Toplines

The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) opened the 9th Party Congress with a focus on economic development and external security on February 19. The removal of key senior officials from the Central Committee reflects WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s ongoing consolidation of power. Kim Jong Un delivered an opening speech, framing the past five years as successful despite challenges. Kim said that “hostile forces” grew more reckless in enforcing sanctions against North Korea, which hindered its economic development and threatened national security.[1] Kim also claimed that North Korea “irreversibly” strengthened its external-facing position and the geopolitical landscape created “favorable” conditions for its socialist system. Kim vowed to prioritize economic construction, improving livelihoods, and social transformation through his “new era” development policy and rural revolution program.[2]

Kim vowed to reorganize WPK leadership ostensibly to improve party competency. He criticized defeatism, irresponsibility, and immaturity in leadership ability among unspecified WPK officials. The WPK proceeded to elect 39 members to the executive board of the 9th Congress, replacing 23 members from the last congress. Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Choe Ryong Hae, along with WPK secretaries Jo Yong Won, Ri Il Hwan, and Pak Jong Chun, retained their seats from the previous congress.[3] The reshuffle removed officials associated with inter-Korean affairs and unification policy, including former United Front Department Director Kim Yong Chol and Ri Son Kwon. North Korean state media reported that the participants reviewed work of the 8th Central Committee for the first three days of the congress and declared that the five-year plans set by the 8th Party Congress were successfully completed across all sectors. It added that the congress adopted revised rules to strengthen the authority and operational systems of WPK central leadership bodies but did not list the revisions.[4]

The 9th Party Congress on February 22 re-elected Kim Jong Un as the WPK General Secretary and elected members and alternate members of the 9th WPK Central Committee.[5] The new Central Committee —comprised of 139 full members and 111 alternate members — observed a replacement rate of 51.6 percent.[6] The WPK reappointed or promoted most full members. Approximately 76.6 percent of alternate members were newly elected.[7] The Kim regime appears to have targeted cabinet economic officials overseeing priority sectors, including coal, shipbuilding, fisheries, maritime transport, and chemicals, for replacement.[8] The 9th Central Committee did not re-elect senior figures, such as Choe Ryong Hae, Ri Pyong Chol, and Pak Jong Chun.[9]

Kim Jong Un appears to be using the 9th Party Congress to consolidate his authority independent of Kim Il Sung-era legacies and accelerating generational transition toward younger technocrats. Kim Jong Un has long relied on second-generation descendants of Kim Il Sung-era “revolutionary” figures to bolster his legitimacy.[10] Choe Ryong Hae, the son of former Korean People’s Army (KPA) Minister Choe Hyon who fought Japan alongside Kim Il Sung, served as a key stabilizing figure early in Kim’s rule. Choe’s removal — alongside other senior leaders — signals Kim Jong Un’s overall confidence in his governing base. ISW-CDOT previously assessed that Kim Jong Un systematically weakened Choe’s political network to manage the influence of competing factions.[11] The assessment is consistent with the active membership of Deputy Chief of the WPK Secretariat Jo Yong Won, considered Choe’s rival, in the 9th Central Committee. The high turnover among alternate members likely reflects efforts to elevate younger technocrats and accelerate the implementation of signature policy initiatives, such as the “12 major priority goals” over food, energy, and industrial material production and the “20×10 Regional Development Plan.”[12] North Korea has not yet clarified its policies regarding inter-Korean relations or the United States. The removal of Kim Yong Chol and Ri Song Kwon suggests continued adherence to a hostile two-state framework, however.

North Korea is likely trying to improve its ability to penetrate South Korea’s integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) network with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). That capability could enhance North Korea’s nuclear deterrent and provide the KPA with more vectors for precision fires in a wartime scenario. North Korea presented 50 600mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) capable of firing SRBMs during a February 18 ceremony to the KPA and Kim Jong Un.[13] Kim claimed in his speech at the ceremony that the missile platform used artificial intelligence (AI) and a “compound targeting system” to enhance accuracy and could carry a nuclear warhead.[14] North Korean state media claimed the system is an upgraded version of the 600mm MLRS system first tested in 2019.[15] The most recent variant features five launch tubes and a wheeled chassis, whereas the previous variant had six launch tubes on a tracked chassis.[16] A wheeled chassis likely improves the system’s road-based maneuverability over the tracked variant.

