Toplines

The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses. There are likely internal debates within the Kremlin about whether Russia should conduct another round of involuntary reserve call-ups. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 27 that Ukraine is receiving internal Russian information regarding preparations for an additional mobilization in Russia to offset its high losses in Ukraine and to increase the size of the Russian contingent in Ukraine by “tens of thousands” of personnel.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukraine also received intelligence on a further increase in Russian “mobilization efforts,” though it is unclear if Zelensky is referring to ongoing Russian voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization efforts or efforts to register and process Russian reservists.  Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain committed to the ongoing contract recruitment campaign for now, however. Putin signed a decree on May 25 granting debt relief of up to 10 million rubles to new recruits and the spouses of new recruits who signed a contract for at least one year with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after May 1.[2] These apparent discussions in the Kremlin about a potential involuntary reserve call-up are likely coming from a place of weakness as Russia is increasingly struggling with poor battlefield performance, compounding effects of the war on Russian economy, declining recruitment rates, and societal discontent.[3] The Kremlin appears to remain committed to defining its main advantage over Ukraine as overwhelming numbers, but Ukraine’s tactical drone superiority throughout the theater and mid-range strike campaign have neutralized this advantage for now, inflicting disproportionately high personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces.[4] The lack of significant battlefield successes, mounting war sacrifices, and casualty rates are contributing to the domestic Russian perception that the war in Ukraine is not going well for Russia, a perception that is already hindering Russian contract recruitment.[5] Any involuntary mobilization campaign would likely be significantly more unpopular among the Russian population now, while Russia’s war effort is generating so much strain and discontent than it might have been in  mid- to late 2025 when Russian forces were making tactically-significant advances in multiple sectors using a campaign design that Ukraine has since been able to counter.[6]

The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline. Russia has to not only replace its battlefield casualties but also recruit servicemembers for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and to defend its operational and deep rear areas from Ukrainian drone strikes.[7] Russia’s voluntary recruitment efforts have waned in 2026, forcing Moscow to expand its voluntary recruitment drives to new demographics, including women and students for USF and rear area air defense operations.[8] Russian contract recruitment continues to decline despite these efforts and recent increases to one-time signing bonuses.[9] Russian forces are already suffering from administrative and training bottlenecks for their ground forces and drone operators at their current recruitment rate, and these challenges would likely have a compounding negative effect on the quality of Russian personnel in a possible involuntary call-up.[10] These training bottlenecks likely contributed to the degradation in the effectiveness of Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems drone operators, whose elite operations initially allowed Russian forces to make substantial gains from August 2025 to late 2025.[11]

Ukraine’s successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia’s ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions. Ukrainian forces began significantly intensifying their intermediate-range strike campaign in Spring 2026 and have already achieved notable operational effects, including degrading Russia’s ability to use the key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, including the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway, and GLOCs connecting occupied southern Ukraine to Donetsk City.[12] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated May 27 that Ukraine is launching a “logistics lockdown” of Russian forces, aiming to scale its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and supply lines by increasing procurement funding for Ukraine’s most effective drone units and launching large-scale competitive tenders for further funding.[13]

Ukrainian forces are also achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors.[14] Mid-range strikes are actively inhibiting Russia’s ability to transport personnel to the frontlines as well as to supply and hold frontline positions, which would significantly reduce the number of additional reservists who could even get to the frontlines where they could impact Russian ground operations under current conditions. Frontline Ukrainian strikes are also inhibiting Russian infiltration missions. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on May 26 that effective Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and frontline strikes have undermined the success of the infiltration missions on which Russian forces have relied to advance for the past several months.[15] Ukrainian forces have created a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, and it is unclear that additional reserve mobilization would materially improve Russian forces’ battlefield performance unless Russian forces can first counter Ukrainian drone operations.

