Toplines
The PRC may have provided targeting intelligence to support a recent, large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) stated that two PRC satellites—the Yaogan 33-03 and Yaogan 33-04—orbited over western Ukraine at the same time as a large-scale Russian strike targeting the western city of Lviv on October 5.[1] Western media and US think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) claim that the PRC’s Yaogan satellites provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with space-based reconnaissance, though the PRC claims they are for environmental management and agricultural purposes.[2] The SZRU stated that the PRC likely used the Yaogan satellites to provide targeting support for the Russian strike on Lviv.[3] ISW noted at the time of the strike that Russian forces experimented with different flight trajectories to reduce the effectiveness of the Ukranian-operated Patriot air defense systems.[4] The PRC continues to frame itself as a neutral party working for peace in Ukraine.[5]
This support to Russian forces could provide the PLA some critical operational experience that it currently lacks. The PLA has placed tremendous emphasis in recent years on the need to fight “informatized warfare,” which involves fielding a well-networked force and emphases efforts trying to achieve information superiority or even dominance.[6] PLA writings stress the need to closely integrate space-based capabilities and long range, precision fires to conduct informatized warfare.[7] The PLA views those capabilities are critical to target enemy command, control, communications, and computers and thereby disrupt the enemy ability to conduct joint operations.
Ukraine has previously accused the PRC of supplying Russia with military equipment despite claiming that it is neutral in the war.[8] Ukraine also claimed in April 2025 that 155 PRC nationals were fighting in the Russian military. PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas that the PRC cannot accept a Russian defeat in Ukraine.[9] The PRC has a strategic interest in enabling the Russian war effort in Ukraine to keep United States’ and its allies’ attention divided between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.[10]
The PRC has reportedly expanded one of its “mock Taipei” training grounds in Inner Mongolia. PLA training using a model of Taipei signals its increasing commitment to realism in its military exercises. The Japanese Institute for National Fundamentals published evidence of a new “mock Judicial Yuan” and an underground tunnel linking it to an existing “mock Presidential Office” in Inner Mongolia, PRC, on October 1.[11] Japanese media reported that these new training facilities may serve to prepare PLA forces for a decapitation operation against Taiwanese leadership.[12] The facilities, located at the Zhurihe military base, featured in live military exercises in 2015 and 2022. The training ground has reportedly expanded nearly threefold since 2020.[13] US military reporting confirmed the expansion of the site between 2020 and 2021, with satellite imagery revealing additional buildings over time.[14] An unnamed Taiwanese defense official said that Taiwan’s military has fortified the neighborhood around the Presidential Office, the Bo’ai Special District, with missile, artillery, and anti-drone systems following the emergence of the Japanese report.[15]
Taiwanese and Western media have previously tracked PLA efforts to create at least two “mock Taipei” training grounds in recent years.[16] CDOT-ISW satellite imagery shows two separate sites in Inner Mongolia: one smaller replica and one to-scale, which accurately reflects the street system of the neighborhood surrounding Taipei’s government buildings.[17] The Institute for National Fundamentals reported on construction developments at the smaller replica. The PRC likely built these sites to signal its readiness to both Taiwan and to domestic audiences, in addition to training military personnel. The PLA has made realistic military exercises a central focus in recent years.[18] CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has specifically instructed the PLA to improve the realism of its training since at least 2018.[19] The PLA has maintained at least three urban warfare training sites: Zhurihe, a site at Jiangsu, and a possible site at Yanshan.[20]
Key Takeaways
- PLA modernization: The PRC may have provided targeting intelligence via satellite to support a recent, large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine. This support could provide the PLA with some critical operational experience that it currently lacks. The PLA has emphasized the need to use space-based reconnaissance and long-range and precision strikes in modern warfare.
