Iran Project

Hamas conducted a large-scale rocket attack from southern Lebanon into Israel on April 6 possibly as part of the larger pattern of escalation between Iran and Israel occurring throughout 2023. Hamas and other unidentified Palestinian militants launched at least 34 rockets into northern Israel, with four landing in Israeli territory and injuring at least three people. Israeli forces intercepted around 25 rockets, and several more fell short of the border. Hamas launched an additional two rockets into Israel several hours later. Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem framed the attacks as retaliation for Israeli raids and mass arrests inside the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on April 4-5. Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants launched as many as 15 rockets from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip on April 5 in response to the raids, as CTP previously reported.

Student poisonings have resumed in Iran after approximately three weeks without reported incidents, indicating that the regime has failed to take the necessary security measures to permanently prevent these attacks. CTP recorded ten student poisoning cases on April 5, four cases on April 4, and one case on April 3. The April 3 chemical poisoning attack on Iranian school girls in Naghadeh, West Azerbaijan Province marked the first of such attacks since March 13, as CTP previously reported. The pause in student poisonings between March 13 and April 3 roughly corresponds to the Iranian New Year holiday between March 20 and April 2, suggesting that the recent respite from student poisonings was not due to the regime’s ability to effectively crack down on the perpetrators of these attacks, but because schools were not in session. The resumption of student poisoning attacks also indicates that the network targeting Iranian school girls still exists and retains the ability to operate in Iran.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reaffirmed his commitment to enforcing the mandatory hijab law during a meeting with senior regime officials on April 4. Khamenei framed the law as both a political and religious requirement. He added that the hijab issue “will definitely be solved,” but did not specify how exactly regime officials should go about enforcing mandatory veiling. It is noteworthy that Khamenei provided no specific guidance on how to enforce the hijab law given that regime officials have articulated different theories on how to do so in recent days. Khamenei’s explicit endorsement of mandatory veiling on April 4 differs from his vague reference to this issue in his Nowrouz address on March 21. Khamenei previously implied that the economy should be the primary topic of intra-regime debate in his Nowrouz address, as CTP previously reported, implying that socio-cultural issues, such as the hijab requirement, are not up for discussion. Khamenei contrastingly stated on April 4 that “choosing an economic slogan does not mean disregarding social and cultural issues.” Khamenei may have made this clarification to explain to regime officials that they can discuss the hijab—in addition to the economy—so long as their discussions about veiling are in the context of enforcing the hijab law.

The Israel Defense Force conducted an airstrike targeting at least two Iranian-backed militia bases in western Syria on April 1, 2023. Unidentified Western intelligence sources reported that rockets hit the al Dabaa Military Airport and T4 Tyas air base, according to a Reuters report. An unidentified Syrian military source claimed to the Syrian Arab News Agency that Israeli forces targeted multiple military targets in Homs city and its outskirts on April 1 killing five Syrian soldiers. The Syrian Ministry of Defense released a statement claiming that Syrian air defense systems shot down several Israeli missiles over Homs city and countryside. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and Crisis 24 reported that the IDF also damaged an Iranian research facility in Khirbat al Tain, western Homs.[4] An anti-Syrian regime Twitter account claimed that a Lebanese Hezbollah leader was killed in the Israeli airstrike on April 1.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes in Damascus, Syria on March 30 that resulted in the death of senior IRGC official Milad Heydari, which likely will prompt Iranian-backed militants to attack US forces stationed in eastern Syria in the coming days. Recent Iranian attacks on US forces in response to IDF airstrikes suggests a pattern in which Iran retaliates for instances in which IRGC personnel are killed. Local Syrian media reported that an IDF drone killed an IRGC official and a Lebanese Hezbollah official on March 23 near Abu Kamal, Deir ez Zor province. The IDF drone strike occurred approximately 12-18 hours prior to the attack on US forces in Hasakah province, suggesting that Iran ordered the attack in response to the IDF drone strike and not the airstrike on Aleppo International Airport on March 22, which did not kill any IRGC personnel. CTP has observed several other Iranian-backed attacks on US forces that support this pattern, which are outlined in the timeline graphic below.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian alluded to Iranian involvement in the recent attacks on US bases in Syria during his meeting with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Russia on March 29. Abdollahian rejected US reports that Iranian drones were involved in the March 23 attack on a US base in Syria but added that Iran responded “decisively and clearly to the American side” in “the events that took place east of the Euphrates.” The US conducted airstrikes on at least two Iranian-backed militant positions in eastern Syria on March 23 in retaliation for a drone attack on a US base near Hasakah. Likely Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack on the US base at the Green Village base in eastern Syria on March 24, likely in retaliation for the US airstrikes, as CTP previously assessed. Amir Abdollahian’s rejection of Iranian drone involvement in the recent attacks was likely a reference to the March 23 drone attack on the Hasaka base. His second statement about the decisive "response" was likely a reference to the Iranian's separate retaliatory rocket attack on the Green Village base, as CTP previously assessed. Amir Abdollahian’s use of the Persian word “pasokh” or “respond” suggests that he may be claiming responsibility for the rocket attacks on the Green Village base.

IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour claimed foreign-backed threats are the source of unrest in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, possibly to set conditions to degrade Prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s anti-regime following in Zahedan. Pakpour claimed that foreign-backed “evildoers and enemies” were responsible for unrest in the province and threatened to deal “severely” with these actors in a speech to local clan leaders, scholars, and critics in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on March 28. The regime has both recently and historically blamed foreign actors to justify violently cracking down on domestic unrest. CTP has not observed any significant increase in violence in Zahedan that would warrant a regime security response. This suggests Pakpour’s statement referenced anti-regime protests inspired by Abdol Hamid, who has continuously criticized the regime during his Friday prayer sermons and generated significant in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province throughout the past several months.

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have messaged that the Iran-led Axis of Resistance is prepared to continue escalating against American forces in eastern Syria. Iran uses the term “Axis of Resistance” to refer to the regional state, semi-state, and non-state actors with which Tehran cooperates to pursue its strategic objectives, including the Bashar al Assad regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various Iraqi, Syrian, and other proxy groups. The Iranian Advisory Center in Syria—likely a front for the IRGC Quds Force—issued a statement on March 24 warning the US that the Axis of Resistance has “the upper hand” in Syria and can retaliate against any US attacks. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Spokesperson Keyvan Khosravi echoed these remarks on March 25. Iranian state media and Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated outlets have similarly emphasized in recent days that the Axis of Resistance is prepared to attack US forces in eastern Syria if the escalation cycle between them continues. The IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah are responding to the series of attacks between the US and Iranian-backed forces that erupted in Syria on March 23-24 after Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on US forces in northeastern Syria, killing one American.

The US has become entangled in a regional escalation pattern between Iran and Israel. Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on US forces in northeastern Syria, killing one American, on March 23. Iran likely ordered the attack in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-backed targets in Syria. Israel has conducted several such strikes in recent days, including attacking Iranian-backed positions at Aleppo International Airport on March 22, as CTP previously reported. Senior Iranian military officers frequently threaten that they will hold the US accountable for Israeli attacks in Syria.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has trapped the Iranian regime by focusing public and government attention on improving the economy—an issue he does not yet appear willing to seriously address. Khamenei confined intra-regime debate to the economy—rather than addressing the socio-cultural issues that fueled the Mahsa Amini protests—and proposed various solutions to Iran’s economic problems during his Nowrouz address on March 21. Khamenei called for privatization, stating that “the most important problem and weakness of the country is the governmental nature of the economy.” Khamenei additionally acknowledged some critics’ use of the term “khasoulati”—meaning “state-controlled”—to describe the economic dominance of parastatal entities. Khamenei’s reference to this term confirms that he is aware of some of the arguments made by pragmatic hardliners, such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, about what role the parastatal establishment should play in Iran’s economy. Ghalibaf has explicitly called for parastatal organizations to decrease their involvement in the economy in recent weeks, as CTP previously reported. Khamenei’s recognition of and lip service to this conversation does not necessarily mean he is prepared to make the difficult decisions involved in seriously prying the economy from the grip of the state-owned economic giants. Meaningful privatization would require an overhaul of the Iranian economy which would likely take years to complete and would cause severe economic disruptions. Khamenei declined to take such measures when former President Hassan Rouhani advocated for them fervently, moreover. It is thus more likely that Khamenei is discussing privatization because he has designated the economy as one of the only acceptable topics of intra-regime debate.