Iran Project

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) are continuing to promote the expectation in the information space that LH will announce some kind of escalation against Israel on November 3. CTP-ISW previously reported that LH has released two dramatic videos in recent days ahead of LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s planned speech on November 3, creating the expectation of a significant announcement on the Israel-Hamas war. This speech is significant in that it will be Nasrallah’s first public statement on the war. Iranian state media has further amplified the news of the upcoming speech and the dramatic videos, describing them as a “sign of future events.”

Israeli forces conducted a route clearance operation moving from near Juhor ad Dik to the Salah al Din road in the Gaza Strip before withdrawing. Israeli forces, including at least one bulldozer and other armor, held a position on the Salah al Din road on October 30. Israeli forces withdrew after a brief period. Palestinian sources and the IDF reported that Palestinian fighters engaged IDF armor east of Zaytoun neighborhood, which is just west of Salah al Din road. The Salah al Din road is an important north-south thoroughfare running through the entirety of the strip. This Israeli operation is consistent with Israeli military experts’ characterization of IDF tactics, which involve small IDF units taking “limited areas” before following up with additional ground forces and armor.

The al Qassem Brigade—the militant wing of Hamas—likely conducted a complex attack targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at the Erez checkpoint on October 29. Militants from the al Qassem Brigades infiltrated Israeli territory via a tunnel west of the checkpoint before clashing with the IDF. LH-affiliated media reported that the militants fired an anti-armor munition at Israeli vehicles at the checkpoint, killing several soldiers. The IDF reported that it “killed several and wounded others,” but did not provide further details. The al Qassem Brigades claimed a rocket and mortar attack in the surrounding area to prevent support from reaching Israeli forces at Erez. Hamas leader Ismail Radwan claimed that al Qassem Brigades militants closed on the checkpoint and engaged in small arms clashes with IDF forces. CTP-ISW has not recorded independent confirmation of the clash or other tactical details.

Israeli ground forces advanced into the Gaza Strip on October 27. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said IDF ground forces supported by heavy fire entered the Gaza Strip to dismantle Hamas, secure the border, and return hostages. IDF Southern Command Fire Center Commander Lieutenant Colonel Gilad Keinan stated that Israel is using fire “from the air, from the ground, or from the underground.” IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that Israeli troops entered the northern Gaza Strip with ground troops, armor, and artillery. The IDF released footage of tanks entering along the beach in the northwestern Gaza Strip. Hagari added that the ground operation was supported by "very significant, massive attacks from the sea." The IDF Air Force struck 150 underground targets in the northern Gaza Strip overnight, which included striking Hamas militants, tunnels, and other subterranean infrastructure. Hamas maintains around 480 kilometers of tunnels under the strip.

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted rocket attacks into Israel at roughly half their usual rate on October 27.
The IDF conducted five raids into the Gaza Strip on October 27, and IDF ground forces will expand their operations overnight.
Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli security forces across the West Bank at a higher rate on October 27, amid Israeli arrest raids.
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), resumed attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
The United States conducted two self-defense airstrikes targeting “IRGC-affiliated targets” in response to drone and rocket attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria.
The Iran-backed Houthi movement conducted a drone attack targeting southern Israel on October 27.
Iran and its Axis of Resistance are continuing to signal their willingness and capability to escalate against the United States and Israel from multiple fronts.

Palestinian militias continued attacks at their usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 26. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for 10 indirect fire attacks. Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for five mortar and rocket attacks. The al Aqsa Matyrs’ Brigade, which claims it is affiliated with Fatah, claimed responsibility for one rocket attack. Fatah denies that it has any connection to the al Aqsa Matyrs’ Brigade, however. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed responsibility for two rocket attacks. Axis of Resistance-affiliated media reported five other unclaimed mortar and rocket attacks.

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are pursuing a coordinated strategy to (1) deter Israel from trying to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip, (2) prevent Israel from destroying Hamas if deterrence fails, and (3) deter the United States from providing military support to Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Iran and its proxy and partner militias throughout the Middle East seek to ensure Hamas’ long-term survival, as Israel has indicated that it will soon launch a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas. The Iran-led effort to prevent this outcome is occurring along four main geographic axes: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and the broader Middle East. The following text examines the campaign objectives that CTP-ISW assesses that the Axis of Resistance is pursuing on each axis in support of its strategic objectives of deterring Israel and the United States.

Hamas and its allies are preparing the information environment to blame Israel for the possible deaths of hostages in the Gaza Strip, especially if Hamas begins killing hostages. Hamas military spokesperson Abu Ubaida said on October 9 that Hamas would kill hostages in response to Israeli airstrikes, indicating Hamas’ willingness to do so for perceived military and/or political gains. Tasnim News Agency—an Iranian outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—reported on October 22 that Israel’s “clandestine goal” is to “cause the killing of captive Israelis,” according to “informed sources. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) spokesperson Abu Hamza said on October 24 that Israel does not “pay attention” to the lives of hostages.

Iranian officials and media are continuing their attempts to deter an Israeli ground operation into the Gaza Strip while also attempting to reassure their domestic and Axis of Resistance audiences that such an operation will fail. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency outlined the “significant challenges” that Israel will face in conducting a ground operation into the Gaza Strip, highlighting Hamas’ anti-tank capabilities. Iranian state media similarly argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s senior advisers fear Hamas and further outlined several “challenges” facing Israeli ground operations into the strip, including declining public support, weakened relations with the Arab world, a high military death toll, and the potential for a geographic expansion of the conflict. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi similarly warned that Israel would suffer a “disgraceful” defeat at the hands of the Palestinian resistance were it to enter the Gaza Strip during an interview IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani arrived in Syria on October 21 to monitor Iranian-backed militias on the Israel-Syria border, according to Israeli media. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report. Iranian-backed militias have concentrated in southern Lebanon and southwestern Syria in recent days as part of Iran-led preparations for the war to expand into a regional conflict. An Iranian state-affiliated journalist previously claimed that Ghaani warned Syrian President Bashar al Assad on October 15 that Iran intends to use Syria as a second front if the Israel-Hamas war expands. An unspecified Iranian intelligence official claimed that Iran would start a ”limited” ground operation from Syria into the Golan Heights and notably not from Lebanon if the situation escalates to protect LH.