- PLA modernization: The PLA has expanded one of its “mock Taipei” training grounds in Inner Mongolia. The expansion of that site reflects PLA efforts to make military exercises increasingly realistic and better prepare the force for combat around Taipei in particular. The PRC may also use the expansion of the site to further intimidate Taiwanese leaders and the public.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The number of Taiwanese citizens reported missing, detained, or under travel restrictions in the PRC in 2025 has nearly tripled since 2024. The PRC illegally detains Taiwanese citizens to reinforce its false claims of jurisdiction over Taiwan. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) recorded 133 new cases of missing, detained, or movement restricted Taiwanese citizens since January 2025, according to MAC Minister Chiu Chui-cheng on October 2.[21] MAC Deputy Minister and spokesperson Liang Wen-chieh clarified during a press conference later that day that Taiwanese families had reported an additional 24 cases to the MAC in September 2025, bringing the total number of new cases to 157.[22] This represents a dramatic increase from the 55 cases reported in 2024.[23]
The MAC has maintained a travel warning since June 2024 urging Taiwanese citizens to avoid nonessential travel to the PRC, where authorities have arbitrarily held Taiwanese travelers without formal charges.[24] The PRC has also illegally detained some Taiwanese citizens and held them incommunicado, tried them in closed-door trials, and prevented them from returning to Taiwan even after finishing their prison sentences in the PRC through an additional punishment that the PRC refers to as “deprivation of political rights.”[25] The PRC uses forced deportations, arbitrary detentions, and “deprivation of political rights” to demonstrate its claimed authority over the Taiwanese people and to shape international perspectives on its claim over Taiwan.[26]
A senior Taiwanese delegation attended the Warsaw Security Forum on September 29 and 30, signaling growing interest in defense cooperation between Taiwan and friendly countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Minister Lin Chia-lung was the first in his position to attend the forum.[27] Only one Taiwanese official participated in the forum in 2024.[28] Lin oversaw the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Community of Democracies (CoD).[29] The CoD is a non-governmental organization aiming to combat foreign interference and information operations that undermine the security of democratic states.[30] Taiwanese cooperation with the CoD is an important step toward strengthening the Taiwanese connection to friendly European countries, such as Poland.[31]
Taiwanese National Security Council adviser Hsu Szu-chien and Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense Deputy Chief of Intelligence Lieutenant General Hsieh Jih-sheng attended the Warsaw Forum and highlighted avenues for collaboration with Europe in light strengthening ties between the PRC and Russia. Hsieh said that Taiwan “sincerely hopes Ukraine wins” its conflict with Russia to deter PRC aggression against Taiwan.[32] Hsieh also warned of a two-front crisis of coordinated aggression in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.[33] Hsu called for increased European support for Taiwanese national security in light of growing PRC-Russia cooperation. Hsu specifically emphasized collaboration on drone technology to aid Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.[34] CDOT-ISW has reported that Taiwan is enhancing its efforts to provide an alternative to PRC drone components to create a “democratic” supply chain.[35]
Hsu and Hsieh discussed commonalities between PRC and Russian coercion against Taiwan and Europe, respectively. Hsu compared the PRC aerial incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace.[36] CDOT-ISW has reported extensively on PRC coercive activities to erode Taiwan’s military readiness and threat awareness.[37] Lieutenant General Hsieh noted Taiwan’s significant experience in countering PRC harassment, which Europe can use to address Russian drone incursions and information operations.[38] The Warsaw Security Forum released a summary report of the 2025 proceedings that highlighted Europe’s overreliance on the PRC for defense technology components and noted the deleterious effect that a Taiwan Strait contingency could have on European security.[39]
The participation of high-level Taiwanese officials and a uniformed officer at the forum illustrates growing Taiwanese and Polish interest in security cooperation with one another. Government officials from Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the United Kingdom, and the United States spoke at the forum alongside Taiwanese officials.[40] The forum further showed that Europe and Taiwan face common security concerns that may provide avenues for stronger ties between the two.
The Kuomintang’s (KMT) selected legislators for the Legislative Yuan (LY) Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee could stifle President William Lai Ching-te’s efforts to increase defense spending. The KMT nominated LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu as a member of the committee and legislator Ma Wen-chun as Committee convener. Han and Ma are both “deep Blue” politicians, referring to their hardline KMT stances. Han and Ma have both served on the Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee in past legislative sessions, and their renewed nominations likely indicate a consistent KMT stance on foreign and defense policy.
The Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee is responsible for reviewing draft legislation concerning diplomatic and national security-related legislation before the entire LY votes on it.[41] Committee conveners determine the agenda for committee meetings.[42] Committees have the authority to freeze or withhold funds if the LY is dissatisfied with government spending of allocated funds. Ma’s position would give her significant authority over Taiwan’s defense spending and related legislation, which could inhibit Taiwan’s ability to increase its defense spending to the extent desired by the Lai administration. The KMT-led LY passed sweeping cuts and freezes to the Taiwanese national budget in February 2025, including approximately 30 percent of the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) budget.[43]
The MND submitted to the Executive Yuan a draft of a record-high special defense budget bill worth approximately 33 billion US dollars on September 13.[44] The special budget will go to the LY if the Executive Yuan approves it. The Ma-led Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee may delay or otherwise inhibit the passage of the special budget as written before the LY votes on it based on previous KMT behavior. Failure to pass this special budget would impair Taiwan’s ability to enhance its military capabilities. This would occur amidst increased pressure by the United States to increase Taiwanese military spending and pervasive PRC coercion and military incursions.
Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te called upon US President Donald Trump to deter a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) condemned Lai’s statements in a notable rhetorical escalation. Lai appeared on the US conservative podcast Clay and Buck, saying that US President Donald Trump should win a Nobel Peace Prize if he successfully deters CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping from staging an invasion of Taiwan.[45] Lai used the podcast to make statements relevant to Taiwan’s defense, saying that Taiwan and the PRC are “not subordinate to each other” and that Taiwan hopes to preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait.[46]
An October 8 TAO readout accused Lai of “fawning” over foreign powers and acting “servilely” towards them.[47] The PRC regularly accuses Lai and the DPP of “separatist provocation,” part of an ongoing narrative to frame Taiwan as an aggressor and promote “reunification.” The PRC also frequently accuses the DPP of reliance on “foreign powers” and criticizes Lai as a provocateur. The TAO’s statements mark a rhetorical escalation from previous comments, however. The intensity of the TAO’s comments reflects PRC efforts to isolate Taiwan from international partners, specifically by condemning Taiwan’s participation in foreign media.
Northeast Asia
Japan
Sanae Takaichi was elected as the 29th president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on October 4. Takaichi could face difficulties being elected prime minister since the October 10 dissolution of the LDP alliance with major opposition party, Komeito. The Japanese Diet will reconvene on October 15, where Takaichi will have to secure a simple majority to officially replace Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister.[48] Given the loss of Komeito’s support, the LDP will need to seek alliances with other minority parties.
Takaichi was a close ally of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and has served in multiple cabinet positions, including as minister of state for Okinawa and Northern Territories affairs, minister of state for innovation, minister for internal affairs and communications, and minister of state for economic security.[49] Takaichi’s campaign emphasized increasing Japan’s defense budget, acquiring stand-off weapons, and strengthening the US-Japanese alliance and commitments to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).[50] Takaichi also supports revising Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which limits the Japan Self Defense Force’s (JSDF) offensive capabilities and renounces Japan’s right to declare war and rename the JSDF to the “National Defense Military.”[51]
Takaichi has long called for Japan to build closer relations with Taiwan and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force or coercion.[52] Takaichi has echoed Abe’s belief that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” and urged Japan to establish a “quasi-security alliance” with Taiwan and other like-minded partners.[53] Takaichi expressed concerns about Japan’s close economic ties with the PRC and advocates for limiting Japanese-PRC high-tech cooperation.[54] Takaichi is generally viewed by the Japanese public and overseas observers as a conservative nationalist.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declined to comment on the LDP presidential election results, but conveyed PRC wishes that Takaichi adhere to previously established PRC-Japan agreements. Takaichi’s policies and past comments have led to the PRC public and state media labeling her as “extreme-right” and “anti-China.”[55] Former editor-in-chief of the PRC state media Global Times Hu Xijin, broadly considered a PRC propaganda mouthpiece, on Weibo that Takaichi is the “most disliked” candidate by the PRC public as she exhibits “almost all of the traits in a Japanese politician that the Chinese people are opposed to.”[56] Many of Takaichi’s foreign and defense policies are reminiscent of the policies of the Abe administration, when they were regularly criticized by the PRC. It is unlikely that Takaichi will make significant improvements to Japan-PRC relations if elected as prime minister. The PRC will likely see Takaichi as a successor to Abe and continue to frame her policies as attempts to contain the PRC, undermine the PRC’s interest, and destabilize the region.