The Russian government is reportedly considering imposing a temporary restriction on Russian diesel and jet fuel exports after several months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian news agency Interfax and Russian outlet RBK reported on May 26, citing oil inustry sources and sources familiar with the situation, that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak held a meeting on May 26 where he discussed a possible temporary ban on the export of jet and diesel fuel.[16] The sources indicated that the ban could last for one or two months but that the Russian Ministry of Economic Development must approve the initiative before setting a timeline for the ban. Several sources told Interfax that the Russian government advised Russian oil companies to curb petroleum product exports after the May 26 meeting.[17] One source claimed to Interfax that the Russian government will only ban jet fuel exports but not diesel exports, as there is a sufficient supply of diesel on the market. Novak stated after the meeting on May 26 that the Russian government prioritizes domestic markets for fuel.[18] The potential temporary ban on jet and diesel fuel exports comes as Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since March 2026, including against refiners that produce diesel and jet fuel.[19] Russia already imposed a temporary ban on gasoline exports from April 1 to July 31, 2026.[20] Bloomberg reported on May 26 that data from analytics firm OilX indicates that the average output of a Russian oil refinery in April 2026 fell to an average of 4.69 million barrels a day, the lowest daily refining average since December 2009.[21] The Russian government’s consideration of further export restrictions on Russian petroleum products indicates that Ukrainian strikes continue imposing costs on Russia’s oil industry and are forcing Russia to make hard choices to balance domestic fuel stability, military logistics requirements, and export revenue.

Toplines

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast, on the night of April 25 to 26, causing a fire at the facility.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery has a processing capacity of about 15 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Geolocated footage published on April 26 shows fires at the refinery, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source assessed that Ukrainian forces may have struck the ELOU-AT-4 installation, a key unit for raw materials primary processing.[2] ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 10 strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure across Russia in the last two weeks (since roughly April 12). Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces also struck Russia’s naval base and Belbek Airfield in occupied Sevastopol on the night of April 25 to 26, damaging the Yamal Ropucha-class project 775and Filchenkov Tapir-class project 1171large landing ships (both of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF]); the Ivan Khurs Yury Ivanov–class reconnaissance ship; the Lukomka BSF Training Center; a Russian Air Defense Forces radio technical intelligence headquarters; a MR-10M1 Mys-M1 coastal radar station; a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft; and Belbek Airfield’s maintenance section.[3] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged the Ukrainian strikes and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted one of the largest strike campaigns on Sevastopol, launching at least 71 drones overnight.[4] Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since March 2026, including a recent strike in Chelyabinsk on April 25 over 1,800 kilometers from the international border.[5] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to exploit the large attack surface area of Russia’s deep rear and overstretched Russian air defenses to launch more frequent and larger strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, supported by increased Ukrainian domestic drone production.[6]

Toplines

Ukrainian forces advanced 10 to 12 kilometers deep in two separate drives in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that have reportedly liberated more than 400 square kilometers since late January 2026. Ukrainian 1st Separate Assault Regiment Commander Captain Dmytro Filatov, whose regiment is operating in the Hulyaipole direction, stated on March 10 that the regiment pushed 12 kilometers deep into Russian positions between Nove Zaporizhzhia and Dobropillya (both north of Hulyaipole and south of Oleksandrivka).[1] The commander of a Ukrainian airborne assault battalion stated on March 10 that the battalion had advanced 10 to 11 kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction.[2] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have regained the initiative in some areas near the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[3] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces have not been advancing in the Hulyaipole direction for the past three months (since mid-December 2025) and have now shifted their focus to attacking toward Zalizynychne (west of Hulyaipole), Myrne, and Charivne (both southwest of Hulyaipole), likely due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks north and northeast of Hulyaipole.

Major General Oleksandr Komarenko, the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, stated on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have liberated more than 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction.[4] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have liberated roughly 279 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions since January 1, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances. Komarenko also stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated almost all of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not seized three small settlements nor cleared two other settlements – likely referring to five settlements that are both in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the Oleksandrivka direction.[5] Ukraine’s Airborne Assault Troops previously reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated nine settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction as of March 2.[6]

ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Novohryhorivka, Kalynivske, and Stepove (all southeast of Oleksandrivka). Geolocated footage published on March 10 shows a Ukrainian armored vehicle operating within central Novohryhorivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area and likely also liberated Kalynivske and Stepove (both just north of Novohryhorivka).[7] A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Kalynivske and Stepove.[8] ISW is also changing its previous assessment that geolocated footage published on March 7 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) occurred after a Russian infiltration mission into the settlement.[9] ISW now assesses that the March 7 footage likely occurred before – not after –Ukrainian forces liberated Ternove as of March 6, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain position within the settlement.[10] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have liberated Ternove.[11]

ISW therefore assesses that the five settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Russian forces maintain positions and to which Komarenko was likely referring, are Novomykolaivka, Zaporizke, Novoheorhiivka, Sichneve, and Maliivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka). Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko assessed on March 10 that Russian forces maintain positions within Novomykolaivka, Sichneve, Maliivka, Ternove, Berezove (just west of Ternove), and in parts of Vorone (north of Ternove).[12] Kovalenko noted, however, that Ukrainian forces may have already liberated and cleared some of these settlements. The status of three additional settlements in eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’s Synelnykivskyi Raion (notably outside of the Oleksandrivka direction) that were recently contested – Novopidhorodne, Novopavlivka, and Ivanivka – remains unclear.

