Toplines

The Houthis are setting conditions to establish the Bab al Mandeb Strait as an Axis of Resistance-controlled body of water as part of the Axis of Resistance’s effort to assert control over regional oil exports. Allowing the Houthis to consolidate control over the Bab al Mandeb would be unacceptable for US national security and economic interests. The Houthis have further expanded their control of territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and islands in the Red Sea since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on September 10.[1] The Houthis seized control of the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands in the southern Red Sea, according to a Yemeni government official speaking to international media on September 11.[2] The Houthis had conducted attacks over several weeks to isolate Yemeni government forces on these islands.[3] The Houthis continued their advance south from Mokha Port, which the Houthis captured on September 10, to towns and positions closer to the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[4] Two Yemeni government officials told Reuters that the Houthis seized Dhubab, which had been the Yemeni government’s last remaining port city on the Red Sea, on September 11.[5] A Houthi fighter posted a photo on September 11 outside the Dhubab council building, further indicating Houthi control over the city.[6] The Houthis also seized Perim Island, which is in the middle of the Bab al Mandeb Strait off the Yemeni coast’s southwestern-most headland at Ras Menheli, according to Yemeni government officials speaking to international media.[7] The Houthis have also reportedly advanced into the coastal town of al Aradi, Lahij Governorate, across from Perim Island.[8]

Houthi officials and organizations have emphasized that the Houthis intend to maintain “safe” shipping in the Bab al Mandeb, but the Houthis’ recent advances set conditions for the Houthis to be able to threaten shipping more easily if they decide it is in their interest to do so.[9] Public Houthi statements may not necessarily reflect the Houthis’ true intentions or future plans regarding the strait. The Houthis explicitly stated on September 11 that Saudi vessels are banned from transiting through the Bab al Mandeb as part of the group’s ongoing blockade of Saudi ports, for example.[10] The Houthis’ campaign against Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve four primary objectives, including ending Saudi military operations in Yemen, lifting the Saudi blockade of Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports and airports, coercing Saudi Arabia to pay Houthi civil servant salaries, and coercing Saudi Arabia to pay reparations to Yemeni civilians.[11] Allowing the Houthis to consolidate their new positions and establish control over the Bab al Mandeb would also give the Houthis unacceptable leverage over this critical waterway in future conflicts, beyond the current Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis’ seizure of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and Perim Island in the Bab al Mandeb Strait enables the Houthis to use a broader range of weapons systems to threaten shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. An unspecified Houthi commander in al Aradi told his subordinates that they could position artillery along the newly captured Yemeni coastline to target shipping transiting through the Bab al Mandeb.[12] The commander may have been boasting about the Houthis’ capabilities as part of a victory speech to his subordinates, but the Houthis’ recent advances do put them within artillery range of the shipping lanes in the Bab al Mandeb. The Houthis possess a variety of self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, some of which possess an effective range of up to 17 kilometers.[13] Al Aradi is located approximately 16 kilometers from the center of the Bab al Mandeb. The Houthis’ ability to use artillery to attack vessels passing through the strait would depend upon their ability to sustain logistics lines to their newly captured coastal territory, however.

The Houthis’ new positions along the Red Sea coast—particularly on Perim Island—also place the Houthis in range to use tactical weapons systems, such as tactical drones. The Houthis could potentially use short-range drones or hexacopter drones that can drop various kinds of large or armor-piercing explosive devices to attack vessels.[14] The Houthis could also launch swarms of smaller, shorter-range drones to attack and harass shipping from these new positions closer to the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Allowing the Houthis to consolidate positions that leave them in range to use tactical weapons against shipping lanes in the Bab al Mandeb is unacceptable for US national security interests.

The Houthis could also use their new positions to deploy anti-shipping methods that the group deployed further away from shipping lanes in northern Yemen during the 2023-2025 Houthi campaign against international shipping. The Houthis do not currently possess the same military systems and infrastructure that Iran has developed over several decades to interfere with international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthis have invested in developing their anti-shipping capabilities in recent years, however, which they successfully used to attack shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait during the group’s campaign against international shipping between 2023 and 2025.[15] The Houthis used an unmanned surface vessel (USV) to attack shipping in the Red Sea for the first time in the October 7 War in January 2024 and subsequently regularly used USVs to attack vessels in that conflict.[16] The IRGC Quds Force has furnished the Houthis with explosive-laden drone boats in recent years, and the Houthis conducted their first waterborne IED attack on a Saudi naval frigate in January 2017.[17] The Houthis also demonstrated the ability to board vessels during the October 7 War. The Houthis hijacked an Israeli-owned, Japanese-operated freighter in November 2023 after Houthi fighters fast-roped onto the deck of the vessel from a helicopter.[18] The Houthis conducted these attacks against international shipping while based in the Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port, which is located nearly 250 kilometers north of the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[19] The Houthis’ recent advances enable the Houthis to position weapons systems within a much closer range of the strait and thus enable the Houthis to pose a greater threat to international shipping. The Houthis will likely not be able to attack shipping immediately, but the Houthis are setting conditions to be able to do so if they’re allowed to consolidate their positions and decide it advances their interests to attack shipping.