North Korea
North Korea showcased its latest defense achievements ahead of its expected October 10 military parade. A significant portion of the featured weapons remain untested, and several key systems North Korea claims to have completed were absent, suggesting a focus on propaganda rather than proven combat capabilities. North Korea’s Defense Development Exhibition from October 4 to 5 featured nearly 40 weapon systems, including a wide range of missiles capable of striking South Korea and the US mainland. Workers Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un accused South Korea and the United States of threatening North Korea, adding that Pyongyang has “allocated special assets to key targets in response to the growing US military presence.”[57] Seoul-based outlet NK Pro assessed that the exhibition included the Hwasal-series cruise missiles; Hwasong-18 and -19 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their transporter erector launchers (TELs); the Hwasong 16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV); an anti-submarine missile; and the Hwasong-11D and -11E short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).[58] North Korea also unveiled new systems, including an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) and a short-range air defense system that resembles Russia’s Pantsir-S1.[59] Kim visited North Korea’s first-ever destroyer, Choe Hyon, as part of the defense exhibition on October 6.[60] North Korea launched the Choe Hyon in April 2025 and expects it to enter service by 2026.[61]
These military displays come just days before the October 10 parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the WPK. The parade also coincides with the final year of North Korea’s five-year defense development plan, announced at the 8th Party Congress in 2021.[62] Pyongyang will likely use the event to showcase the progress it claims to have made under the defense plan. Many of the weapons prioritized by Kim five years ago remain incomplete, untested, or absent, however. Both the Choe Hyon destroyer and the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) unveiled in March 2025 have yet to be tested, for example.[63] North Korea failed three spy satellite launch attempts between 2023 and 2024 and did not present the high-thrust solid-fuel engine or the Hwasong-20 ICBM at the exhibition.[64] These indicators contrast with Kim’s October 4 declaration that North Korea had “fulfilled” the defense goals set out at the 8th Party Congress.[65] This suggests that North Korea may be revamping propagandistic displays of military strength alongside Kim’s achievements while several key systems remain under development.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
Reuters reported on October 5 that the PRC funded a cyber campaign spreading anti-US narratives in the Philippines and supporting PRC territorial claims in the South China Sea.[66] The report cited PRC-owned firm InfinitUs Marketing Solutions as the Philippine company running fake social media accounts posting such content. InfinitUs also promoted pro-PRC content from Filipino media figures, some of whom received awards from the PRC embassy with money worth thousands of US dollars. The Philippines Senate probed InfinitUs Marketing Solutions for attempting to influence the Philippine midterm elections, which were held in May 2025. [67] InfinitUS CEO Paul Li testified before the Philippine Senate that “we are the PR company for the Chinese embassy” and confirmed receiving money from the PRC embassy but denied involvement in operating troll bot farms to shape online discourse.[68] PRC disinformation campaigns in the Philippines likely seek to undermine public confidence in the US-Philippine alliance by spreading anti-US sentiment and pro-PRC messaging.
The Philippines recovered a PRC unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in its territorial waters, highlighting continued PRC efforts to use research vehicles to undermine Philippine claims in the South China Sea. Philippine Coast Guard Spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated that Philippine fishermen recovered the UUV in waters near Barangonan Island to the north of Palawan Island on September 28.[69] Philippine authorities determined that the UUV was equipped with sensor technology for “advanced underwater surveillance and seafloor mapping” and had Chinese markings.[70] The Philippines claims to have recovered five other UUVs linked to the PRC since 2022.[71] The PRC used research vessels to map Taiwan’s coast and surrounding sea areas in 2023 and 2024.[72] The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US think tank, has shown that PRC geographic surveillance of this kind can serve a dual-use function, as the intelligence it provides is critical to the planning of military operations.[73] CSIS noted that PRC unmanned research vessels can detect underwater targets such as submarines, mines, and undersea cables that the PLA would likely target in a Taiwan contingency.[74] A strong understanding of the undersea environment and topography is also necessary for the safe operation of the PLAN’s own submarines.[75]
Data from ship tracking software Starboard Maritime Intelligence shows that PRC research vessel Jia Geng conducted research operations around Second Thomas Shoal and the Philippines’ military base on Thitu Island from October 3 to 7. Jia Geng was previously expelled from Taiwan’s waters in July 2024.[76] Jia Geng can launch surveillance UUVs like the one found near Barangonan Island.[77] It is unclear if Jia Geng launched that particular UUV, however.
Jia Geng’s presence near Philippine territories west of Palawan Island, concomitant with the UUV found north of Palawan, suggests a PRC effort to use research vessels in and around Philippine waters to gain intelligence that may be leveraged for military use. Continued PRC deployment of research vessels around Philippine claims in the South China Sea, within its claimed EEZ, and its territorial waters, likewise undermines Philippine sovereignty in the area.
Oceania
The Cabinet of Papua New Guinea (PNG) approved the Pukpuk defense agreement with Australia, enhancing defense cooperation between the two countries. PNG Prime Minister James Marape said that PNG would be unlikely to enter a conflict against the PRC, however. Marape said that PNG will sign the treaty following Cabinet approval.[78] Australia considers PNG a key defense partner and incorporated PNG into its flagship Talisman Sabre military exercises in summer 2025.[79] The Pukpuk treaty covers “the mutual defence of both Parties in order to support each other in times of crisis or conflict” and paves the way for combined exercises and training of the Australian and PNG militaries.[80] Marape said that he does not “necessarily see China as an enemy” and would try to persuade Australia to seek peace if war erupted between the PRC and United States.[81] Marape’s stance echoes that of other Oceanian states that seek to balance between the United States and PRC.