Ukrainian forces conducted mutually supporting drives in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late 2025 and early 2026, respectively, to push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and to undermine Russian preparations for a spring offensive. Ukrainian forces first set conditions for a flank attack north of Hulyaipole in late 2025 and later launched counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction starting in late January 2026. Ukrainian 1st Separate Assault Regiment Commander Captain Dmytro Filatov stated that the regiment’s elements redeployed to an area between Dobropillya and Nove Zaporizhzhia (both north of Hulyaipole and on the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border) in late 2025 to conduct a flank attack and push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Filatov stated that Ukrainian offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast do not mark the start of a new “counteroffensive,” as these counterattacks aim to stabilize the frontline and improve Ukraine’s positions amidst Russian troop redeployments to the area. Filatov stated that Russian forces considered conducting offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction as part of their “pre-spring” offensive campaign, implying that Russian forces may have sought to use attacks in the Oleksandrivka direction to set conditions for offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Lyman direction in the spring. Ukraine’s Airborne Assault Forces reported on March 2 that its elements launched an “offensive operation” in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 29, and Komarenko stated that Ukrainian counterattacks in the area are part of a planned operation.[14]

Ukrainian forces were likely able to rapidly advance in the Oleksandrivka direction after infiltrating dispersed Russian positions in poor weather conditions and suppressing Russian drone-based defenses. The commander of a Ukrainian airborne assault battalion, which deployed to the Oleksandrivka direction in late January 2026, reported that Ukrainian forces infiltrated into Russian positions under the cover of snow and fog during the winter.[15] Snowy and foggy weather conditions likely hindered Russian drone operations, such as aerial reconnaissance and strikes, due to poor visibility. The commander noted that the battalion’s infantry elements suppressed Russian reconnaissance capabilities and drone operators, encircled 60 Russian servicemen, and captured three prisoners of war (POWs) after successfully infiltrating behind Russian lines. Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Commander Major General Oleh Apostol, who reportedly commands the Ukrainian counterattacks in Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, stated that the Ukrainian General Staff selected a frontline sector where Russian forces did not have significant manpower concentrations, which likely enabled Ukrainian infiltrations.[16] Apostol stated that Ukrainian forces have also eliminated two Russian battalion commanders during the counterattacks. Russian milbloggers similarly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces were able to infiltrate Russian positions in small groups and conduct mechanized assaults into Novohryhorivka due to the dispersed and non-linear character of the frontline.[17] ISW assessed in December 2025 that Russia did not have sufficient manpower and equipment to defend and develop simultaneous advances along the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions and would need to either reduce the area of responsibility or commit additional resources to these directions.[18] Ukrainian forces – both infantry and mechanized elements – appear to have exploited gaps in Russian defenses, exacerbated by decreased Russian drone activity amid poor weather conditions.

SpaceX’s blocking of Russia’s Starlink satellite connection in Ukraine in early February 2026 likely also enabled Ukrainian advances in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces reported that SpaceX’s blocking of Starlink satellite connection on February 1 further degraded Russian situational awareness and complicated Russian command and control (C2) in the Oleksandrivka direction.[19] Ukrainian forces may have also replicated their improved tactics for hunting Russian drone operators from other frontline directions in the Oleksandrivka direction. The planning group head of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces turned to less effective technological solutions following the blocking of Starlink, which allowed Ukrainian forces to more effectively destroy Russian communication systems and hunt down Russian drone operators and drone launch sites.[20] The planning group head reported that Russian forces now have to rely on large antennas to maintain connectivity and fly drones, which expose Russian positions from afar and are more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. The planning group head reported that Ukrainian strikes against these antennas are disrupting Russia’s information transmission system and reconnaissance capabilities, consequently undermining Russian combat operations. The planning group head added that Ukrainian strikes against Russian drone operators before the Starlink block had already reduced drone support for Russian assault groups and affected Russian forces’ ability to track Ukrainian drone operators. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction similarly reported that Russian forces are placing antennas and communications repeaters on the roofs of high-rise buildings in central Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to compensate for their loss of Starlink, indicating that these Russian vulnerabilities likely exist across the frontline.[21]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian battlefield advances despite Ukrainian forces’ recent liberation of significant territory in southern Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Putin told US President Donald Trump in a March 9 call that Russian forces are “successfully advancing” and that Ukraine should therefore “finally” move toward a negotiated settlement to end the war, likely claiming that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands.[22] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed in a meeting with Putin on March 10 that Ukrainian forces controlled 25 percent of Donetsk Oblast six months ago (in September 2025) but now control 17 percent – claiming that Russian forces have seized eight percent of the oblast in six months.[23] Putin claimed, however, that his subordinates have given figures of between 15 and 17 percent, additionally claiming that Russian forces may have seized 10 percent of Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces control roughly 19 percent of Donetsk Oblast, however, compared with about 23.4 percent in September 2025. The Kremlin is overstating Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast since September by a factor of two or more.

