. Iranian media and officials highlighted the addition of the Abu Mahdi land attack cruise missile to Iran’s naval arsenal to signal Iran’s longer-range naval capabilities.
2. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called on BRICS to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela in this organization as part of its effort to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance.”
3. Iranian students are planning protests in early September in commemoration of Mahsa Amini’s killing on September 18, 2022. Iranian leadership has voiced concerns about the resumption of anti-regime protests in recent weeks.

The buildup of Iranian-backed forces in eastern Syria is possibly causing local anti-Iran and anti-Shia discontent.

The Iranian state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) launched an Azeri language section on July 21, likely to shape domestic Azerbaijani public opinion as Iran grapples with its concerns about the Caucasus becoming an arena for foreign interference.

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for greater cyber security cooperation among BRICS countries during a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24. Iran may seek to bolster cyber security cooperation with BRICS countries to confront cyber-attacks and negative Western media narratives about Iran more effectively.

Iranian-backed militias transferred air defense weapons to eastern Syria, which likely will jeopardize the US-led International Coalition mission to defeat ISIS.

Iran expanded judicial cooperation with Syria, likely as part of a policy of building institutional links with regional allies.

CIA Director William Burns stated on July 20 that Russian technicians are assisting with the Iranian Space Launch Vehicle and missile program inside Iran. Russian assistance could advance Iran’s development of inter-continental ballistic missiles and a military space program that would enhance Iran’s intelligence gathering capabilities.

BRICS has invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to attend its 15th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in late August.

Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating military operations in eastern Syria likely as part of a coercive campaign to expel the United States from Syria. Iran and the Syrian regime have surged forces and materiel to eastern Syria since July 7 under the auspices of defending against a rumored US- Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) offensive into regime-controlled territory. They have done so despite statements from the SDF to Syrian officials and Russian officials that its actions in eastern Syria are non-emergency operations to eliminate ISIS cells. The surge of Iranian and Syrian forces to eastern Syria has occurred through greater coordination with Russia, which began last November when Iran, Russia, and Syria agreed to establish a “coordination center” for a campaign to expel US forces from Syria. An unspecified US DoD official asserted that recent aggressive Russian military activity aimed at US forces in Syria is part of that campaign.

Iran and Russia are amplifying rumors of International Coalition attacks into Syrian regime territory likely as part of a campaign to expel US forces from Syria.

The British Secret Intelligence Service revealed on July 19 that Iran seeks to acquire cash from Russia in return for Iranian drones.

The IRGC Ground Forces conducted a military exercise near Iran’s border with Azerbaijan on July 19. Iranian officials have articulated a series of demands against Azerbaijan, which largely focus on Baku halting its anti-Iran cooperation with Israel and Turkey.

1. Russia accused the United States of preparing false flag chemical weapons attacks against Syria, possibly supporting the joint Russian-Syrian-Iranian pressure campaign to expel US forces from the country.
2. Hamas’ militant wing in Jenin ambushed an Israeli military vehicle with a Shawath-1 explosively formed penetrator (EFP) during the Jenin raid on July 3, leading to the injury of seven Israeli soldiers. The Axis of Resistance likely aims to raise the costs of Israeli ground operations in the West Bank through the proliferation of EFPs.
3. Iran is pursuing a tit-for-tat policy with respect to seizing commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf.
4. Iranian Economic and Financial Affairs Minister Ehsan Khandouzi traveled to Beijing, China to attend the first Iran-China Joint Cooperation Commission meeting on July 16.

A US senior defense official said Iran, Russia, and Syria are cooperating to pressure the US to withdraw forces from Syria. This is consistent with CTP’s assessment that Iran’s military buildup in eastern Syria may be to achieve hegemony.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al Sudani met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on July 16 to discuss economic, security, and normalization issues. The improvement of Iraqi-Syrian relations through joint economic integration projects very likely would enable Iran to exploit regional trade to improve its economy and bolster Iranian regional influence.

Senior Iranian and Pakistani military officials met in Tehran between July 15 and 17. The meetings likely regard the volatile security situation in southeastern Iran, where Jaish al Adl conducted an attack on July 8.

Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan. Iran may expand its military support to Armenia in response to Russian “negligence” toward the Caucasus.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) resumed the country-wide deployment of its morality patrol officers to enforce mandatory veiling on July 16.

Iranian-backed militias raised salaries for standard militia members in Mayadin and Albu Kamal Cities, Deir ez Zor Province by 13 percent on July 13, likely enabling Iran to maintain a competitive advantage in recruitment amid increasing troop deployments to the province.

Popular Mobilization Force (PMF)-affiliated social media accounts that circulated calls to storm the US Embassy on July 14 prompted two small demonstrations of Ashab al Kahf protesters in the Jadiriyah District and al Kahdra neighborhood of Baghdad.

President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe between July 12-14 as part of his administration’s intensifying economic diplomacy efforts.

Senior security and foreign policy officials are articulating the regime’s comprehensive perspective on threats emanating from the Caucasus.

Iranian-backed militias are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province, possibly to bolster defensive positions against a rumored International Coalition attack.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced the Iraqi government will evade US sanctions on Iran by trading Iraqi crude oil for Iranian gas during a televised statement on July 11.

Social media accounts affiliated with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces called for supporters to siege the US Embassy in Baghdad, which could elevate the risk of an attack on US personnel in Iraq.

Iranian officials and media responded negatively to the July 10 Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint statement, highlighting preexisting tensions in the Russo-Iranian relationship.

The Raisi administration is attempting to override parliamentary adjustments to its mandatory veiling bill. Regime enforcement of mandatory veiling—in any capacity—will likely exacerbate intra-regime tensions. It will also likely reignite anti-regime sentiments.