Australia’s efforts to draft and implement military agreements with regional partners reflects a growing commitment to coalition-building germane to Taiwan’s defense. Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, Fiji, and PNG are the only South Pacific island states with militaries, and Australia is likewise developing a defense agreement with Fiji.[82] Australia and the Philippines are drafting a new defense agreement aimed at supporting combined military drills and will reportedly sign it in 2026.[83] Australia has also maintained a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan since 2023.[84] Australia maintains one mutual defense treaty in addition to its new treaty with PNG: the 1951 ANZUS agreement, which includes the United States and New Zealand.[85]
Europe
UK officials allegedly obstructed a PRC-linked espionage case in order to preserve UK-PRC trade relations. This case underscores the extent of PRC infiltration and coercion within the UK government and may embolden further PRC espionage. The UK government dropped espionage charges against two UK citizens, one of whom previously worked as a parliamentary aide, in September following the Crown Prosecution Service’s (CPS) refusal to testify against the accused.[86] The UK parliament investigated the case after charges were dropped and determined that the prosecution was undermined following UK Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Collins’ refusal to provide testimony that would define the PRC as an “enemy.” This definition comprised a necessary requirement for prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, which the two individuals were charged with breaking.[87] This refusal was allegedly done to preserve UK-PRC economic and diplomatic relations. The Kier Starmer administration denied pressuring UK officials not to testify on October 6 and stated that they could not have referred to the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) identifying the PRC as a growing threat when testifying, as the alleged espionage occurred between 2021 and 2023.[88]
The UK 2025 NSS reported in August that PRC espionage efforts and infiltration into UK society were undermining UK democracy and economic security.[89] Collins did provide testimony in a similar espionage case conducted on behalf of Russia, identifying Russia as an “enemy.” This possibly reflects a different threat calculation with regard to Russian and PRC influence cases.[90] The UK’s seeming unwillingness to prosecute PRC-connected espionage cases could embolden the PRC, enabling even higher levels of infiltration into UK society and government.
The PRC reportedly threatened to retaliate against the UK government if it targeted PRC officials under its Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS). The PRC may use economic coercion against the United Kingdom to ensure that its policies towards the PRC remain favorable. The Guardian reported on October 5 that the PRC warned the UK Foreign Office that targeting elements of the PRC security apparatus would have negative consequences for PRC-UK relations.[91] These threats follow conversations within the UK government about targeting elements of the PRC government, including the Ministry of State Security, the PRC’s main intelligence organization; the CCP; the United Front Work Department, which conducts overseas influence operations; and the PLA, on the list of entities required to register under FIRS). The FIRS requires that any individual within the UK acting on behalf of a foreign state or entity declare their activities to the government or face sanctions.[92] The United Kingdom requires individuals working on behalf of Russia and Iran to register under the FIRS’ enhanced tier, due to increased national security risks.[93] The United Kingdom has not included the PRC under the enhanced tier, despite official UK reports of growing PRC infiltration and threats to the UK’s national security.[94] The UK government has not responded to this report at the time of writing. The PRC may seek further concessions from the UK in exchange for continued UK-PRC economic and diplomatic engagement if it perceives its coercive efforts as effective.
