Ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Ukraine come only weeks after Ukraine began ramping up its mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the operational rear. Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov announced restrictions on the sale of gasoline in occupied Crimea to 20 liters starting May 30, and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged that gasoline sold out in occupied Sevastopol after a few hours on May 31.[1] Aksyonov further restricted sales on May 31 to those with coupons, but Russian opposition source Astra reported on June 1 that two major gasoline companies in occupied Crimea temporarily stopped selling coupons.[2] Authorities have started to restrict gasoline sales in occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.[3]

Ukrainian military officials began reporting strikes near occupied Mariupol on May 8.[4] Ukraine has significantly intensified its mid-range strikes against the M-14 highway connecting occupied Berdyansk and Mariupol to Rostov-on-Don in the weeks since.[5] Ukraine has also been striking the H-20 highway, a major GLOC connecting Donetsk City to Mariupol.[6] Ukrainian strikes have targeted fuel trucks in southern and eastern Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian forces have also announced recently that they achieved drone-enabled fire control over Luhansk City, Starobilsk, Alchevsk, Bryanka, and Kadiivka in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[8] Occupation authorities have restricted civilian traffic in some areas due to the mounting Ukrainian strike risk.[9] Russian milbloggers have credited Ukrainian mid-range strikes with disrupting Russian logistics throughout occupied Ukraine.[10]

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Russia’s deep rear is also contributing to the gasoline shortages. Ukraine has continued its long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, including oil refineries, export terminals, and pumping stations in 2026, significantly reducing Russia’s refining capacity. Ukraine has struck some Russian oil facilities several times since January 2026, such as the Tuapse, Volgograd, Saratov, Yaroslavl, Afipsky, and Ilsky oil refineries.[11] Russia’s oil refinery output, according to Bloomberg, dropped in April 2026 to the lowest daily average since December 2009.[12] Almost all major oil refineries in central Russia have reportedly halted or scaled back their output, with the affected refineries totaling over 30 percent of Russia’s gasoline output.[13] The long-range strike campaign is therefore reducing Russia’s production capacity, while the mid-range strike campaign is hurting Russia’s ability to transport the gasoline Russia is still able to produce.

Russia and occupied Ukraine suffered gasoline shortages in 2025, but the 2026 shortages have thus far been mostly limited to occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in 2025 in part created a gasoline shortage that resulted in long lines at gas stations throughout occupied Ukraine and Russia.[14] At least 57 Russian regions suffered gasoline shortages between August and October 2025.[15] Russia was largely able to weather the storm, including by implementing a number of export bans. Russia banned gasoline exports for non-producers in late July 2025 and completely banned gasoline exports starting in August 2025.[16] Russia did not lift the ban on companies directly producing petroleum products until February 2026.[17] Russia also significantly increased its import of gasoline from Belarus in September 2025 and introduced sales restrictions in various regions.[18]

That Russia is currently not widely suffering shortages despite Ukraine’s intensification of its long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure throughout 2026 suggests that Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against GLOCs in occupied Ukraine was the ultimate catalyst for the ongoing shortages in occupied Ukraine. Ukraine has intensified the frequency, scale, and depth of its long-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Russia throughout 2026, yet Russia is not yet suffering the same scale of gasoline shortages as it did in 2025. Some areas in Russia, such as Belgorod, Kursk, Moscow, and St. Petersburg oblasts, have started to restrict gasoline sales in recent days, but the acute crisis has been largely limited to occupied Ukraine, at least for now.[19] Russia’s own shortages may mature in the coming weeks and months, however.

Moscow may have taken preemptive actions earlier in 2026 as Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign began to ramp up in order to avoid repeat shortages in Russia. The Kremlin likely forecasted that the annual high summertime gasoline demand would exacerbate shortages already on the horizon due to Ukrainian strikes and may have diverted some gasoline supplies from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kremlin is likely concerned about the optics of long lines at gas stations and widespread complaints about shortages in Russia, considerations that might have prompted such a move. The Kremlin is likely increasingly mindful of possible domestic content at the moment, as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ratings have been dropping in recent months, Moscow has been making unpopular decisions to restrict the internet, and more frequent Ukrainian strikes deeper into the Russian rear have been bringing the war closer to home than ever before.[20]

Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign may have caused unforeseen problems in the Kremlin’s preemptive plan. The Kremlin may have aimed to keep gasoline stations in occupied Ukraine supplied just enough to handle most of the summertime demand. Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs likely caused these minimally supplied gas stations to run out of gasoline quickly by disrupting expected resupply via fuel trucks. The Kremlin expected Ukraine to continue its long-range campaign, but the addition of the mid-range strike campaign likely disrupted Kremlin attempts to maintain control over the situation.

Ukraine’s long-range strikes alone would have likely caused another gasoline shortage in Russia this summer, but the mid-range strike campaign will likely make the shortages in occupied Ukraine worse in 2026 than they were in 2025. Some Russian regions are starting to report gasoline shortages and restrict sales, likely due more to Ukraine’s long-range strikes that have limited Russia’s refining capacity and less to the mid-range strike campaign limiting traffic on major supply routes in eastern and southern Ukraine. The mid-range strikes, however, will likely make this year’s shortages in occupied Ukraine significantly worse than those last year as they will greatly limit Moscow’s ability to effectively resupply occupied areas. Moscow may decide to prioritize addressing a gasoline shortage in Russia over the one in occupied Ukraine in order to prevent discontent at home.

The gasoline shortages in occupied Ukraine are likely having a limited effect on the Russian military for the time being. More militarily consequential diesel shortages are beginning to materialize, but the Kremlin may try to limit them with an export ban. The Russian military’s motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, and trucks, which Russian forces mostly use to move forces and means closer to the front, run on gasoline. Moscow is likely prioritizing gasoline supplies to the Russian military for these vehicles over supplies to civilians in occupied Ukraine. Russian armored vehicles, Ural trucks, and generators, however, use diesel. Ukraine’s long-range strikes are affecting Russian diesel production, with production falling about 10 percent in April and another 10 percent in May, and limits on diesel sales at gas stations are starting to appear in Moscow City and Oblast, suggesting that wider shortages may be on the horizon.[21] Russia is a major diesel exporter, however, and typically sells about 40 percent of its production, likely providing more of a cushion for domestic diesel supplies than the Kremlin has for domestic gasoline supplies.[22] The Kremlin has reportedly been discussing a full diesel export ban, which would boost domestic supply and possibly prevent shortages from becoming a major issue in the civilian and military sectors in the near future.[23]  

Fuel shortages in occupied Ukraine highlight the synergy of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign with its evolving mid-range strike campaign. The two efforts together are likely achieving considerably greater effects than either would have accomplished alone. The same phenomenon is likely emerging in the competition for air defense resources from Russia’s frontline units all the way to central Russia. The combination of the two Ukrainian strike campaigns presents the Kremlin with multiple challenges that it is so far struggling to meet.