Putin further claimed that Russian forces are bypassing Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) “from all sides.”[24] ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have advanced north and west of Hryshyne, however. Putin’s mention of Hryshyne, a settlement with a pre-war population of roughly 2,000 people, highlights his focus on minor tactical details about small settlements that aim to create the impression of broad Russian advances to audiences that have no idea where these settlements are or how significant they might be.[25] Ukraine’s recent liberation of at least 275 square kilometers of territory in southern Ukraine clearly contradicts Putin’s ongoing claims that Russian forces are successfully advancing along the entire front and that Ukrainian defenses are on the verge of collapse.[26] Ukrainian gains, in fact, exceeded Russian gains in February 2026.[27] A Russian insider source noted on March 10 that Putin has not visited any frontline command posts in 2026, whereas he did so regularly in 2025.[28] The source claimed that Putin’s failure to visit his troops is due in part to a lack of Russian successes on the front, suggesting that the Kremlin is aware of Russia’s slowing advances and is knowingly lying about supposed Russian military successes.

Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine are likely interfering with the anticipated Russian spring-summer 2026 offensives in Donetsk Oblast and southern Ukraine despite Putin’s claims of Russian battlefield successes. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction stated on March 10 that the Russian military command was transferring forces to the area as part of its “pre-spring campaign.”[29] The commander assessed that Russian forces will begin their spring campaign first in the Pokrovsk direction, then in the Lyman direction, likely to try to advance to the Donetsk Oblast border and to attack the Fortress Belt from the north. Komarenko assessed that Russian forces will prioritize the Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and Zaporizhia directions in spring 2026 to fulfill their tasks of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and to advance as far as possible in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[30] The Ukrainian liberation of all but five small settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is obviously a setback to this plan.

ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions are having cascading effects on other sectors of the front that are likely disrupting the Russian military command’s spring and summer plans.[31] Ukrainian counterattacks are likely affecting Russian plans to use relatively elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces in the spring-summer offensives in eastern and southern Ukraine. A Ukrainian journalist who visited a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on March 10 that Russian VDV and naval infantry elements have appeared in the area, likely in preparation for intensified assaults in southern Ukraine.[32] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division from the Pokrovsk direction to the Zaporizhia direction in January and February 2026, likely in preparation for intensified Russian attacks in the area.[33] ISW also recently observed reports that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 55th Naval Infantry Division (both of the Pacific Fleet) redeployed from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Hulyaipole direction as of late February 2026, likely in response to the successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[34] ISW has yet to observe other reports of naval infantry forces operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the timing of this reported redeployment is unclear at this time. The Russian military command has committed naval infantry units to respond to Ukrainian successes in the past, however, and may have also redeployed naval infantry elements to western Zaporizhia Oblast to respond to recent Ukrainian counterattacks that have largely halted Russian advances in that area.[35] Komarenko noted on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have stopped Russian advances near Plavni and Prymorske (both west of Orikhiv) and are counterattacking.[36] Komarenko added that the number of Russian attacks near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has somewhat decreased as Russian forces focus on the Oleksandrivka direction.[37] The diversion of Russian forces and means away from the Pokrovsk direction to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks and try to regain lost territory in southern Ukraine is likely hindering Russian forces’ ability to reach the intended starting positions to launch the spring-summer 2026 campaign in both southern and eastern Ukraine.