The Bab al Mandeb is narrower than the Strait of Hormuz, and there is therefore little prospect of establishing a secure transit route off the coast of Africa similar to the US-sponsored alternative transit route off the coast of Oman in the Strait of Hormuz. The Bab al Mandeb Strait from Perim Island to Djibouti’s coast is approximately 29 kilometers wide.[20] The Strait of Hormuz is 39 kilometers at its narrowest point.[21] The United States has helped facilitate traffic through an alternative route off the coast of Oman in the Strait of Hormuz that enables vessels to transit the strait without having to use Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme. The Bab al Mandeb’s narrowness will likely preclude the establishment of a similar secure route in that waterway.

The Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping in the Bab al Mandeb offers Iran an alternative way to disrupt global energy markets while Iran appears to be facing difficulties disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on September 10 that four unspecified projectiles hit two vessels transiting the strait through the US-sponsored southern transit route.[22] These likely Iranian strikes are part of the regime’s effort to prevent international traffic through the southern route, which undermines Iranian control of the strait. The regime appears to be facing difficulties in disrupting traffic, however.[23] Maritime data tracking firm Tanker Trackers reported on September 11 that ten million barrels per day of oil are leaving the strait for the first time since July, highlighting Iran’s difficulty in stopping the flow of oil out of the strait.[24] Houthi control over the Bab al Mandeb thus gives Iran an alternative way to pressure energy markets and impose economic costs on the United States and its regional allies. Iranian regime media argued on September 11 that the Houthi offensive near the Bab al Mandeb Strait gives the Houthis “veto power” along a critical maritime route by raising shipping risks, insurance costs, and military resource demands without the use of a large naval fleet.[25]

The Houthis are conducting a coordinated effort with other Axis of Resistance members to coerce Saudi Arabia to meet Houthi demands by attacking Saudi energy infrastructure. The Saudi Foreign Ministry announced that an unspecified actor launched several drones from Iraq that struck the East-West Pipeline and nearby pumping stations south of Medina, Medina Province, on September 10.[26] The Saudi Energy Ministry announced on September 11 that Saudi Arabia shut down the East-West Pipeline as a precaution following the attack as engineering teams conducted repairs and assessed the damage.[27] The attack was almost certainly conducted by either the Houthis or Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Houthis are able to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia from Iraq because Iranian-backed Iraqi militias allow the Houthis to operate in areas that the militias control. The Houthis have increasingly coordinated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iraqi militias to attack Saudi Arabia since July 28, when the Houthis attacked Saudi oil infrastructure from Iraqi territory in coordination with the Iraqi militias and under IRGC supervision.[28]

A prolonged shutdown of the East-West Pipeline could put further pressure on Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil. Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on the East-West Pipeline to transport oil to Yanbu, on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, to circumvent Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.[29] Saudi Arabia can presumably repair the East-West Pipeline relatively quickly. The Axis of Resistance would need to conduct sustained attacks against the pipeline to render it inoperable. Saudi Arabia would need to provide counter-drone defenses across the entire length of the 1,200-kilometer-long pipeline in order to defend it if the Axis of Resistance conducted sustained attacks, given that damage to a single segment along the pipeline would render the entire pipeline inoperable.[30] The deployment of counter-drone systems across 1,200 kilometers of Saudi territory to defend the pipeline would be a very resource-intensive process for Saudi Arabia.

The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes some Iranian-backed parties, is reportedly divided and considering several proposals to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias amid US pressure and the nearing September 30 disarmament deadline. These options appear designed to enable the militias to maintain access to their weapons. Iraqi sources told US-funded, Arabic-language media on September 10 that some unspecified framework members want the Iraqi militias to surrender their weapons to the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[31] This option would probably entail the militias handing over their weapons to militia-controlled PMF brigades that answer to Iran and operate outside of formal PMF channels. The Iraqi sources said that both Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have rejected this option. Both groups have previously resisted disarmament on ideological grounds.[32] Both militias, as well as Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and other unspecified framework parties, instead support “regulating” militia weapons.[33] The ambiguity of the rules that would govern this “regulation” and how they would be enforced suggests that this proposal is intended to enable the militias to retain their weapons and use them at will. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s support for this policy option, given both militias’ continued refusal to disarm, further indicates that this option would do little to affect the militias’ armament.[34] The framework is also discussing a plan to transfer weapons, particularly long-range missiles, to Iran for storage, according to informed sources speaking to Saudi media on September 9.[35] Iran has provided its Iraqi partners with weapons, including missiles and drones, for years, including during the US-Israel-Iran War.[36] Iran would probably just transfer weapons stored in Iran back to the militias at a later point if the framework chose this policy option. None of the framework’s current options, as reported by regional media, appear to meet US expectations for the Iraqi government’s disarmament of the militias.[37]