The most recent variant of the 600mm MLRS may provide the KPA with a precision-strike capability that is resilient against South Korea’s IAMD network. The KPA tested the system on January 27 firing two rockets at ranges of 340 km and 350 km, respectively.[17] The tests revealed the missile’s apogee to be 80 km, comparatively low for a ballistic missile.[18] A low missile apogee could allow the projectile to avoid South Korea‘s and the United States Forces Korea (USFK)’s long-range interceptors, designed to target ballistic missiles at higher altitudes.[19] North Korea has also demonstrated the capability to produce missiles with a quasi-ballistic trajectory, meaning they can alter their path during the missile’s flight and increase the difficulty of successful intercept.[20] South Korean military experts also speculated that North Korean state media’s emphasis on the missile’s autonomy indicated it was resistant to soft-kill methods like jamming.[21] ISW-CDOT cannot independently confirm whether the new missile system features these capabilities, however.

ISW-CDOT previously assessed that North Korea’s 2021–2025 defense modernization plan emphasized “miniaturization” of nuclear weapons with diversified launch platforms to enhance the survivability of its nuclear deterrent.[22] Deploying tactical nuclear weapons with these systems would help to achieve this goal due to the high mobility of the launch platform and the ability to disperse several launchers across a wide area.

It is unlikely that most of these systems will deploy nuclear warheads due to limitations in North Korean fissile material, indicating these systems will primarily contribute to conventional military operations.[23] The US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested that the missile system has a maximum range of 380 km.[24] This would allow the system to target most of the Korean Peninsula if launched close to the DMZ. The missile’s range and survivability, if accurate, would allow the KPA to strike targets of strategic or operational significance behind the frontline, such as South Korean political centers, logistics hubs, command and control (C2) nodes, or USFK basing infrastructure. It is not clear whether North Korea can produce munitions with the high precision needed to execute these missions effectively, however.

ISW-CDOT has reported that Kim showcases high-end military equipment to suggest that North Korea can defend itself independently.[25] Kim is likely using the new variant of the 600mm MLRS similarly, particularly ahead of the WPK’s 9th Party Congress, both to illustrate North Korean military proficiency and their ability to scale production of these systems.

Vice Department Director of the WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, welcomed South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s acknowledgment of South Korean drone incursions.[26] The Lee Jae Myung administration is likely to push to formalize inter-Korean dialogue channels despite likely North Korean disinterest. Chung said on February 18 that the Ministry of Unification (MOU) would pursue a series of legal amendments to prevent the recurrence of civilian drone incursions into North Korea, including codifying penalties under the Aviation Safety Act and banning drone incursions under the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act.[27] Chung also announced plans for the MOU to restore the “9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement,” focusing on reinstating no-fly zones near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Pyongyang and Seoul established the 9.19 Military Agreement in 2018 to reduce military tensions. North Korea unilaterally terminated the agreement in 2023, and the South Korean government suspended it in 2024 in response to North Korea’s repeated violations of its terms.[28] North Korean state media reported on February 19 that Kim Yo Jong issued a response to the MOU measures, stating that she “highly regards” Chung for “expressing regret” and showing “willingness to prevent recurrence” of the drone incursions.[29] Kim warned, however, of “terrible consequences” if airspace violations continue and urged South Korea to adopt preventive steps.[30] The exchange came after South Korean nationals allegedly flew small commercial drones equipped with recording devices into various areas of North Korea from September 2025 to January 2026.[31]

A series of MOU statements and measures aimed at reducing unintended inter-Korean conflicts reflects the Lee administration’s broader efforts under the “peaceful coexistence” policy.[32] The policy prioritizes lowering military risks on the Korean Peninsula, consistent with Lee’s focus on economic stability over end-state goals such as unification. Lee’s approach also seeks to encourage North Korea’s return to dialogue by signaling a reversal from the Yoon administration’s pressure-focused policy. The MOU likely views exchanges as meaningful steps towards normalizing inter-Korean communications, which were severed in 2022.[33] The Lee administration is likely to accelerate efforts to convert the exchanges into a more formalized dialogue channel.

The likelihood of North Korea opening communications with the Lee administration remains low, however. Kim’s February 19 statement did not indicate any shift from North Korea’s hostile two-state framework, instead reiterating themes of North Korean sovereignty and the separation of the two Koreas.[34]