Russia also continues to suffer massive losses on the battlefield that will continue to hinder Russia’s ability to achieve its sweeping goals for the spring-summer 2026 campaign. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 10 that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) obtained Russian documents assessing Russia’s own battlefield losses.[38] The document reportedly states that Russian forces have suffered 1.315 million killed in action (KIA) and seriously wounded in action (WIA) in the full-scale invasion. ISW recently assessed that the Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine are highlighting the constraints on Russia’s options to redeploy forces to reinforce unstable sectors.[39] Continued heavy losses on the battlefield, particularly if Russia continues to struggle to recruit enough new volunteers to replace its losses, will hinder Russia’s ability to respond to Ukrainian advances, let alone to launch large-scale summer offensives to try to meet the Kremlin’s unrealistic goals.

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their theater-wide mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower, which will likely also interfere with the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive. Russian milbloggers observed in March 2026 that Ukrainian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drones across all frontline sectors, including by leveraging drones that are harder to suppress or jam, such as high-frequency, fiber-optic, and mothership drones.[40] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are switching to flying drones on new frequencies to bypass Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and expand the “kill zone” by tens of kilometers.[41] The kill zone refers to an isolated frontline area of elevated drone strike risk, and Ukrainian officials reported on March 10 that the current kill zone in Ukraine is 20 to 25 kilometers and that the infiltration zone is 10 kilometers.[42] Some Russian milbloggers cautioned that Ukrainian forces increased the number of drone operators in the Kostyantynivka direction, are conducting precise strikes against vehicles traveling along highways northeast of occupied Donetsk City (approximately 55 kilometers behind the frontline), and are complicating Russian logistics.[43] Geolocated footage published in March 2026 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks and vehicles traveling along highways north and northeast of Donetsk City.[44] Ukrainian forces are reportedly conducting similar precise strikes in southern Ukraine. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian freight train in occupied Crimea.[45]

Ukraine’s increased drone operations may also be degrading Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, which enabled some Russian tactical advances in mid to late 2025.[46] BAI refers to the use of air power to strike targets in the operational or near rear of the frontline (within 100-120 kilometers) to impact battlefield operations in the near term. Ukrainian Commander in Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 9 that Russian FPV drone use decreased by 18 percent in February 2026, possibly as a result of Ukrainian strikes against Russian drone storage facilities.[47] A Russian milblogger implied that elements of the Russian BAI campaign, such as strikes against Ukrainian drone operator positions and warehouses, are no longer generating the desired effects, judging by the abundance of Ukrainian drones in the air.[48]

Kremlin officials provided varying accounts of US President Donald Trump’s statements about a ceasefire in Ukraine during his March 9 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Trump reiterated his interest in a speedy end to Russia’s war in Ukraine through a ceasefire that achieves long-term peace.[49] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov subsequently responded to a question asking if Trump had set conditions for a ceasefire to move forward with negotiations, stating that Trump did not set such conditions.[50] The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected any proposals for a ceasefire in Ukraine that do not concede to the Kremlin’s demands.[51]

Putin continued to call on the United States to halt its ongoing military operation in the Middle East while refusing to end Russia’s own war in Ukraine. Ushakov claimed on March 9 that Putin used his call with Trump to propose many measures aimed at achieving a speedy political and diplomatic settlement to the US-Israeli campaign in the Middle East.[52] Putin highlighted his contacts with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in particular. Trump stated on March 9 that Putin wanted to be helpful with the situation surrounding Iran but that it would be ”more helpful” for Putin to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[53] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth responded to the Putin-Trump call and stated that Russia ”should not be involved” in the military operation in the Middle East.[54] Putin continues to insist that the United States halt its campaign, despite simultaneously refusing to allow the ceasefire necessary to end the war in Ukraine that Putin himself started.[55]

The Russian government is reportedly considering a bill that would grant the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad. The Russian Government Commission submitted a bill to the State Duma on March 10 that would allow the Russian president to use Russian military forces to protect Russian citizens abroad in the event of their arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, or other legal proceedings in foreign courts.[56] The bill’s explanatory note reportedly states that the measure is intended to protect the rights of Russian citizens in foreign courts without Russia’s participation or in international courts that are not based on international treaties with Russia or a United Nations Security Council resolution. This legislation, if passed, may set informational and legal conditions for Russia to justify future military activity abroad under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Baltic states are persecuting Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, for example.[57]