Iran
Note: A version of this text appeared in the Iran Update on October 6, 2025.[95]
Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.[96] PRC companies began exporting motor vehicles to Iran in exchange for Iranian metals, including copper and zinc, around 2018 after US President Donald Trump launched his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, according to individuals with knowledge of the trade speaking to Bloomberg.[97] Hong Kong-registered PRC front companies have also recently paid PRC contractors to build infrastructure in Iran in exchange for Iranian crude oil exports to the PRC, according to current and former Western officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[98] Some of the officials stated that the PRC transmitted 8.4 billion US dollars in oil payments via this barter arrangement to finance PRC contracted infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024.[99] Iran and the PRC previously conducted negotiations in 2023 over a similar barter agreement in which Iran would provide the PRC with crude oil in exchange for the PRC’s assistance in constructing the Tehran-North freeway, which connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea.[100] It is unclear whether Iran and the PRC signed the agreement in 2023. These transactions do not require Chinese or Iranian companies to trade on the international market using the US dollar and are not subject to US sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reports.[101] The PRC does not acknowledge the United States’ unilateral sanctions and subsequent secondary sanctions on Iran, claiming that PRC-Iran trade complies with international law.[102]
[1] https://tvpworld dot com/89313784/ukraine-claims-china-helped-russian-missile-attacks-with-reconnaissance-satellites; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/
[2] https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-place-hide-look-chinas-geosynchronous-surveillance-capabilities; https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/china-launches-trio-of-yaogan-remote-sensing-satellites-to-orbit-video; https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/#:~:text=China%20uses%20the%20Yaogan%20name,are%20the%20Yaogan%2031%20satellites; https://www.supercluster.com/launches/yaogan-34-04
[3] https://tvpworld dot com/89313784/ukraine-claims-china-helped-russian-missile-attacks-with-reconnaissance-satellites
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/
[5] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202504/t20250409_11590807.shtml
[6] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371164/finding-the-right-model-the-joint-force-the-peoples-liberation-army-and-informa/
[7] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy/
[8] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wdd228953o; https://tvpworld dot com/86230437/zelenskyy-claims-china-supplying-weapons-and-gunpowder-to-russia
[9] https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/04/europe/china-ukraine-eu-war-intl
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/the-strengthening-china-russia-nexus/
[11] https://www.sankei dot com/article/20251001-J6TMERNIBRMKRGH5562GRAO7BM/
[12] https://www.sankei dot com/article/20251001-J6TMERNIBRMKRGH5562GRAO7BM/
[13] https://www.sankei dot com/article/20251001-J6TMERNIBRMKRGH5562GRAO7BM/
[14] https://www.tearline.mil/public_page/pla-joint-training#article
[15] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/10/03/2003844851
[16] https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/china-rehearsing-possible-taiwan-decapitation-operation/; https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/5131830; https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-presidential-office-mock-target-images-1883927
[17] https://x.com/JulienHoez/status/1772727385927860313
[18] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Chairman-Xi-Remakes-the-PLA/
[19] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/10/02/2003844809
[20] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/crossing-the-strait/crossing-the-strait.pdf
[21] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6212432
[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwYaiqO8NeE
[23] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6212432
[24]https://www.mac.gov dot tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E79&s=68582E452223D639; https://www.voanews.com/a/detention-of-two-taiwanese-in-china-sparks-concern-about-personal-safety/7651055.html
[25]https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/first-separatism-conviction-taiwanese-citizen-and-its-implications; https://www.rfa.org/english/china/2025/03/17/china-taiwanese-editor-secession-trial/; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taiwan-lee-09232019150838.html
[26]https://perma.cc/NM3R-HGWA
[27] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20251001002038-260407?chdtv
[28] https://warsawsecurityforum dot org/wsf-2024/speakers/
[29] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202510010096.aspx
[30] https://community-democracies.org/what-we-do/strategic-objectives-2/
[31] https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-china-summit-leyen-xi/33481019.html
[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/defeat-ukraine-would-embolden-china-towards-taiwan-taiwanese-officer-says-poland-2025-10-02/; https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202510020224.aspx
[33] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202510020224.aspx
[34] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202510030313.aspx
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-3-2025/
[36] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202510030313.aspx
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-3-2025/
[38] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202510020224.aspx
[39] https://warsawsecurityforum dot org/wsf2025/report/
[40] https://warsawsecurityforum dot org/wsf2025/speakers/
[41] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202401305003.aspx; https://www.ly.gov dot tw/EngPages/List.aspx?nodeid=449
[42] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202401305003.aspx
[43] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202502180272.aspx
[44] https://def.ltn dot com.tw/article/breakingnews/5176653
[45] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-taiwan-president-is-prostituting-himself-after-interview-lauding-2025-10-08/; https://www.clayandbuck.com/videos/audio-clips/buck-sits-down-with-the-president-of-taiwan-lai-ching-te/
[46] http://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/39512; http://www.president.gov dot tw/NEWS/39512
[47] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202510/t20251008_12727332.htm
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[65] http://www.rodong.rep dot kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNS0xMC0wNS0wNzFAMUAxQEAwQDNA==
[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-china-waged-an-infowar-against-us-interests-philippines-2025-10-06/
[67] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3309463/calls-sanctions-philippine-probe-accuses-chinese-embassy-influence-campaign
https://www.straitstimes dot com/asia/se-asia/manila-accuses-beijing-of-sinister-campaign-to-sway-midterms-push-south-china-sea-narratives
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[73] https://features.csis.org/snapshots/china-research-vessel-taiwan/
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