Iran Project

Iran Update Special Report, June 15, 2025, Evening Edition

The IDF expanded its air campaign into Iran by beginning to strike regime institutions, including some related to internal security and social control. This comes the day after the IDF began striking energy infrastructure. The degradation of the Iranian coercive apparatus coupled with energy shortages could destabilize the regime. The IDF conducted its furthest strike eastward as part of its efforts to establish air superiority over Iran. Iran has continued its missile campaign targeting Israel, having launched 10 total barrages at the time of this writing.

Iran Update Special Report, June 14, 2025, Evening Edition

The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership. The IDF has continued to target Iranian military targets across Iran, likely to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. This update contains early battle damage assessments (BDA) of several Iranian facilities, including Natanz, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and several military bases.

 

Iran Update Special Report, June 14, 2025, Morning Edition

Iran has used significantly fewer munitions in its response to Israel than originally planned because the IDF destroyed and damaged missile launchers and silos that Iran planned to use to retaliate against Israel. This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that degrading Iran’s retaliatory capabilities was one objective of the initial Israeli strikes on June 12.

Iran Update Special Edition: Israeli Strikes on Iran, June 13, 2025, 2:00 PM ET

Israel launched an air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12 to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program. The June 12 to 13 strikes are the opening volley in a weekslong air campaign, according to multiple Israeli officials.

Iran Update, June 10, 2025

The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support for insurgent groups, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity in coastal areas.

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